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Online Political Participation in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election: Mobilizing or Reinforcing?

Kenneth M. Winneg
University of Pennsylvania, kwinneg@asc.upenn.edu

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Abstract
Participation is at the core of democratic society. However, studies have shown that participation is biased toward those who are better educated, more affluent, and in greater possession of civic skills. Scholars have pointed to the Internet as a possible remedy for the disparity in participation for its potential to lower barriers and increase access to those who lack the time, money, and/or necessary civic skills. Research has been mixed about whether the Internet mobilizes new or marginalized participants to the electoral process, simply reinforces those who are active in that process already, or does both. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, all major presidential candidates utilized the Internet and email as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting, communicating and raising money. New media, especially the Internet and other Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), played a significant role in extending and perhaps even supplanting more traditional methods of political participation. Because of the greater role played by the Internet and ICTs in 2008, the ability to test the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses was much greater than in previous elections. My research adds to the general debate by 1) testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories related to the impact of the Internet on political participation; 2) refining these theories by testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently in online versus offline participation; and 3) exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are contingent on activities of individual campaigns. The 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey is the data source for this research.

This dissertation provides evidence to support each of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses I proposed. However, the mobilized groups varied across the campaign by activity. No single group either advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, was mobilized consistently throughout the primaries and general election campaigns. While this study offers evidence of mobilization and reinforcement in a number of instances and among a number of demographic groups, it raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with the available data. Nevertheless, the results do illustrate that Internet usage in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities. Further, online campaign contact is a strong predictor for most participation activities.

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Kathleen Hall Jamieson

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Kenneth M. Winneg

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Dr. Michael X. Delli Carpini
Supervisor of Dissertation

_____

Dr. Katherine Sender
Graduate Group Chairperson

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Michael X. Delli Carpini
Dr. Kathleen Hall Jamieson
Dr. Vincent Price
Dr. Richard Johnston

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ABSTRACT

ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 2008 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: MOBILIZING OR REINFORCING?

Kenneth M. Winneg

Michael X. Delli Carpini

Dissertation Supervisor

Participation is at the core of democratic society. However, studies have shown that participation is biased toward those who are better educated, more affluent, and in greater possession of civic skills. Scholars have pointed to the Internet as a possible remedy for the disparity in participation for its potential to lower barriers and increase access to those who lack the time, money, and/or necessary civic skills. Research has been mixed about whether the Internet mobilizes new or marginalized participants to the electoral process, simply reinforces those who are active in that process already, or does both. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, all major presidential candidates utilized the Internet and email as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting, communicating and raising money. New media, especially the Internet and other Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), played a significant role in extending and perhaps even supplanting more traditional methods of political participation. Because of the greater role played by the Internet and ICTs in 2008, the ability to test the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses was much greater than in previous elections. My research adds to the general debate by 1) testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories related to the impact of the Internet on political participation; 2) refining these theories by

testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently in online versus offline participation; and 3) exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are contingent on activities of individual campaigns. The 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey is the data source for this research.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF PROBLEM

In their seminal work, *Participation in America,* Verba and Nie (1972) write:

> If democracy is interpreted as rule by the people, then the question of who participates in political decisions becomes the question of the nature of democracy in society. Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is (p. 1).

Although most scholars grant that participation is at the core of a democratic society, Verba and Nie's (1972) research and studies by others (Campbell et al., 1960. Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995, Conway, 2000) show that some segments of society are more likely to participate, specifically the better educated and affluent, and those in greater possession of civic skills. While this would have satisfied the founding fathers, it does not satisfy democratic theory. Thus, the decisions Verba and Nie write about are influenced most strongly by a relatively limited and advantaged segment of society.

The type of participation I focus on in this dissertation relates directly to engaging in electoral process activities leading up to, but not including voting, the ultimate act of political participation. The activities leading up to voting, including persuading, discussing, campaign volunteering, contributing are as important in bringing the more disadvantaged and newer participants into the democratic process.

With the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s, its potential role for opening up the process of political participation to a wider and more diverse range of citizens has drawn much speculation:

> The Internet could have a significant impact on broadening political participation by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of organizing groups and opening up new channels of information that bypass traditional media gatekeepers. (Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006, p. 299)

Contrary to these optimistic predictions,[1] others argue that the Internet is unlikely to bring in those who have not traditionally participated. For example, Margolis and Resnick (2000) argue that cyberspace is not the utopian democratic meeting ground some have envisioned:

> It will not empower the powerless because those who are powerful outside of cyberspace are taking those advantages with them in the Internet. Direct democracy will not happen nor is it desired. Representative democracy is more realistic. Most people neither have the time, inclination, nor aptitude to be aware of the myriad of policy issues. Public policy issues are too complicated and citizens too distracted to devote the time and effort to public affairs that such a society would require. (p. 205)

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[1] In the grand scheme of communication, the Internet has been characterized by some as having the potential to bring people together to form communities of either common interests or diverse backgrounds and viewpoints (Rheingold, 1995). Were the Internet to do so, it might expand the public sphere as envisioned by Habermas (1989). This utopian view is very deterministic, assuming that the Internet technology is an unassailable democratic force (Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Coleman, 2006). However, some like Putnam (2000) say the Internet will decrease the public sphere and decrease rather than increase participation.

Taking a related view, Bimber and Davis (2003) argue that while the Internet is indispensible for campaigns and the electoral process, its campaign messages are aimed primarily at niche audiences which actively seeks the online tools relevant to their political interests. As more people become connected to the Internet, the effects will become even smaller as the Internet audience would change from one that is more purposive and interested to one that is more like a mass audience. Unlike television viewers, the Internet users are not a captive audience and cannot do as television and newspapers do and "saturate a large audience with messages that interrupt citizens' focus and direct it toward the campaign and, more specifically, a candidate's message" (Bimber and Davis, 2003, p. 147). Rather, the interactive nature of the medium allows them to become both direct and indirect participants in the political process.

Simplifying somewhat, the likely impact of the Internet on the amount and diversity of political participation has created two camps: Mobilization theorists and Reinforcement theorists. Mobilization theorists believe the Internet will enfranchise those who have been traditionally marginalized by bringing them into the political process and thereby enhancing democracy. In Weare's (2002) summary of mobilization and reinforcement, he asserts that such theorists predict that the "the open, decentralized and interactive nature of Internet communications will enfranchise marginalized sectors of the electorate by making political information more easily accessible and more germane to their concerns and improve the openness of government by equalizing access to information" (Weare, 2002, p. 679). Lower communications and networking costs will make it easier for citizens to enter the political process and perform such activities as

learning candidate stands on issues, contacting elective officials, or organizing networks with others on local issues (Norris, 2001; DiGennaro and Dutton, 2006).

According to summaries by Weare (2002) and Norris (2001), reinforcement theory argues that while the Internet may expand and decentralize communication patterns, making information accessible to more people, it will continue to primarily benefit those who are already participants, namely "elites" who have greater access to the technology and who are already highly politically interested (e.g., Bimber and Davis, 2003). The technology offers just another resource for the most motivated, active, and informed members of society (Norris, 2001), at best allowing existing biases in who participates to remain, and at worst exacerbating these disparities.[2]

Results from the relatively limited but growing number of empirical studies testing the mobilizing versus reinforcing effects of the Internet have been mixed and inconclusive. Some studies have shown evidence of mobilization (e.g., see Weaver, Loumakis and Bergman, 2003, Tolbert and McNeal, 2003, Shah et al., 2001, Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward, 2005; Best and Krueger, 2005; Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008). Others tend to support the reinforcement hypothesis. (e.g., see Bimber, 1999; Kaye, 1998; Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Bimber, 2001; Norris, 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2000; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Johnson and Kaye, 2004; Polat, 2005; Xenos and Moy, 2007; Shah et al. 2007). Most recently, a meta-analysis (Boulianne, 2009) has also shown equivocal results.

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[2]There is also a body of literature which argues that both reinforcement and mobilization can occur (see Norris, 2001). Some prior research sets up a false dichotomy between mobilization and reinforcement, when both could occur simultaneously by mobilizing some groups and reinforcing others.

One limitation of most of the earlier studies is their exclusive focus on traditional forms of campaign participation as measured by Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba et al. (1995). These activities include attending political campaign rallies, contributing money to a campaign, and/or working for a campaign, with no attention to whether these and other activities are done "offline" or "online." Ignoring or failing to distinguish "online participation" may hamper our ability to uncover the mobilizing and/or reinforcing effects of Internet use (Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward, 2005).

In one of the more recent studies to address this issue, Gibson et al. (2005) describe a more contextualized model of online participation as one that "takes into account a wider range of online participatory behaviors and incorporates the various new forms of stimuli present in the new media that can kick-start those behaviors." (p. 10) Examples of online participation include, discussing politics online in a chat group or via email, forward campaign emails or video to others, viewing campaign ads and other video on sites like YouTube, visiting a campaign website to learn about the issues, and volunteer or donate online. Using these measures, they found some evidence of mobilization among those previously disengaged in the 2002 British elections. Since the publication of their work, others have measured participation using online and offline variables, but again with mixed results (e.g., Best and Krueger, 2005; Shah et al. 2007; Xenos and Moy, 2007).

Two additional shortcomings of the extant research are the under-theorizing of the role played by campaign organizations themselves, and the rapidly changing and growing use of the Internet by both citizens and campaign organizations. First, as work by

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and others (Kramer, 1970; Cain and McCue, 1985; Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993 as cited in Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeil, 2008) make clear, contact by political campaign organizations is an important predictor of actual campaign participation.

Second, access and use of the Internet by citizens has increased dramatically in recent years. So too has the frequency and innovativeness of Internet use by candidates for office, since even the 2004 presidential election cycle. For example, during the 2008 presidential election campaign the mainstream media often pointed to the Internet's role in the campaign, particularly as a fundraising tool, especially among small donors, as a tool for mobilizing and recruiting supporters, and as a means of communicating campaign messages (e.g., see USA Today, May 2, 2008; New York Times, July 17, 2008 and March 22, 2008, and the Washington Post, January 1, 2008). The Internet was integral to the campaigns of all the major presidential candidates in 2008. During the primaries and caucuses, some attributed Sen. Barack Obama's success over Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton and the other Democratic candidates to his campaign's greater effectiveness with using the technology to contact and activate new and younger voters to build a strong and successful base of support.

In short, findings examining earlier elections may not be a good indication of the current or future impact of the Internet. Based on, but not a replication of, Gibson et al.'s (2005) contextual model of political participation, Verba et al.'s (1995) Civic Voluntarism Model of political participation, and Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) work on campaign contact and mobilization, and drawing on data from the 2008 presidential

campaign, my dissertation is intended to add to our understanding of the mobilizing and/or reinforcing effects of the Internet by specifically addressing the following questions: 1) Overall did Internet use by candidates and voters in the 2008 presidential election lead to the political mobilization of previously under-represented citizens or the reinforcement of existing biases? 2) Did mobilization or reinforcement occur differently for different kinds of participation (e.g., campaign giving, volunteering, voting) and/or for different modes of participation (i.e., "offline" vs. "online" activities)? 3) Did mobilization or reinforcement vary by different demographic groups (e.g., young adults, women, minorities)? And 4) is mobilization or reinforcement contingent on the extent and ways in which candidates used the Internet and other Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in their campaigns?

The data source for my dissertation is the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) rolling cross-sectional national probability telephone survey and the NAES post-election telephone panel survey. NAES was in the field continuously from mid-December, 2007 until Election Day. On November 5, 2008 the day following the general election, NAES conducted a post-election telephone panel study. In this dissertation, I analyzed data the NAES collected during four distinct periods: February 1 through March 10, 2008—a period when 39 primaries and caucuses took place; July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008, the post-primary period, where I retrospectively measured respondents primary season participation activities; August 8 through October 2, 2008, the first two months of the general election period; and November 5 through November 12, 2008, a retrospective panel of individuals interviewed from August 8 through

November 3, 2008. In each of these periods I was able to place questions specifically designed to help answer the four research questions listed above on the surveys, after consultation with and approval by the senior directors of the survey.

1-1: Overview of Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in the following way. In the remainder of this chapter I describe two major models of political participation developed before the Internet became a widely used medium. I then relate these models to the Internet, detailing how attributes and processes of the Internet act as parts of these models. .

Chapter 2 contains both a review of the empirical research related to the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses and a discussion placing the dissertation in the context of the very unique 2008 presidential election. This chapter shows that the studies in these areas, taken in their totality, provide mixed conclusions about whether the Internet leads to mobilization, reinforcement, or both. These studies offer a rationale for my study as a way to contribute to clarifying the debate. The discussion of the Internet and participation within the context of the 2008 election revolves around the uniqueness of that election and presents descriptive data from the NAES on Internet usage, political interest, and comparative measures of participation throughout the 2008 campaign and to the 2004 presidential election.

Chapter 3 is the methods chapter. I present my hypotheses and research questions. In addition, this chapter contains the details about the methodology and the data used to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. This chapter includes

the sample frame, data collection methodology, survey question design, and the analytical techniques.

I present the findings of my research in chapters 4 through 8. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the data from the primaries related to mobilization and reinforcement (Cases 1 and 2), while chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on the general election data (Cases 3 and 4). In Chapter 8, I present the findings from the test of the activation hypothesis—Hypothesis 3—which examines the role of communication of the campaigns themselves on mobilization and reinforcement. Finally, this dissertation concludes with a discussion of the implications of my study for the political process and, more broadly, for the field of political communication. Finally, I will conclude with what I believed this research has contributed to the field and what should be the next steps.

In this dissertation, I provide evidence to support each of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses I have proposed. However, and this is an important point, the groups that were mobilized varied by case and activity. No single group either advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, was mobilized consistently throughout the primaries and general election campaigns. One can argue that a stronger case for the Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a pattern of mobilized groups emerged across the four cases. This lack of consistency could be due to the methodology, question wording, or time of interview. The data reveal that while much had been made of the increased amount of participation among some segments of the population, relative to the 2004 campaign, participation levels, excluding voting, remained about where they were for all adults and within most demographic segments, except for African

Americans, where there was an increase compared to 2004. It is unclear what factors may have contributed to the limited amount of mobilization, but the data are suggestive that low levels of participation across the population combined with a continued digital divide may be the major contributors. Without a further narrowing between those who have and those who do not have access to the Internet, we may not see wholesale movements toward mobilization. Therefore, while this study offers evidence of mobilization and reinforcement in a number of instances and among a number of demographic groups, it raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with the available data. Nevertheless, the results do illustrate that Internet use in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities. In short, there is ample evidence that the advantaged are most likely to benefit from what the Internet has to offer, however, there is evidence that heretofore disadvantaged groups like African Americans and the young were mobilized by the Internet to participate, but the mobilization was relatively low. More optimistically, this research found evidence that online campaign contact was more likely than offline campaign contact to lead to political participation. Therefore, online targeting by campaigns may be an effective way to encourage participation.

Before moving to a more specific review of the literature related to mobilization and reinforcement, it is necessary to present the foundation of traditional political participation, weaving in how the Internet relates to and connects with the traditional methods. To make the relationship and connections clearer, I discuss specific methods of participation found online.

1-2: Traditional Models of Political Participation

Emerging from rational choice theory (Downs, 1957), noteworthy studies (Verba et al., 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) are built upon the assumption that citizens participate when they see potential benefits outweighing the costs. In turn, political elites mobilize citizens to participate by providing them with benefits and reducing the costs, with the expectation of their support in return. While voting is the most common form of such support, political participation and more broadly, civic participation can involve multiple activities. Traditional forms of political participation include working or volunteering on electoral campaigns or for political or civic organizations, contributing money to those entities, contacting government officials, attending protests, marches, or demonstrations, placing a candidate's sign on a lawn, and wearing a button in support of a candidate.

Prior research consistently finds inequities in who participates and, therefore, who benefits from such activities. These disparities are drawn across demographic and attitudinal lines and result from a lack of resources, insufficient psychological engagement or political interest, and being outside the recruitment network (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al.,1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Those more likely to participate are generally better educated, more affluent, possess more developed civic skills, have a greater interest in politics, and generally have increased levels of engagement. As a result, they are more advantaged and more successful in ultimately pushing for policy change.

In their landmark work, Verba et al. (1995) describe a participation model focusing on three things: resources, engagement, and recruitment. Their Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) attempts to explain and predict political participation. Verba et al. categorize participation into four types of acts: time-based acts, political contributions, voting, and political discussion. The elements which have the greatest impact on fostering time-based acts include education and free time. Income is the best predictor for making political contributions. Political interest, knowledge/education, and partisanship are the best predictors for voting, and political interest is the strongest predictor for political discussion (see also Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995).

Citizens need more than just these resources to participate. There must also be external mechanisms at work, such as recruitment. Institutionally-based political recruitment is also a significant predictor of political participation when placed in the CVM. When those who are members of organizations are asked to participate by other members of their organizations they are likely to do so. The types of activities developed in religious and voluntary non-political civic organizations provide a wealth of benefits to the citizenry—civic skills, social networking opportunities, and is a fertile ground for recruitment. Members of these networks are more likely to know each other.

In Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) theory of political activation, recruitment plays a central role. Candidates, political parties, the media and other contributors (groups and activists) induce citizens to participate. Rosenstone and Hansen point to two types of activation: direct and indirect. Direct activation takes place in the form of meetings, door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for money by the candidate

directly. These are the methods which the Obama campaign asserted was the key to their primary and general electoral victories (Jamieson, 2009). Indirect activation can occur through family, friends, co-workers, and social networks making people responsive to activation from these sources. Social networks help get the word out, therefore multiplying the effects of activation. The strategy of political motivation consists of targeting and timing of the activation.

The conclusions reached by the authors in these works on recruitment indicate participation does not occur in a vacuum. There needs to be a mechanism to motivate citizens to become engaged and a method by which they can participate. These works have shown that participation has been biased towards those equipped with the most resources and motivations to participate. Those most potentially in need of policy change are either unwilling or unable to press for it because of the barriers to traditional participation. These works also suggest recruitment tend to focus on those who are most likely participate, thus reinforcing the current cycle of political participation.

As noted above, the development of the Internet and its growing use by citizens and political elites raises both the possibility that this "vicious cycle" could be turned into a "virtuous" one (Norris, 2000) by bringing formerly marginalized citizens into the process, or that it simply provides new means for those already engaged to maintain or increase their participatory advantages. Determining which of these viewpoints (or more accurately what combination of them) is the more accurate depends in part on conceptualizing how the Internet fits into or revises the traditional models developed by Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). The foundations of their work are based

on the importance of having the resources of time, money, and civic skills, a certain level of political engagement, and the susceptibility for recruitment. I argue in the next section that while these models can be applied to Internet-based politics, the conclusions one draws about this new technology's likely effect on the amount and distribution of citizens' political participation are potentially quite different than those drawn in the pre-Internet era.

1-3: Relating Online Participation to the Established Models

1-2.1: Online participation activities and resources and engagement

Many forms of traditional participation can be performed online in a more efficient manner because of the technology. Further, the convenience of performing these acts online is high but the costs are low. According to a study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, people cite convenience as the top reason for going online (Rainie et al., 2005). There are many election-related online participation activities that parallel traditional participation models. Persuading, recruiting, volunteering, and contributing can be performed both online and offline. However, the Internet also creates new forms of participation such as viewing or posting political videos on YouTube or other peer-to-peer (P2P) sites, or passing along emails or videos to others. While each of these activities requires a certain level of resources such as time, civic skills, or money, or levels engagement such as political interest, political efficacy, or need for political information, these requirements may be lower than for offline participation.

For instance, visiting a campaign/party/political website may be, by itself, a form of information-seeking. However, if one visits the site in order to sign-up to volunteer or

to contribute money, then it becomes an active form of participation. This action is an extension of traditional activities of volunteering to work for a campaign and contributing money. Necessary for this activity is time and the best engagement predictor is political interest.

Another activity, signing up for a campaign e-mail/bulletin provides an advantage to both the citizen and the campaign. The citizen signs up and becomes informed about the campaign/candidate, possibly leading to further action. The campaign builds up a database which can be used for future mobilization, i.e., fundraising efforts aimed at a maximum number of potential donors in a fairly quick amount of time. This method extends traditional methods because of the ability to build up a large database and maximize fundraising efforts efficiently. This is akin to contacting a campaign and requesting information about the candidate's stance.

Sending an email to, or receiving an email from, a politician, campaign, candidate or organization is a potentially effective means of pushing a policy issue. Officials place differing weights on what they perceive to be mass-mailings from organizations rather than an individual note or email (Bimber, 2000; Williams and Trammell, 2005). This activity requires time, civic skills, political interest and a level of political efficacy.

Discussing politics online in a chat group or joining an email discussion group is an extension of the traditional activity of discussing politics with friends and family at home, school, work, or the local watering hole. This activity has changed dramatically online as the social network extends beyond real friends and family to online "friends" who may never meet face-to-face, but engage in political discussion and, more

importantly, persuasion. This activity requires the resources of time and civic skills, along with a level of political interest and need for political information.

Viewing online political advertising and videos on sites like YouTube is an active form of political participation since once you enter a candidate's web site, you must actively click to view the video. The campaign's desired outcome is for the citizen to take action. The ability to view the videos/ad on demand is unique to the technology. Ad viewing, traditionally has been a passive activity. In the 2008, campaign, YouTube played a major role. For example, Senator Hillary Clinton's boasts of her foreign policy experience including references to arriving "under sniper fire" in Bosnia were debunked initially by CBS News, but subsequent video on YouTube was viewed nearly two million times in a week. Senator Barack Obama's erstwhile pastor/advisor, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright's sermons have also had a multitude of views on YouTube. The ability to upload video quickly on file sharing sites like YouTube can bypass mainstream media and have an impact on a campaign. While viewing this video is not active political participation, passing it on to a friend may be considered a form of persuasion.

Donating money online to a campaign or political organization is an extension of one of the most critical elements of any successful campaign—raising money and making contributions. Using the Internet for this effort has shown in prior presidential campaigns to be highly effective. The campaigns of the 2008 presidential candidates raised millions of dollars from via the Internet, allowing smaller contributions by more donors. High-end donors are continued to be reached by traditional fund-raising efforts. Online solicitation for campaign contributions reaches millions of small donors. Rather than

making separate efforts to send out fund-raising letters or telephone calls, the Internet can link contributors to donation pages via multiple pathways—email, blog, and campaign web site.

Volunteering online to help with a political campaign/cause is an extension of traditional volunteering activities. One can now sign up online to work for a campaign or campaigns can recruit potential volunteers via the Internet, using email databases. Campaigns can use these databases to mobilize people to travel to different areas of need, be it within the area or out of state (as the Kerry campaign did in Ohio in 2004). This method of mobilizing can be more efficient than traditional methods.

Posting to a political blog is akin to engaging in political discussion in a chat room/forum. Web blogs became most prominent in 2004 and continue to play a role today. Blogs claimed credit for Ned Lamont's Democratic primary win in the 2006 Connecticut Senate race, but were unsuccessful during the general election campaign. Nevertheless, blogs can help mobilize people to action as seen in 2004 when a number of liberal blogs helped stop a conservative owned television group (Sinclair) from airing what Democrats considered biased propaganda against John Kerry's Vietnam war record (Benkler, 2006).

1-2.2: Online participation and recruitment

In the prior section, I described how online participation activities can parallel traditional offline activities and how some activities extend the definition of participation because of the uniqueness of the technology. In this section, I discuss how campaigns and civic organizations can use the Internet to recruit and mobilize citizens to participate. In

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995), recruitment takes place both directly and indirectly. Therefore, the traditional direct forms of mobilization including in-person meetings, door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for money by the candidate directly, can now be performed, perhaps more effectively and efficiently through the Internet. Campaigns can utilize the Internet to reach a maximum number of potential voters, supporters, or contributors via email recruiting using databases, links from their own web sites, links from other web sites and blogs. Through these sites, and through the sophisticated methods of microtargeting, campaigns can focus on those most susceptible to recruiting, the "low hanging fruit." (If campaigns or advocates for a particular policy wish to mobilize fundraising to buy media or engage in a mass emailing campaign they can do so without much more effort than creating a message on their server and sending it out to those on their email list with the added request to pass it on to others.) In this way, online recruitment accomplishes two things. First, it gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with hope of spurring them into action. Second, it helps expand this message to those who may be interested but up until the point of contact were unsure how to act. The financial cost to the campaign is significantly lower than engaging in a more traditional mailing campaign. This method was foreseen by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. in their discussion of effective recruiting among ones social network. In these times of the Internet, social networks have expanded. This ease of mobilization at a significantly reduced cost can help more grass roots organizations make their voice be heard and push their policy.

The traditional resources found in Verba et al.'s (1995) CVM and Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) work should facilitate online participation (Krueger, 2002). While commitments of time and money limit participation in traditional non-voting forms of political participation, the Internet could work to neutralize these barriers due to the medium's ease of access and convenience of use. However, constraints to effective online political participation to which I alluded earlier include the digital divide where those who are more likely to become politically engaged—those with greater educational and income levels—are more likely to participate online.

Scholars have debated the role and the benefits of the Internet in encouraging participation, deliberation, and community with some empirical studies supporting the arguments. However, the argument over whether the Internet is a mobilizing or reinforcing mechanism has yet to be settled. The next section of this proposal reviews the extant literature centering on the debate about the Internet as either a mobilizing or reinforcing mechanism. As Internet technology became more diffuse, scholars began investigating its impact on the political participation process.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW—ONLINE PARTICIPATION: REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION

There have been a limited number of empirical studies to prove either the reinforcement or mobilization theories. In the few studies undertaken and published thus far no consensus emerges among the scholars as to the impact of the Internet on political participation. A recent meta-analysis conducted by Boulianne (2009) bears this out. In her fairly comprehensive review, Boulianne provides evidence that the Internet neither negatively affects political engagement, nor significantly increases it. Her analysis of the studies finds, perhaps logically, that the effect of the Internet is greater for the most recent studies. As is the problem with any meta-analysis and most literature reviews, for that matter, the studies she examines generally lack a consistent single unit of measurement, making comparability of the studies difficult. She does create a common measure by essentially averaging the coefficients of the regression models the studies produce. She concludes that the Internet does not contribute to civic decline, and perhaps may positively impact engagement, but the effect sizes are generally small and therefore puts into question how significant a contributor the Internet is to increasing civic engagement. Boulianne also suggests from the meta-analysis that measuring Internet by including online news in the operationalization the likelihood for political engagement increases. In my dissertation, I do not include Internet media use in the operationalization, but rather as a control variable. Within that framework, the following sections review the major studies published to this point most relevant to addressing my hypotheses on reinforcement and mobilization.

2-1: The Case for Reinforcement: A Review of the Literature

The studies I review in this section echo the argument that online technology applied to the political process advantages those with the most resources and highest level of engagement. Yet, in many cases, the studies suffer from limited samples and poor designs. Another issue is that among the many studies conducted, there is no single unit of measurement for Internet use and therefore comparability is difficult. Further, some argue that Internet skills and level of civic skills go hand-in-hand (Bimber, 1999; Best and Krueger, 2005; di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006) but do not necessarily lead to mobilization (Johnson and Kaye, 2002). I detail these and other studies below.

Bimber (1999) found evidence of reinforcement in his study of citizens' engagement with government services. Those more likely to contact government agencies either offline (phone or letter) or online (email) in this study conducted in 1996 and 1997 were those who fit the reinforcement profile—better educated, older, male, and more politically connected. However, there were small effects suggesting mobilization in one of Bimber's models which showed that younger people were more likely than older people to use email to contact government officials. However, when looking at those who have contacted government officials at least one time, the age effect reversed itself. That is, once older citizens tried contacting by email, they are more likely than younger people to do so frequently. Bimber used both an RDD telephone survey and a large-sample on-line survey that ran for a year on selected political and government web sites. This study was conducted at a time when familiarity with the Internet was lower than it is today, but it is one of the first conducted on the effects of the medium. He attributes the

findings to a "transition effect" caused by the medium moving from an exclusive technology to a mass medium.

In a more recent study, Bimber and Davis (2003) found further evidence of reinforcement. While acknowledging that no campaign can succeed without the Internet, their research shows that the Internet attracted very few new or marginalized participants to the campaigns. They looked at how candidates presented themselves on line, how it compared to traditional media, and the influence of Internet-based political campaigns on voter knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Methods included a series of randomized sample telephone surveys conducted nationally and in Missouri. In addition, Bimber and Davis conducted controlled experiments in four cities among those who visited campaign Web sites. They argue that as the Internet becomes more diffuse, then effects will become even smaller as the Internet audience will change from one that is more purposive and interested to one that is more like a mass audience. Unlike television, the Internet is not a captive audience and cannot do what television and newspapers can which to "saturate a large audience with messages that interrupt citizens' focus and direct it toward the campaign and, more specifically, a candidate's message" (p. 147). They argue while advertising can capture an audience in an unsuspecting state, the Internet is more directed. The Internet is most successful at mobilizing activists, the most politically interested, to volunteer, donate, communicate with others, and ultimately, though not assuredly, vote. Further, they found that people will use the Internet to satisfy their campaign information needs, but will not produce mobilization. Thus, they conclude that rather than narrowing the digital political divide, the Internet will expand it.

Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) concluded that while Internet use leads to an increase in personal perceptions of political efficacy, it does not lead to "objectively measurable changes in political involvement or information" (p.70). Looking at Internet users and non-Internet users, they find no evidence that Internet use led to traditional political participation. Scheufele and Nisbet examined three types of Internet use, political information seeking, entertainment use, and nonpolitical information seeking. None of these types of online usage had any impact on traditional forms of participation (attended a neighborhood meeting, writing a letter to a local candidate, working for a political campaign, contacting a local public official, and contributing money to a local organization). Consistent with Verba et al., the authors found that the SES variables explains much of the variance but newspaper reading is the strongest predictor of traditional participation. Other media variables, viewing television for news or entertainment, had no impact on traditional participation.

Jennings and Zeitner (2003) showed that while Internet had positive effects on several indicators of civic engagement, the authors concluded that there was evidence suggesting that the Internet would mirror the inequalities already in place regarding who participates in the electoral process and who does not. This study, therefore, falls within the reinforcement camp of studies. They used a quasi-experimental design employing a panel design to examine, longitudinally, changes in civic engagement among users and non-users of the Internet. Among Internet users, the more politically involved, the more likely they were to use the Internet for political information. This was especially true of the younger cohort in the sample than the older one. The benefit of Jennings and

Zeitner's study is that they used the panel data to examine individual level changes over time.

In two studies published in 1998 and 2003, Johnson and Kaye found that people who go online for political information are already politically engaged. However, those online tended to be less trustful of government and less likely to vote than those more trustful or offline. Thus, those online when these studies were conducted, perhaps were more politically extreme and cynical than those who did not. In their 1998 study they found that while the Internet had a positive and significant impact on political interest, there was a negative impact between reliance on the Internet and trust in government, efficacy, and voting behavior (1996 elections). More importantly for the reinforcement theory, those who are more web reliant are not any more likely to vote or express interest in the campaign than more casual users. Johnson and Kaye make another interesting assertion:

> While politically interested web users participate in politics and believe they have the power to influence the system, this group remains distrustful of politicians with levels of distrust highest among the heavier users of the Internet. However, scholars have suggested that the mixture of high efficacy and low trust might actually be desirable (Johnson and Kaye, 1998, p131-32).

Distrust might lead to citizen action. However, Nie and Erbring (2001) find that sociability decreases and alienation and societal disconnection increases with Internet use.

In a more recent study, consistent with reinforcement theory, Johnson and Kaye concluded that those who are politically interested are more likely to seek out political information from the media more so than the general public (Johnson and Kaye, 2004). "Political attitudes may have little influence on online credibility because studies suggest that online users rather than being socially isolated and apathetic, are politically interested and more likely to seek out information from the media than the general public" (p. 626). The authors conducted an online survey aimed at blog users, representing diverse ideologies and weblogs. Their sampling technique was a "Snowball design," so they had some difficulty in building a representative sample. They conclude that the web has moved to a more demographically mainstream place from a bastion of young, white, affluent, highly-educated, males.

In another study showing reinforcement with a potential for mobilization, Solop (2001) found that the Internet attracted both those with a higher level of education, and younger voters. In this study on the effects of Internet voting, Solop examined differences between those choosing to vote via the Internet and those voting in the traditional manner at a polling place during a Democratic primary in Arizona. Solop initially finds that more affluent, better educated, white, and younger voters were more likely to choose the Internet voting option. A logistic regression showed that the best predictors for Internet voting were education and age. Additionally, Internet voters scored higher on a scale of political efficacy than non-Internet voters. The findings seem, on the one hand, to provide evidence for the reinforcement hypothesis, and the

mobilization hypothesis, but on the other, it shows that younger voters are more attracted to Internet voting.

In a study among those already online, Norris (2001), finds that a virtual political system will "most likely facilitate further knowledge, interest and activism of those who are already most predisposed toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of political participation" (p. 228). Norris studied the characteristics of online users versus nonusers in the European Union in 1999.

However, some question whether the Internet is a separate medium for politics, representing a major paradigm shift. They argue that it is merely an extension of the offerings of the main stream media (MSM), supplementing other sources of political information (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Kaye, 1998). If anything, the Internet foils the MSM's gatekeeper status.

Weber, Loumakis and Bergman (2003) found a positive relationship between engagement on the Internet and civic and political participation. However, it appears to exacerbate the socioeconomic bias already exhibited by civic and political participation prior to the rise of the Internet. This study suffers from self-selection bias in the sampling procedure because they used *Survey 2000*, an online survey, which used a non-probability, self-selected sample.

With the wide array of information available in cyberspace, citizens need to be able to know where to access political information and possess the necessary skills to trust the information. Internet proficiency is closely related to online political participation. DiGennaro and Dutton (2006) found in their study of Internet use and

political participation in the United Kingdom that fifty-six percent of highly proficient Internet users participated in at least one political function, compared with 33% of moderate experts, and 19% of the novices. They base their findings on the 2003 and 2005 Oxford Internet Studies (OxIS), a national telephone survey of Internet use in the UK. While DiGennarro and Dutton's findings point to reinforcement—those with the necessary skills are most likely to participate, the authors still see a greater opportunity for mobilization by arguing that building Internet skills should increase both internal and external political efficacy and thus increase active participation.

Xenos and Moy (2007) conducted a secondary analysis on 2004 ANES data to address two hypotheses related to the Internet and civic and political engagement. The first: exposure to online political information is positively related to civic and political engagement. The second: The effects of online political information exposure on civic and political engagement are contingent on levels of political interest. The results generally pointed to reinforcement. They found support for differential effects, specifically that participation was more contingent on levels of political interest. Using the Internet for participation was greater for those with higher levels of political interest. On the positive side, regardless of level of political interest, the Internet use increased levels of political knowledge.

A paper presented by Kroh and Neiss (2009) at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science Association asserts that cross-sectional studies attempting to address the mobilization versus reinforcement questions fall short in that most participation results from "unspecified background variables" and "self-selection of politically active citizens

into Internet use." The Internet benefits, at best, are small and marginal since those who are most likely to use the Internet for political participation are those already engaged. The data source is a longitudinal panel conducted in Germany called the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) from 1995 through 2008. The authors measure self-selection by analyzing the panel data across time beginning in 1995 when the Internet was not widely used in the population through 2008. This allows them to create a "before and after" test for the introduction of the Internet. The authors analyze differences in political engagement by comparing Internet users and non-users using cross-sectional data from the 2005 SOEP. The authors use a very limited measure of Internet access—either one has it or does not. This presents a problem in that that those who are more active online may be very different from those who spend little time online, yet they are both categorized together. I address this problem in my own research in cases 2-4 (see Chapter 3 methodology). Second, their measures of political engagement are limited to party strength, political interest, and active political work. They find that Internet access is a relative weak predictor of active work in politics and political interest. They find that "further education" is a somewhat stronger predictor. Their study, like others, does not take into account the interaction between Internet use and education to determine if Internet access moderates the effect of education, which would provide evidence of a greater impact of the Internet on participation.

2-2: A Case for Mobilization: A Review of the Literature on Online Participation

While there have been studies supporting the reinforcement thesis, scholars have found some support for mobilization, albeit limited in nature. A common thread across many of these studies has been youth appeal of the Internet.

A study of 18 to 29 year old citizens' use of the Internet for campaign purposes in the 2004 presidential campaign shows that online campaigns strongly facilitated political engagement among those with at least some interest in the campaign. (Georgetown University/Brigham Young University 2004 Presidential Election Internet Study—a 3 wave panel conducted during October-November, 2004 in Owen, 2006). While voters in this study used the Internet primarily to search for political information, a significant number used it to express their opinions and to become active online in the election.

Shah, Kwak and Holbert (2001) found that those most likely to be mobilized are younger people and those with the greatest familiarity and experience with the Internet regardless of socioeconomic status. Their major research aim was to understand how "patterns of new media use that provide information or contain the possibility of strengthening strong ties are positively related to the individual level production of social capital—including civic voluntarism. They measure voluntarism based on self-reported frequency of activity. While overall Internet use had a negative impact on civic engagement, it was significant predictor of civic engagement among "GenXers" (defined as those between the ages of 18-34). Television viewing, either generally, or for "hard news" viewing had no effect on civic engagement for "GenXers" or any other age group.

Shah et al. (2007), in a more recent study, looked at whether online news information seeking and political discussion leads to political participation, found that

using the Internet and the Web as a means for information and messaging leads to political participation. However, they show no evidence of whether those participating are new to the political process. Their theoretical model accounted "for effects of the Internet use on participation while also accounting for a much broader array of communication behaviors" (p. 683)" Their findings suggest that young people may be the best targets of mobilization by the Internet, especially through political messaging. They suggest future research look at the effects across age groups.

Quintelier and Vissers (2008) studied the online habits of sixteen year olds in Belgium and hypothesized that the more time young people spend online the more likely they will be to participate in politics offline and different forms of Internet use will have positive and/or negative effects on offline political participation. Using a large sample survey of Belgian youth, the authors find that frequency of Internet use has no effect on offline political participation. Rather, variables such as political interest, membership associations, and parental discussion have a greater impact. However, some online activities, such as blogging, forwarding political emails, and following the news online have a positive effect on offline participation. While the age of the subjects of this study is too young for comparability to what I did with the NAES data, the important finding is the relationship between certain online participation activities and offline participation—something which I investigate in this dissertation.

There has been some empirical evidence of mobilization across all age groups. Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found those with access to the Internet and online election news were significantly more likely to report voting in the 1996 and 2000 presidential

elections (using NES data) even after controlling for a SES, partisanship, attitudes, traditional media use, and state environmental factors. The dependent variable was voting and the causal mechanism for turnout was Internet access and reading election news online.

Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal (2008) empirically showed the relationship between engaging in such online activities as chat rooms and email and voting. For example, "the probability of voting increases between 21 and 39 percent, comparing individuals who regularly send and receive political e-mails, with those who rarely do. (page 85). The range of probability depends on the impact of other media. For example, heavy users of television and newspapers for news are less likely to vote as a result of sending or receiving political emails, and are more likely to vote as a result of sending or receiving emails if they do not use television or newspapers as a information source. This is in line with Rosenstone and Hansen's work (1993).

In addition to sampling issues, what most studies on mobilization have failed to do is to better specify the nature of the Internet activities. Doing so would create a clearer understanding of the effects (Shah et al., 2002).

Gibson, Lusoli and Ward (2005) also argue scholars show an incomplete understanding of online political participation, most specifically by excluding examination of contextualized online resources that may encourage mobilization. Gibson et al. go beyond prior studies of the Internet and political participation by widening the understanding of online political participation as well as introducing Internet-specific variables as part of their contextualization model of Internet effects. In examining the

level of political participation by those who are and are not Internet users just prior to the 2002 British parliamentary elections, they found support for their contextualization model showing that the Internet is expanding the number of those who are politically active among those who had been previously disengaged in more traditional offline political activities. The difference in their research is the inclusion of the contextualized variables not typically found in prior studies of online political participation.

De Huniga et al. (2009) show the impact of the Internet on the political environment in their study of how reading web logs (blogs) affects participation. They find that blog usage significantly increases online political participation and discussion, but has no effect on offline participation. Missing from their sets of controls is political interest, so it is difficult to determine how blog usage would impact participation by controlling for that. However, one could treat one of their media variables, "political book readership" as a proxy. Additionally, they find that media use in general minimally predicts participation, except that using online news sources does significantly predict online participation. In my dissertation, I treat blog reading and posting as a form of participation, so I am unable to compare De Huniga et al.'s findings with my own. The import of their research is they find a relationship between blog reading and online participation, but no connection between Internet usage and offline participation, generally. Therefore, the shows some evidence of mobilization, but again without controls for political interest, one cannot be certain. The study was based on a secondary data analysis of Pew Internet and American Life data from the 2008 campaign. The definition of blog usage is very general and as the authors state, there is no distinction for

level of blog traffic or blog content. Therefore the relationship between blog use and participation could have been underestimated.

Two papers presented at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Toronto, Canada examined how online social networking and online social capital had an effect on offline participation and engagement. Feezell, Conroy, and Guerrero studied Facebook users to measure their level of offline political engagement. They conducted a survey among political science students who were actively on Facebook and found a positive linkage between Facebook usage and offline participation. Using OLS regression and an aggregate measure of participation (which they do not define in their paper) as the dependent variable, they find that membership on Facebook is associated with offline political participation. However, while Facebook users are more likely to participate offline, the authors find no significant effect of increased political knowledge among the users. The primary drawback I see with this study is the use of a sample of political science students. By choice or by nature, this group is probably more likely to participate offline in any event compared with non-political science students. While this is a serious limitation, the research moves in the right direction and is but one example of the research that is currently taking place to determine the impact of the Internet on participation.

Gibson and McAllister (2009) also presented a paper on virtual social capital and civic engagement and participation. Using data collected from the 2007 Australian Election Study (AES), the authors found that building a bonding type of social capital is positively associated with political efficacy and active social engagement than is a

bridging type of social capital. Building a bonding form of social capital simply means using the Internet to contact others one knows already in an offline context. Bridging refers to expanding a network to a wider and more diverse group. Further, younger people tended to be more likely to engage in this form of social network building than older people. The implication of this study is that targeting tighter networks comprised mainly of friends and family will be more effective in encouraging participation and perhaps support around a candidate or issue.

Both Feezell, Conroy, and Guerrero and Gibson and McAllister's papers provide further evidence that the Internet has a positive impact on political engagement and participation. However, neither study go far enough in showing that it is the Internet itself which helps foster such engagement and participation.

2-3: Evidence of both Mobilization and Reinforcement

There have been at least two studies showing evidence of both reinforcement and mobilization. I review two of them in this section. Best and Krueger (2005) find evidence of both reinforcement and mobilization in their examination of offline and online political participation. The best predictors of online political participation are not civic skills (e.g., attending a community meeting, sending a letter to an elected official, planning or chairing a meeting, giving a presentation or speech) but political interest and Internet skills (e.g., designing a web page, sending an attachment via email, downloading a file, and posting something on the Internet), suggesting that online participation behavior differs from offline participation behavior. They support reinforcement in finding that higher SES and highly politically interested people are more likely to

participate either offline or online. Internet skills, a predictor of online political participation, are related to higher SES. However, an important exception to their finding is young people. Controlling for everything else, younger people have greater Internet skills, and their levels of online participation is not lower than older people, whereas, everything being equal, older people are more likely to engage in traditional political participation than younger people. Age was not a significant predictor of participation, so the authors point to the Internet skills as a key determinant.

Kwak et al. (2004) find evidence for reinforcement and mobilization in their study of the relationship between high-speed Internet and knowledge and participation. Using a differential gains model, they posit that as technology changes and improves, i.e., the adoption of broadband, the patterns of "political and social consequences that are different from those introduced by the adoption of narrowband Internet" (p. 427). Since broadband offers greater entertainment opportunities the gains would be smaller than a switch from no Internet to narrowband (slower service). While Kwak et al. found that improved technologies—narrowband to broadband—led to greater socializing (non-political) and "soft knowledge" (non-political, but highly publicized), it had no effect on increased political discussion or "hard knowledge" (political and international issue knowledge). Moving from no Internet to narrowband, however, did significantly increase political discussion. Improved technology, they argue, is more in line with civic disengagement (citing Shah, 2001) rather than civic engagement. The problems I see with their study are a very small sample size, limited geographic area of study, and Internet access was measured at home only. Additionally, the authors did not measure

Internet frequency in any way, they only were interested whether someone had narrowband or broadband, which of course is critical to their study, but by measuring frequency or literacy, one could better determine the effect of narrowband. The study shows evidence for reinforcement because there is no effect on civic engagement when moving to a faster technology. Mobilization is seen when going from no Internet to narrowband. Finally, the study is somewhat dated since fewer services offer the slower narrowband technology.

The studies reviewed in this chapter point to a rather inconclusive judgment about whether the Internet and new media are mobilizing forces or tools for reinforcement. As the Internet becomes more diffuse and as the digital divide narrows with later adopters going online, the mix of Internet users may change dramatically, becoming more representative of the population as a whole**.** Yet, prior studies point to youth as great hope for mobilization. There is significant potential for future research, especially for models based on more contextualized measures of online political participation, similar to what Gibson et al. conducted I plan to undertake research that will be based on the foundations of Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). However, I will expand on traditional activities and incorporate those political participation activities which extend the traditional ones and will take into account the uniqueness of the information and communication technologies in the design, to provide a more academically sound answer to the reinforcement and mobilization debate.

2-4: The 2008 Election in the Context of this Research

Before describing the methodology for my research, it is important to understand the context in which this study was conducted. The 2008 election is arguably the singularly most unique presidential contest in the history of the United States. In 2008, Americans saw a convergence of several factors hitherto not seen in any national election—an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate who was considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice presidential nominee, a collapsing national economy, and extensive use of online tools. Hillary Clinton, a former First Lady and at the time a U.S. Senator, was the Democratic party front runner in the period prior to the first caucuses in Iowa, and remained a strong contender throughout the primaries and caucuses season. Sarah Palin, at the time the governor of Alaska, was selected by Republican party nominee, Senator John McCain to be his vice presidential running mate. Palin was the first Republican woman to appear on a national ticket. Barack Obama, a U.S. Senator was the first African American to be nominated by a major political party and the first to be elected U.S. president. The overriding theme of the 2008 election was about hope and change . According to his campaign advisors and supporters, Barack Obama was seen as the candidate who was going to turn the hopes of those who voted for him into real change (Jamieson, 2009).

There were also numerous media reports about the great enthusiasm the election would generate among the voting age population. Some of the headlines readers saw in late Fall, 2008 included, “Obama campaign banks on enthusiasm” (St. Petersburg Sun-Times, September, 28, 2008); “Registration gain favor Democrats; Voter rolls swelling in

key states" (Washington Post, October 6, 2008); and "A race to keep voters engaged" (New York Times, October 18, 2008). More people voted in this election than any other, and turnout as a proportion of the voting eligible population increased slightly from 2004 from 60.1 percent to 61.7 percent (United States Election Project, April 26, 2009). Further, the Census Bureau reported a significant proportional increase among minorities and the young. Based on estimates from the Center for Population Statistics (CPS) survey conducted following the 2008 election, two million more African Americans and two million more Hispanics cast ballots than the Census Bureau reported for the election in 2004. The change in voters aged 18 to 24 increased significantly by two percentage points to 49 percent in 2008 from 47 percent in 2004 U.S. Census Bureau, July 20, 2009)[3].

The Internet had been used effectively as a fund raising tool in the 2000 campaign, especially by John McCain (Kaye, 2009) and as a fund raising and organizing tool in the 2004 campaigns, especially by Howard Dean. The role of the Internet expanded considerably in the 2008 campaign as all the candidates sought to take advantage of the technology and observers noted its many uses and forms in the campaign. The Internet was utilized by all actors in the electoral process—campaigns, media, bloggers, advocates for both candidates, interest groups, and the general voting public. In 2008 the Internet was not only used to raise money, but to contact potential supporters to amass large databases for mobilization purposes, and social networks to produce an efficient well-organized campaign communication and Get Out the Vote

[3] Census Bureau conducted the November 2008 Voting and Registration Survey as a supplement to that month's Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly labor force survey in which interviews are conducted in approximately 56,000 households across the country.

(GOTV) effort. YouTube, a peer to peer video sharing site, which did not exist in 2004, served an important function as both a campaign tool to inform and as a way to become informed. Viral videos and emails quickly and efficiently made their way through cyberspace to spread both accurate and deceptive information about the candidates. Political news sites served as aggregators of campaign news, opinion, and polling to help feed both the media and the general public. Blogs of all political and ideological persuasions helped promote or attack candidates throughout the campaign, link to other blogs, news sites, and political sites, and offered forums for people to express their views online. The Internet also served a fact-checking functions with sites like FactCheck.org and PolitiFact.com. For example, FactCheck.org pointed out deceptions in each candidate's tax, energy, Social Security, and Iraq war positions (FactCheck.org, September 25, 2008).

The Internet was also a source for political advertising, but not on the scale of broadcast and cable in dollars spent. For example, the Obama campaign, which spent more money than all other candidates, allocated just 6 percent of the $380 million advertising budget to Internet advertising while it allocated 85 percent to television (FEC estimates, January 2008 as cited by Kay, 2009). Of course, buying advertising time on television and cable is significantly more expensive, but the disparity between television spending and Internet spending is so great, that one can only conclude that most of the advertising efforts were placed on television. However, perhaps more spending on Internet advertising would have been advisable since a Pew Center for the People and the Press finding showed that a third of voters cited the Internet as their primary source

for election news and 72 percent cited television as their primary source (Pew, October 31, 2008).

Internet advertising held very little persuasive powers compared with broadcast or cable television (Kaye, 2009). However, the campaigns attempted to use online advertising as a persuasive tool, but mainly the Internet was used to communicate information through advertising. In the case of the Obama campaign, the Internet served their campaign best as a means of building their grassroots volunteer organization.. According to Jon Carson, national field director for the Obama campaign, the Internet was the net and not the engine. The online efforts of the Obama campaign were targeted mainly toward quickly mobilizing volunteers toward a number of activities. The Internet was used to build rapid response teams from state to state. Most of the success in voter contact by the Obama campaign resulted from the more traditional field methods such as going door to door and telephoning to recruit and solicit donations. Yet, without the massive database built from the Internet, they argued the ground forces would never had been as successful (Jamieson, 2009).

To illustrate the significant role played by the Internet in 2008, I present some figures from the 2008 general election related to the Obama campaign. During the 2008 campaign, the Obama campaign collected "13 million email addresses, more than a million cell phone numbers, and a half-billion dollars online". Further, the Obama campaign utilized many different forms of online communication and social media. These included signing on to My.BarackObama.com to create profiles, communicate with other supporters, and plan and execute hundreds of thousands of offline events such

as offline dinners and fundraisers. As previously mentioned, volunteers could go online to download lists of swing voters and their contact information in key battleground states.. In the final four days of the campaign, this database allowed supporters to make three million calls to voters. Further, information from the database was analyzed to help volunteers identify potential voters to tap for support through door-to-door activity in those final days. While McCain had a web presence and online efforts it was miniscule compared to the Obama effort. "Obama had four times the number of Facebook supporters, 24 times the Twitter devotees, and three times the visitors to his site in the final campaign week. The public watched about 15 million hours of Obama campaign videos on YouTube" (Ratliff, 2009).

Furthermore, in 2008, as in 2004, the Internet played a major role in fundraising. The media portrayed the Internet as source of fundraising from small (single donations totaling less than $200) versus large donors (e.g., USA Today, May 2, 2008), with the assumption that these small donors were those contacted though and subsequently donated through the Internet. However, the non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute concluded after an analysis of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data that Obama raised 80 percent more from large donors than small donors. This represents a much higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential candidate. Additionally, the CFI analysis showed that Obama raised about the same percentage from small donors (amounts of less than $200) in 2008, as George W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).

While it is clear that the Internet played a large and important role in the campaign, for the Internet to mobilize effectively, those segments of society politically

marginalized in the past, at least must be able to access the Internet to engage and participate. The digital divide has existed since the advent of the Internet and consequently there are large disparities among those who have and do not have access to the Internet and thus providing advantage to those who have access. This digital divide has existed since the Internet's introduction (Norris,2001). Further, reinforcement theorists argue that those who are already who are highly politically interested are more likely to use the Internet. In the next section, I present descriptive data from the 2008 and 2004 NAES data sets showing the levels of Internet access, usage, political interest, and a traditional measure of political participation based on Verba et al. (1995). The index made no differentiation between online and offline participation since NAES did not measure online participation in 2004. The purpose of the index is to establish at the most descriptive level whether there are any differences in the levels of access, interest and participation between the two election years. These baseline numbers serve to provide context to the analysis presented in the main findings of this dissertation.

2-5: Data on Internet Use, Political Interest, and Participation from the 2008 and 2004 NAES

Tables 2-1 and 2-2 present descriptive date for all adults and among key subgroups collected during periods of 2004 and 2008. The data is presented for two broad reasons: first, to assess the level of change in Internet access, political interest, and participation between the 2004 and 2008 elections; and, second, to assess changes within the 2008 election year from the primaries to the general election. The descriptive analysis helps to establish baseline and context for the main analysis presented in the

findings section. Internet access is a broad measure meant to show the level of access in the United States and to establish whether the digital divide continues in the general public. The level of political interest is measured by the proxy of how closely one is following the presidential campaign. The participation measure is a combined index aggregating five activities: persuading others to support or oppose a candidate, doing work on behalf of a candidate, donating money to a campaign, attending a meeting or rally in support of a candidate, and wearing a campaign button, or placing a lawn sign or bumper sticker. The five participation measures were utilized in both the 2004 and 2008 NAES surveys and do not distinguish between online and offline participation activities.

The access data from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show evidence of a continued digital divide between those who have access and those who do not have access to the Internet. The numbers scarcely change from 2008 to 2004. Higher educated and more affluent adults continue to hold a clear advantage in the level of Internet access, and equally important, participation did not significantly change between 2004 and 2008 either.

Demographically, participation remained about the same in 2008 when compared to 2004, except for younger people and African Americans. The data show a slight decrease among 18 to 29 year olds and a significant increase among African Americans in participation. African Americans were potentially energized to participate because of Barack Obama, but controls were inserted for Obama support in my analysis to account for those biases. Despite everything said and written about young people participating in the 2008 election, the decrease is surprising. However, this measure of participation does not include online activities and therefore might be misleading, and thus furthers the

argument to include online participation activities when measuring participation behavior.

The 2008 campaign did, however, generate a significantly higher level of interest when compared to 2004. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show a 14 point increase in the level of political interest between 2008 and 2004. The increase in interest is evident across all demographic subgroups presented in the table. Most notable in 2008 is the relatively low level of interest expressed by the youngest group. However, this number is consistent with the 2004 data among 18 to 29 year olds.

Participation levels did increase significantly between the primaries and general election period--generally in the double digits. The relative proportions remained about the same except for 18 to 29 year olds were there was a small increase relative to a larger increase for older people.

Looking closely at 2008, comparing the general election to the primaries, Table 2-2 shows slight increases in Internet access as the campaign progresses but the same differences are found among the groups. Net usage, measured by online frequency (asked after the primaries and caucus season ended), is significantly higher for the advantaged groups, except for non-African Americans who were not significantly higher in their usage than African Americans.

The description of the online landscape suggests that mobilizing will be difficult as long as the digital divide remains wide between the "digital haves" and "digital have nots." The levels of traditional participation remain relatively static when compared to 2004, but increases among African American and decreases among young adults point to

two critical trends. First, there certainly was greater enthusiasm about the 2008 election among African Americans, in general, but the data does not show a similar level of increased enthusiasm among younger adults. However this could be a result of not taking into account online activities. This dissertation will demonstrate that young people were more likely to engage in online participation behavior.

Table 2-1: *Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity (Traditional) 2004 NAES*[4]

	All Adults %	College Graduate Or Higher %	Not College Graduate %	Male %	Female %	Age 18-29 %	Age 30 or older %	African-American %	Not African-American %	Household Income: $100K Or more %	Household Income: Less than $100K %
2004 GENERAL ELECTION											
Have Internet Access (n=55,550))	76.1	90.8***	67.0	78.9***	73.9	84.6***	74.7	72.6***	76.4	94.7***	72.8
Following campaign very closely (n=39,543)	33.2	41.5***	28.1	37.7***	29.5	17.5***	35.9	30.6***	33.4	44.3***	31.2
Participation (n=5,051)	57.9	65.5***	53.1	58.1*	57.7	56.2	58.2	58.6	57.8	67.3***	56.1

***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

[4] Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked in 2004. The 2004 participation data were collected from September 20, 2004 through November 2, 2004, when the questions were on the survey. The general election access and campaign interest data were collected beginning March 9, 2004, when the general election effectively began as Sen. John Kerry became the presumptive Democratic nominee and President George W. Bush began airing his first general election ads.

Table 2-2: *Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity: 2008 NAES*[5]

	All Adults %	College Graduate Or Higher %	Not College Graduate %	Male %	Female %	Age 18-29 %	Age 30 or older %	African-American %	Not African-American %	Household Income: $100K Or more %	Household Income: Less than $100K %
2008 PRIMARIES											
Have Internet Access (n=29,771)	76.6	90.6	67.4	80.5	73.6	86.3	75.7	71.5	77.0	95.1	71.6
Following campaign very closely (n =29,596)	40.3	48.3	35.0	43.1	38.2	21.4	41.9	45.4	39.9	49.3	37.9
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE) (n=2,217)	39.8	46.9***	34.9	38.7	41.3	45.1	39.3	53.8***	38.7	47.8***	37.6
2008 GENERAL ELECTION											
Have Internet Access (n=24,266)	78.9	91.4***	70.4	81.9***	76.6	87.1***	78.2	74.3***	79.2	95.6***	74.2
Use the Internet at least several hours per day ++ (n=19,134)	39.4	47.0***	32.6	42.2***	37.3	44.6***	39.0	36.9***	39.6	51.8***	35.1
Following campaign very closely (n=19,134)	47.2	55.7***	41.2	50.0***	45.1	28.8***	48.6***	53.8***	46.6	57.7***	44.3
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE) (n=3,737)	58.0	64.3***	52.6	60.4**	56.1	51.2^	58.3	66.9**	57.4	66.5***	55.2

***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05**,** ^Chi Square is significant p<.10

[5] Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked during the 2008 primaries and caucus seasons. The 2008 participation data represented in this table reflect a retrospective measure of participation, while access, interest and usage were collected during the campaigns. The 2008 Primaries retrospective data were collected from July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008-when the survey asked about primary activity. The contemporaneous primaries access and interest data were collected from Jan. 2, 2008 through June 10, 2008—during the primaries season. The 2008 General Election access, usage and interest data were collected from July 2, 2008 through November 2, 2008. The retrospective general election participation data were collected from November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008 among a panel of respondents who completed a survey initially during the General Election period in order to collect data reflecting participation from the 2008 general election campaign.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND STUDY DESIGN

This dissertation addresses three research questions related to the role of the Internet in campaigns and elections: (1) Does the Internet mobilize new participants or reinforce existing biases in participation? (2) Does mobilization or reinforcement vary depending on whether participation occurs offline or online? (3) Does mobilization or reinforcement depend upon the ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their campaigns? The theoretical mechanism that will drive mobilization is the decentralized nature of the Internet which lowers communication and networking costs, providing a convenient, easy, and efficient means of acting and being acted upon by a campaign and its supporters. The outcome would be an increase in the number of those less likely to engage in the political process to take action and participate. In this chapter I describe these three research questions and the related hypotheses that emerge from them in greater detail. I will then turn to a description of the research design, data, measures and methods I will use to test these hypotheses.

3-1: Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does using the Internet mobilize new participants or reinforce the participation of the already engaged?

Whether Internet use alleviates or aggravates existing biases in political participation is at the heart of this dissertation. This dissertation investigates whether the extent to which the Internet acts as a mobilizing mechanism includes mobilizing the types of citizens who are traditionally less engaged (i.e., the young, the less educated, the economically disadvantaged, minorities and women). At the same time however, Internet

use also has shown demographic biases in favor of the better educated, the economically advantaged, and whites. How these sometimes competing, sometimes reinforcing patterns affect levels of participation is unclear. As the previous chapter makes clear, the answer to this question is uncertain since prior research provides both theories and findings in support of *both* mobilization and reinforcement. For this reason RQ1 generates the following competing hypotheses, each of which can be compared to the "null hypothesis," which assumes no effect from Internet use:

> *Hypothesis 1a (H1a):* Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens.
>
> *Hypothesis 1b (H1b):* Using the Internet will reinforce the participation of already engaged citizens.
>
> *Research Question 2 (RQ2):* Does mobilization or reinforcement vary depending on whether participation occurs offline or online?

As also discussed in Chapter One, the potential mobilizing or reinforcing effects of the Internet are further complicated by the fact that the Internet not only provides a means for becoming more informed or motivated, but also an avenue for actually participating (e.g., by contributing money online). As a result, its mobilizing or reinforcing effects may vary by whether the resulting participation is online or offline. Again extant theory and research is equivocal on this issue, leading to a second set of competing hypotheses:

> *Hypothesis 2a (H2a):* Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens to participate offline.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Using the Internet will reinforce the offline participation of already engaged citizens.

Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens to participate online.

Hypothesis 2d (H2d): Using the Internet will reinforce the online participation of already engaged citizens.

Research Question 3(RQ3): Does mobilization or reinforcement depend upon the ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their campaigns?

The final research question to be answered is the extent to which mobilization or reinforcement is dependent on the effectiveness with which different candidates and their campaigns utilize the Internet. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) posit in their work on political mobilization, recruitment and candidate contact play a critical role in any campaign. Through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and activation, campaigns build up their organization and base of support. A more effective activation effort leads to greater success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out, therefore multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an attempt to maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support. Online recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of spurring them into action and also helps to expand this message to those who may be interested but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act.

Therefore, I hypothesize

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to participate than those contacted offline

The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008 presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential supporters. Given this perception, I further hypothesize

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton in the primaries.

Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The Obama campaign online contact would more likely lead to political participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.

3-2 Study Design

In order to test the hypotheses and begin to answer the research questions described above, I utilized data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Telephone survey. In this section I provide an overview of this data set and how I employed it through a series of discrete "case studies," discuss the specific measures of key variables used in my analyses, and describe the statistical methods that make up the bulk of my analyses.

3-2.1 Data Source: National Annenberg Election Telephone Survey (NAES)

The data source for this research is the telephone component of the multimodal[6] 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). The component consisted of a roughly 100 item, 30 minute pre-election telephone survey utilizing a national rolling cross-sectional (RCS) telephone design, [7] and a shorter post-election telephone panel survey. The surveys were designed to measure the dynamics of the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. The respondents were adults, age eighteen or older living in the United States. The field period for the pre-election survey was December 17, 2007 through November 3, 2008 (day before Election Day), producing a robust sample size of 57,967 nationally representative household interviews.[8] The post-election panel consisted of re-contacts with 3,737 respondents from the pre-election survey and was fielded from November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008.

My research is divided into four different phases of the 2008 election cycle, which I present as case studies. In Case 1, the data are from a major portion of the primaries and caucuses period. Data were collected from February 1 through March 10, 2008 (N=4,812).[9] In Case 2, I utilize the data collected during part of the post-primaries

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[6] The 2008 NAES was conducted as two separate studies: A telephone survey instrument looking at aggregated changes over time fielded by ABT-SRBI of New York, NY and an online panel measuring individual changes across five waves conducted by Knowledge Networks of Menlo Park, CA.

[7] Briefly, the RCS approach is composed of a series of repeated cross-sections collected over time. The benefit of using repeated cross-sections is the ability to identify changes between two or more points in time. In the NAES RCS design, each cross-section is composed individuals selecting using a random-digit dialing (RDD) technique. NAES is run on a daily release schedule, and is managed in such a way that the date of an interview is considered a random event. In this way, researchers can treat each days as an individual, representative study (Romer et al., 2006).

[8] Nationally representative of the 48 contiguous United States; no interviews are conducted in Alaska and Hawaii.

[9] Case 1 encompasses the period when thirty-nine primaries and caucuses took place, including the twenty-two states on Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008. The states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,

and caucuses period, July 2 through August 4, 2008 (N=2,217). In Case 3, the data collection covered the time of the pre-convention period through part of the general election period, from August 8 through October 2, 2008 (N=6,832).[10] Case 4 consists of the post-election period from November 5 through November 12, 2008 (N=2,026). The cases are structured in such a way to uniquely answer my research questions and address my hypotheses.

Table 3-1 displays the time periods and sample sizes within the cases, along with an indication of which hypotheses and questions have been addressed by the available information:

Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition, the District of Columbia held its primary on February 12.

[10] The Case 3 period ends on October 2 because other pressing questions had to become part of the survey related to the presidential debates, therefore we made the decision to suspend the participation questions.

Table 3-1: *Sample Periods and Hypotheses/Questions Addressed*

	Data Collection Period	Proposed Sample Size	Hypothesis/RQ to be Addressed
Case 1: Mobilization and Reinforcement during the Primaries and Caucuses on and around Super Tuesday	February 1 through March 10, 2008	4,812	H1a-b and H2a-d
Case 2: A Retrospective Measure of Mobilization, Reinforcement and Activation during the Primaries and Caucuses	July 2 through August 4, 2008	2,217	H1a-b and H2a-d H3a-c
Case 3: Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General Election Period-Pre-Convention Period to October 2, 2008*	August 8 through October 2, 2008	6,832 (mainly asked of a third of the sample)	H1a-b and H2a-d
Case 4: A Retrospective Measure of Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General Election using the Post-Election Panel	November 5 through November 12, 2008	2,026 re-contacts (who were not asked the participation battery in their initial interview)	H1a-b and H2a-d

3-2.2 Criterion variables

3-2.2.1 Overview of participation measures in the NAES. The participation questions in this study are based on work by Verba and Nie (1972), Verba et al. (1995), and Gibson et al. (2005), among others, and have been tailored to fit the 2008 election. In this section I will describe the participation measures used in each research case. Due to a number of circumstances, including space on the survey, time period within the campaign cycle, and research focus, the participation measures varied from case to case. However, as discussed later in the chapter, there was a consistent pattern of participation activities running through each case study. The general structure of the measures is as follows: 1) Participation activities without regard to whether they were performed online

or offline; 2) Participation activities performed online; and, 3) Participation activities performed offline. Each of the participation activities are dichotomous and were measured discretely by asking respondents whether or not (yes/no) they performed each activity during a given time-frame.

My analysis mainly focuses on individual activities because different motivations may underlie decisions to undertake diverse activities. While my analysis of mobilization and reinforcement is primarily based on individual participation activities, it also includes a combined index of online participation and a combined index of offline participation. For example, the most significant predictors of donating to a campaign may be very different from the most significant predictors of forwarding a campaign email to friends, or posting to a political blog.

3-2.2.2 Participation activities without regard to whether they are done offline or online. Internet use or online campaign contact may have an impact on engaging in certain activities, regardless of whether the activity itself was performed online or offline. Prior research generally measured engaging in such activities. In this dissertation, there are three activities that fall within this category: 1) Persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate for president, 2) volunteering to work for a presidential campaign, and, 3) donating to a presidential campaign (see Table 3-2). In each of the case studies, while the survey questions for these behaviors are worded without any reference to whether they were performed offline or online, each of these questions is followed up with a more specific inquiry. The results of this analysis help to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. (See Appendix 1 for the complete wording of all questions).

Table 3.2: *Participation Activities Without Regard to Online or Offline Performances Case 1-4 (Complete Wording in Appendix)**

	Cases 1-4
Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate for president	✓
Volunteer to work for a presidential campaign	✓
Donate money to a presidential candidate or campaign	✓

*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)

3-2.2.3 Offline participation activities—detail. This section details the specific offline participation activities I have analyzed in each of the cases (see Table 3). During Cases 1 and 3, I asked respondents about their behavior in the prior week, based on the assumption that respondents would best recall the time frame closest to the interview date, and thus allowing for real-time measurement. In Cases 2 and 4, I asked, retrospectively, about participation behaviors performed at any time during the primary campaign. In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were included: offline persuasion of others to support or oppose a candidate, offline volunteering for a campaign, and offline donating to a campaign. This turned out to be a rather limited set of participation variables, which I discovered after testing for reliability during a pilot test (α=.16). Consequently, I determined that it was necessary to expand the list of activities to include other traditional offline campaign related variables used by Verba et al. (1995) and others: attending a campaign event in support of a presidential candidate, and wearing a presidential campaign button or placing a bumper sticker or sign. These variables became part of NAES, and hence, part of my research design. The results of the analysis of the offline activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d.

Table 3.3: *Offline Participation Activities during—Cases 1-4 (Complete Wording in Appendix)**

	Case 1**	Case 2***	Case 3**	Case 4****
Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate for president: Offline	✓	✓	✓	✓
Volunteer to work for a presidential campaign: Offline	✓	✓	✓	✓
Donate money to a presidential candidate or campaign: Offline	✓	✓		✓
Attend campaign event in support of a presidential candidate: Offline		✓	✓	✓
Wear a presidential campaign button, place presidential candidate sign in yard: Offline		✓	✓	✓

*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)
**Activity asked about in the prior week, ***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses,
****Activity during the course of the general election

Note that in Case 3, the data concerning whether a respondent made a campaign donation online or offline could not be used because of a typographical error in the survey. This error made it impossible to distinguish between online or offline donations.

3-2.2.4 Online participation questions—detail. In Cases 1 through 4, online participation consisted of up to eight online behaviors (see Table 3-4). In Case 2, due to space limitations on NAES only five of the eight online participation activities were measured. The three variables excluded were, 1) reading/posting to a political blog, 2) discussing politics online in a chat group, and 3) viewing video on sites like YouTube during the primaries and caucuses. As with the analysis of offline variables, Cases 1 and 3 measured participation behavior performed in the prior week, Case 2 measured retrospective activities over the course of the entire primary and caucus period, and Case

4 measured online acts retrospectively over the course of the general election. The results of this analysis of online activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d.

Table 3-4: *Online Participation Activities Measured During Cases 1-4 (Complete Wording in Appendix)**
✓ =Asked during Case

	Case 1**	Case 2***	Case 3**	Case 4****
Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate for president: Online	✓	✓	✓	✓
Volunteer to work for a presidential campaign: Online	✓	✓	✓	✓
Donate money to a presidential candidate or campaign: Online	✓	✓		✓
Discuss politics online in a chat group	✓		✓	✓
Visit a presidential campaign/party/political website	✓	✓	✓	✓
View video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates/campaign	✓		✓	✓
Read a political blog/Post to a political blog or discussion forum	✓		✓	✓
Forward emails/audio/video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, family, co-workers or other people you know	✓	✓	✓	✓

*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)**Activity asked about in the prior week
***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses
****Activity during the course of the general election

3-2.2.5 The offline and online indexes. In each case, the offline index variable was created by combining the "yes" responses to the offline questions, The online participation index was created by combining the "yes" responses to the questions related directly to online participation. As a result, these indexes were used as a tool to test hypotheses 1a-b and 2a-d.

3-2.2.6 Retrospective measures to address h3a-c: the activation hypotheses. The survey included the following question areas to address Hypotheses 3a-c on activating supporters: whether a presidential campaign contacted the respondent either online or offline, the frequency of such contact, and the results of such contact related to participation. In addition, the survey measured most of the online and offline participation activities noted in the prior sections (See Table 3-5).

Table 3-5: *Questions Measuring Activation and Participation during Retrospective Post-Primaries and Caucuses Period (Case 2) (Complete Wording in Appendix)*

Activity During Primaries and Caucuses—Case 2
Contact from any of the campaigns
Which campaign contacted respondent
Mode of contact—online, phone, mail, in-person
Frequency of contact
Did Obama/Clinton campaign email respondent to contact others
How did respondent act on contact
Presidential campaign work (offline/online)
Persuade a friend co-worker to vote a certain way in the presidential election (offline/online)
Presidential campaign contribution (offline/online)
Visit a presidential campaign/party/political website
Forward emails/audio/video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, family, co-workers or other people you know
Wear a presidential campaign button, place presidential candidate sign in yard
Attend campaign event in support of a presidential candidate

3-2.3 Internet usage variables: internet access and internet frequency.

Internet usage measures are critical to test whether mobilization or reinforcement occur in any particular case. In the NAES there were two general Internet usage questions. The first was a dichotomous Internet access question which measured whether someone has access to the Internet at home, work or elsewhere. The second question, added to the survey at the beginning of the Case 2 time period (July 2, 2008), measured the respondents' frequency of general Internet use: several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times a month, every month or so, rarely, or never. This more detailed measurement of Internet use allowed me to expand the breadth of analysis I could perform for Cases 2 through 4 including the ability to test interactions between level of Internet use and the demographic variables for both online and offline political participation (See Table 3-6).

The Internet access variable is a dichotomous variable and was of limited usage since one is unable to discern the level or frequency of Internet activity from it. Further, since Internet access is a prerequisite for answering the questions regarding online participation, its use was limited in Case 1. I could not test for interactions between Internet access and the independent variables to determine online mobilization. Therefore, in Case 1, I focused only on the interaction between Internet and the independent variables in predicting offline participation.

Table 3-6: *Internet Usage Questions*

Question	Asked in Which Case
On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at home, at work or someplace else?	1-4
On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month or so, rarely, or never?	2-4

3-2.4 Independent and control variables used in the analyses.

The survey contained a number of independent and control variables which I employed in my analysis. These represent the demographic questions measured in the extant research, including education, gender, age, race, income and frequency of religious attendance and serve as the basis for addressing the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses. Control variables include, party identification, ideology, campaign interest, campaign contact, media use for campaign information, using the Internet for campaign information about the presidential campaign, candidate support, and the aforementioned Internet access and frequency measures (See Table 3-7). Control variables are used to rule out alternative explanations, but at the same time shed light on what the best predictors are for a given activity.

Table 3-7: *Independent and Control Variables including Internet Access and Internet Frequency*

	Data Collection Period
Age	All
Education	All
Race	All
Income	All
Frequency of religious attendance	All
Party identification	All
Ideology	All
Campaign interest	All
Internet access	All, but in the model only during Case 1
Internet frequency	All, Except February 1 through March 10 (not on survey)
Campaign contact online	All
Candidate support	All
Media usage	All

For purposes of the analyses, I set the demographic variables as dichotomous 0,1 variables (See Table 3-8). I have chosen the age category, "18 to 29 years old" to measure age because prior research suggests that this younger category is more technologically sophisticated (e.g., Zukin et al., 2005; Howe and Strauss, 2000). The education and income variables were set at higher levels, so that they could be used as markers for the traditional biases in participation. Race as a variable was categorized simply as black/non-black to test the levels of participation activities of African-Americans, a group considered to be disadvantaged, politically.

Religious attendance is not a dichotomous variable in my analysis. Instead, I recoded it as a numerical variable ranging from one to five, where one means "never attend religious services" and a five means, "attend religious services more than once a week."

Table 3-8: *Recoded Independent Variables for Analyses*

	1	0
Age	18-29	Not 18-29
Education	College Grad or higher	Not College Grad or higher
Race	Black	Not Black
Income	Household Income $100K or higher	Household Income Not $100K or higher
Gender	Male	Female

3.3 Analytic method

Tables 3-9 and 3-9a display an outline of the analytical methods used to test the hypotheses, followed by a detailed description of the methods as they apply to the four case studies that comprise my analysis. Generally, each case follows a similar pattern to address the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses: descriptive frequencies, correlation analyses, and determining predictors of political participation using multivariate analyses. Most of the multivariate models involve logistic regression because each of the participation dependent variables is dichotomous. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was an inappropriate technique for most of analysis because dichotomous variables violate at least two of the five assumptions necessary to undertake a linear model: homoscedasticity and normal distribution. Binomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable into a logit variable which means that the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not. Logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring.[11] However, I did use OLS regression to estimate the predictors for the online and offline participation indexes.

[11] For a further discussion on logistic regression, see Allison (2006)

The regression models included interactions to test whether a third variable moderates the influence of an independent variable on the outcome or dependent variable. In Case 1, the interaction terms are made up of the Internet access variable and the demographic independent variables. In Cases 2 through 4, the interaction terms include frequency of Internet use and one of the demographic independent variables.[12] For purposes of the multivariate analyses, I made the decision to collapse the frequency of internet usage variable into a dichotomous high frequency of Internet usage. Those who indicated they use the Internet several hours per day were re-coded as "1" and less frequent internet users were coded as "0".[13] If the interaction term decreases the influence of the independent variable, significantly, then the interaction has a moderating effect on the original relationship, and thus provides evidence for mobilization.[14]

[12] In a personal conversation with Eszter Hargittai, a professor of communication at Northwestern University on December 10, 2008, she mentioned that a nuanced measure of Internet literacy/skill is a better Internet classification variable than frequency, but we never measured literacy. Therefore, I cannot empirically test her assertion, but believe that Internet frequency is sufficient. She suggested I make it clear that more recent studies on Internet use (by her) use literacy rather than frequency as a better classification variable.

[13] From the beginning of Case 2 (July 2, 2008) through the end of the field period (11/3), 31.2% said they were frequent Internet users

[14] For more on interactions, see Jaccard and Turis, 2006)

Table 3-9: *Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 1 and 2*

Case 1	Hypothesis to be Addressed
Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and Caucuses Period February 1 through March 10	H1a-b and H2a-d
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using primary data	
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors	
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors of online and offline participation	
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions between Internet use and predictors	
Case 2	
A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and Reinforcement during the Primaries and Caucuses	H1a-b and H2a-d
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using retrospective primary data	
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors	
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors of online and offline participation—A Retrospective Analysis	
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions between Internet use and predictors--A Retrospective Analysis	
A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the Primaries and Caucuses	H3a-c
Step 1: OLS Regression to determine if online campaign contact during the primaries and caucuses was more likely to activate political participation than offline campaign contact—A Retrospective Analysis	
Step 2: Descriptive analysis of online political participation activities performed during the primaries and caucuses to determine effectiveness of Obama online communication compared with Clinton online campaign communication--A Retrospective Analysis	

Table 3-9a: *Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 3 and 4*

Case 3	
Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General Election Period-Pre-convention Period to General Election Day (Data Collected August 8 through October 2)	H1a-b and H2a-d
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using pre-election data	
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors	
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors of online and offline participation	
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions between Internet use and predictors	
Case 4	
A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General Election using the Post-election Panel	H1a-b and H2a-d
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using pre-election data	
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors	
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors of Online and Offline participation	
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions between Internet use and predictors	

3-3.1 Testing the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses

For each of the four cases, I conducted a test of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses (H1a-b and H2a-d) applying univariate, bivariate and multivariate analytical techniques. For each of the cases, I followed specific steps which are described in detail in the next section. I discuss Case 1 separately because the Internet measure in terms of access was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the Internet measure in the other cases in terms of frequency of usage.

3-3.2 Case 1: Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and Caucuses Period February 1 through March 10

3-3.2.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation—Case 1. As a first step, I describe the type and frequency of online and offline participation activities reported by respondents. I then conducted a bivariate analysis of these participation activities by the key demographic independent variables as a means of establishing whether the traditional biases occurred or if new biases emerged, potentially as a result of the Internet's influence.

3-3.2.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities and key demographic and behavioral variables—Case One. In this step, I conducted a correlation analysis to determine if there were significant relationships between, and among, the participation variables and key demographic and political behavioral and attitudinal variables, such as party identification and campaign interest. This is an important step to undertake because before I attempt to establish causation, I need to show whether relationships to exist between and among these variables.

3-3.2.3 Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to Determine the Most Robust Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation—Case One . In order to determine the predictors of the variety of participation activities, I ran a series of logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. These predictors will provide additional evidence that either the traditional biases continue in the presence of controls or new biases occur (e.g. older people less likely to view political video online). The dependent variables, in Case 1, were the three general participation variables measured without regard to whether they were done online or offline (persuasion for support, volunteering for campaign, donating to a campaign), the variety of individual online and

offline political participation behaviors, and the two offline and online indexes. The independent variables in the model included age, gender, race, education, income, and religiosity. The control variables were party identification, ideology, campaign contact, Internet use, campaign interest, candidate support, and media usage for political information.

Within each of the participation activities, the most robust predictors are those with the highest odds ratios estimated by the logistic regression models when compared within category. If the odds ratios are significant and higher among younger people, African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then this would be evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after applying controls. Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the unstandardized "b" coefficients are significant and greater for the non-traditional independent variables, then this would be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not emerge. Furthermore, if the coefficients are significant and greater for online participation than offline participation then that is also evidence of mobilization (See Table 3-10).

3-3.2.4 Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet use and predictors—Case One. I estimated discrete logistic regression models for the discrete participation variables and OLS regression models for the indexes to test for interactions between Internet access and age, gender, race, income and education. In Case 1, Internet access could be a moderator of the effect of one of the independent variables on offline political participation, the outcome variable. During the primary period, *Internet access* was measured as a dichotomous variable: "yes" or "no" to a question

asking whether respondents had Internet access at home, work, or elsewhere. These interactions will indicate if having Internet access impacts the effect of demographic variables on offline participation. If the offline political participation regression model, before interactions, shows support for the reinforcement hypothesis, where the traditional biases are upheld, then a significant and negative interaction between the demographic variables and Internet access could moderate the effect and, therefore provide evidence for mobilization (See Table 3-10).

Table 3-10: *Case 1-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-b (Steps 3 and 4)*

Model/Hyp	Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Interaction Variables*
1-3 H1a-b	Political participation variables without regard to being offline and online: 1) Persuading others to support or oppose a candidate, 2) Volunteering to work for a campaign, 3) Donating to a campaign	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support	Internet Access X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious Attendance
4-11 Determine Predictors	Online political participation variables (See Table 5)	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support	N/A
12-14 H2a-b	Offline political participation variables (See Table 2)	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate support	Internet Access X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious Attendance
15 Determine Predictors	Online political participation Index	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support	N/A
16 H2a-b	Offline political participation Index	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate support	Internet Access X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious Attendance

*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable's coefficient is significant.

3-3.3: Cases 2 through 4: An analysis of mobilization and reinforcement

In Case 1, the analysis focused on testing mobilization and reinforcement during the early and middle primary and caucus period (February 1 through March 10, 2008). I was limited in my test because of the lack of a truly discriminating internet usage question. Beginning with Case 2, I was able to put such a measure in place. Therefore, I was able to expand the number of tests I could perform on my hypotheses. This section details the steps I followed in testing these hypotheses in Cases 2 through 4. I will point out the slight differences in each case, but for the most part, the process was the same.

Case 2 took a retrospective look at mobilization and reinforcement during the entire primary and caucus period. The retrospective primary and caucus questions differed somewhat from the primary period questions since the focus was mainly on activation by the campaigns (H4a-b) rather than solely on participation activities. Case 2 represents a slightly different way to test mobilization and reinforcement since it covers the entire primary and caucus period. Case 3 focuses on data collected during much but not the entire general election period (August 8 through October 2, 2008). The analysis of the Case 3 data shows whether mobilization, reinforcement, or both occurred during the 2008 general election campaign. The participation variables are somewhat different from those in Case 1 and Case 2 and, therefore, present a slightly different test of the hypotheses. Last, during Case 4, the final phase of data collection, NAES collected retrospective participation data from respondents who completed the survey from August 8, 2008 through November 3, 2008. The retrospective participation questions were similar to the pre-general election questions in Case 3, but I asked the respondent to recall

participation activities throughout the general election period, rather than during the prior week (See Tables 3,4, 6 and 7 for questions used in each of the cases related to the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses).

3-3.3.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis—Cases 2 through 4. In Step 1, I describe the type and frequency of online and offline participation activities undertaken in each case, followed by a bivariate analyses of these participation activities by the key demographic independent variables as a means of showing if the traditional biases occurred or if new biases emerged.

3-3.3.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities and key demographic and behavioral variables—Cases 2 through 4. Similar to Case 1, I performed a correlation analysis to determine if the relationships between the participation variables and key demographics, political variables, and relevant behavioral variables are significant. However, cases are not directly comparable because the set of participation questions are slightly different.

3-3.3.3 Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors of Online and Offline participation— Cases 2 through 4. In Step 3, I determined the predictors of online and offline participation, by conducting a series of logistic regressions for the particular participation items, and an OLS regression for the combined online index and the combined offline index. As in Case 1, the independent variables in the model include age, gender, race, education, income, and religiosity. Control variables include party identification, ideology, campaign contact, frequency of Internet use

(replacing Internet access), campaign interest, candidate support/vote, and media usage for political information (See Table 11).

3-3.3.4 Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet use and predictors--Cases 2 through 4. As the final and most direct test of the mobilization versus reinforcement hypotheses I added interaction terms (between frequency of internet use and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic regression analyses (see Table 3-11). The logic of these analyses is straightforward. Consider, for example, the frequency of offline political discussion. Suppose that in the initial logistic regression analyses describe in "step three" I find that frequent internet use *increases* offline political discussion, but being young (18-29) *decreases* offline discussion. If internet use acts to reduce age-related biases in participation beyond the direct or main effects of being young and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a mobilizing effect), then the interaction between these two variables should be significant and positive. If, however, it acts to reinforce this bias, it should be negative. Beyond this, the size of the interaction (relative to the main effects of age and Internet use) and the specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it is being driven by young people who use the internet frequently increasing their political discussion or Internet users decreasing their political discussion) provides further evidence in support or opposition to the mobilization hypothesis.

Table 3-11: *Cases 2-4-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-d (Steps 3 and 4)*

Model/Hypoth	Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Interaction Variables*
1-3 H1a-b	Political participation variables without regard to being offline and online: 1) Persuading others to support or oppose a candidate, 2) Volunteering to work for a campaign, 3) Donating to a campaign	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support,	High Internet Use X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious attendance
4-11 H2a-d	Online political participation variables (See Table 6)	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support	High Internet Use X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious attendance
12-16 H2a-b	Offline political participation variables (See Table 3)	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate support	High Internet Use X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious attendance
17 H2c-d	Online political participation Index	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate Support	High Internet Use X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious attendance
18 H2a-b	Offline political participation Index	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Internet access, Media use for political information, Candidate support	High Internet Use X Age, Education, Race, Gender, Income, Religious attendance

*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable's coefficient is significant.

3-3.4: Testing H3ac: Case 2-- A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the Primaries and Caucuses (July 2 through August 4, 2008)

Research Question Four presents the following hypotheses**:**

H3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline

H3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton campaign in the primaries.

H3c: Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign

I analyzed Case 2 data (the retrospective primaries and caucuses) to test Hypotheses 3a-c. To test H3a and H3c, I used OLS regression to determine if campaign contact activated political participation. To test H3b, I used descriptive analysis of online political participation activities performed during the primaries.

3-3.4.1 Step 1: OLS Regression To Determine If Campaign Contact Activated Political Participation, Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3a and H3c). In order to test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I constructed several OLS regression models to determine if campaign contact activated political participation. I ran several regression models addressing this hypothetical claim that those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline. I then ran several more regression models addressing the claim of hypothesis 3c that those contacted online by Obama were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted online by Clinton. The key dependent

variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c are *political participation* (without specifying offline or online), *offline political participation*, and *online political participation*. There would be support for hypothesis 3a if the positive coefficients are greater for online contact variables than for offline contact. Support for hypothesis 3c would exist if the positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact variables than for the Clinton contact variables (See Table 3-12).

3-3.4.2 Step 2: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation Activities Performed During the Primaries Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3b. In this final part of the analysis, I ran a straightforward descriptive analysis showing the types of offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the primaries. In addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign contact by the Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with the participation activities.

Table 3-12: *Case 2-- Regression Models to Test H3a-c (Step 2)*

Model	Dependent Variable	Independent Variables	Controls
1	Offline Political Participation	a) Contacted by Either Clinton or Obama b) Contact by Campaign Online c) Contact by Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
2	Online Political Participation	a) Contacted by Either Clinton or Obama b) Contact by Campaign Online c) Contact by Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
3	Political Participation (combined)	a) Contacted by Either Clinton or Obama b) Contact by Campaign Online c) Contact by Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
4	Offline Political Participation	a) Contact by the Obama Campaign b) Contact by the Obama Campaign Online c) Contact by the Obama Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Campaign interest, Religious attendance, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
5	Online Political Participation	a) Contact by the Obama Campaign b) Contact by the Obama Campaign Online c) Contact by the Obama Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Campaign interest, Religious attendance, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
6	Political Participation (combined)	a) Contact by the Obama Campaign b) Contact by the Obama Campaign Online c) Contact by the Obama Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Campaign interest, Religious attendance, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
7	Offline Political Participation	a) Contact by the Clinton Campaign	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income,

		b) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Online c) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Offline	Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
8	Online Political Participation	a) Contact by the Clinton Campaign b) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Online c) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access
9	Political Participation (combined)	a) Contact by the Clinton Campaign b) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Online c) Contact by the Clinton Campaign Offline	Age, Gender, Race, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Campaign interest, Party Identification, Ideology, Level of Internet access

3.4: Limitations to Design

There are several limitations to this design that I must point out here. First, measures are based on self-report, which have been shown to be less reliable measures of behavior (See Hovland, 1959; Converse, 1964; Prior, 2009). Additionally, Hargittai (2005, 2009), asserts that nuanced measures of Internet literacy/skill are superior to self-reported frequency or general self-reported Internet literacy. Other studies have used Internet skills as a measure to predict participation, also (DiGennaro and Dutton, 2006). However, NAES does not measure frequency in that way and contains no measures of Internet literacy; therefore, I accept this as a limitation of this study. Second, the political participation questions have not been consistent throughout the survey periods, and therefore there is no mechanism to directly compare results among the time periods. However, each case can be viewed as a separate study of mobilization and reinforcement contributing important findings related to different measures. Third, it might be difficult to assess the wider applicability of these results beyond 2008 because of this presidential campaign's uniqueness. This is a campaign where for the first time a major party has nominated an African American, and nearly nominated a woman. The excitement generated by the Obama and Clinton candidacies in attracting voters might overpower the effects of the Internet. However, with my study, which controls for those variables, I will demonstrate how the campaigns effectively used the Internet as part of the activation process.

MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART I: THE 2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES

I have divided the findings related to mobilization and reinforcement into two parts. Part I presents the analysis of the two cases covering the 2008 primaries and caucuses—Case 1 (Chapter 4) and Case 2 (Chapter 5). Part II presents the mobilization and reinforcement findings from the two cases concentrating on the general election period—Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7). I have organized the findings in this way, so the reader may easily follow and compare the results from these two distinct periods in the 2008 presidential campaign.

The four case studies illustrate in multiple ways how political participation occurred online and offline during the 2008 campaign, how often, who was more likely to participate and/or predict participation, and finally, determine whether reinforcement, mobilization, or both occurred. Prior research is equivocal about the impact of internet on participation. The results presented in the following chapters are an attempt to the provide clarity, but in the end, they raise more questions. Nevertheless, I conclude that the data suggest strongly that mobilization took place.

CHAPTER 4: CASE 1-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE 2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES ON AND AROUND SUPER TUESDAY

The findings contained within this chapter are from the Case 1 data collected as part of the NAES rolling cross section telephone survey from February 1, 2008 through March 10, 2008. The data cover the period in which there were thirty-nine primaries and caucuses, including twenty-two that took place on Super Tuesday, February 5. During this period the candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties engaged in intensive efforts to involve more potential voters than at any other point during the primaries and caucuses.

Findings presented in this chapter and the subsequent ones related to mobilization and reinforcement (Chs. 4-7) are structured similarly. Minor variation will be noted accordingly in the specific chapter. Chapter 4 includes the following analyses of Case 1:

- A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported retrospectively; including a correlation analysis among participation activities;
- Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online participation;
- Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between Internet access and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or reinforcement—focusing only on offline participation.

4-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

In Case 1, political participation activities were measured by respondent recall of engagement in selected activities during the week prior to being interviewed. The results indicate a relatively low level of participation, but interesting patterns emerged from this data collection method. A major premise underlying this study of mobilization and reinforcement rests on the notion that there is systematic bias in the levels of political participation across different demographic groups. Prior research, noted in Chapter 2, has demonstrated that those who are better educated and more affluent are most likely to engage in political participation activities, while the less educated, minorities and young adults are least likely to be involved in such actions. The descriptive analysis detailed in this chapter partly affirms and contradicts the past biases in a variety of ways.

Demographically, some of the Case 1 findings provide evidence of the bias reported in prior research, with more affluent and better educated adults more likely to engage in the measured participation activities, both online and offline. However, countering the biases, the data show that younger people were more likely to report engaging in most of the measured online behaviors and most of the offline behaviors, pointing, perhaps, to greater youth involvement in the campaign. More significantly, African Americans emerge as a group more likely to say they engaged in several of the online and offline behaviors. This finding also contradicts prior research on participation among African Americans during the primaries (See Table 4-1), and may reflect the effects of the presence of a "serious" African American candidate.[15] This first picture of

[15] The most direct comparison is the 2004 NAES. During the primaries, African Americans were significantly less likely than whites to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate and contribute to

African American activity is rather incomplete since Table 4-1 provides descriptive data only, without the presence of controls. Subsequent analyses will provide a clearer picture.

As for the frequency of activity among the adult population, generally, the Case 1 data show more adults reported participating by attempting to persuade someone they knew to either support or oppose a candidate (27.2%) than any other activity. However, they were much more likely to say they engaged in this type of persuasion offline (24.1%) than online (3.0%).

Few adults reported performing the other offline activities measured during this period. Two percent or fewer reported they volunteered to work for (0.7%), or contributed to one of the candidates, offline (2.1%).

In Case 1, the survey measured eight online participation activities (See Chapter 3 for detail). A nearly equal proportion of adults said they performed one of the three activities: forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (14.7%), viewing political video on sites like YouTube (13.4%), visiting web sites of one of the campaigns (12.3%), or discussing politics online (11.4%). Among the unique online activities measured, fewer said they read or posted to a blog having to do with politics or the campaign (7.3%) (See Table 4-1). [16] Not surprisingly, these four uniquely online activities are moderately, but significantly and positively correlated with each other. For example, forwarding political emails is moderately correlated with discussing politics online (r= .45), viewing political video online (r= .29), and visiting a campaign website (r= .28). Visiting a

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the primary campaign of one of the candidates. During the 2008 primaries and caucus period measured in Case 1, the gap has closed—See Table 4-1.

[16] Unique because there is no equivalent offline activity

campaign web site is also moderately correlated with viewing a political video (r= .36) and reading or posting to a political blog (r= .24) (See Appendix for correlation table).

It is important to note that the while the relationships are moderate and positive, they are not strong enough to be concerned about collinearity. The Case 1 correlations among the variety of participation activities range from r= .02 to r=.45, suggesting that it is proper to examine the mobilizing or reinforcing effect of each activity, rather than combining them into an index.

Table 4-1: *Case 1 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)*

Activities Regardless of Whether it Was Performed Offline during the presidential primary campaign done in the prior week	All Adults % (n=4,812)	College Graduate Or Higher % (n=1,914)	Not College Graduate % (n=2,898)	Male % (n=2,047)	Female % (n=2,765)	Age 18-29 % (n=377)	Age 30 or older % (n=4,435)	African-American % (n=425)	Not African-American % (n=4,387)	Household Income: $100K Or more % (n=990)	Household Income: Less than $100K % (n=3,822)
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate	27.2	32.2***	23.8	28.0	26.5	33.4**	26.6	30.8	26.5	33.6***	25.5
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.6	0.9	1.9	0.9	0.9	1.0
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates	3-3	5.4***	1.8	3.4	3.1	2.1	3.3	3.5	3.2	5.8***	2.6
OFFLINE Activities during the presidential primary campaign done in the prior week											
Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or oppose a candidate	24.1	27.8***	21.7	24.5	23.9	28.6*	23.8	28.2*	23.8	28.7***	23.0
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates OFFLINE	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.9**	0.6	0.4	0.8
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE	2.1	3.0***	1.4	2.2	1.9	1.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	3.1**	1.8

ONLINE Activities during the presidential primary campaign done in the prior week											
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	3.0	4.4***	2.1	3.5	2.7	4.8*	2.9	2.6	3.1	4.9***	2.5
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	++	0.5	++	++	++	0.8	++	++	++	0.5	++
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE	1.1	2.4***	++	1.5	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.1	2.6***	0.8
Discuss Politics ONLINE	11.4	16.4***	8.1	12.4	10.6	19.6***	10.7	11.4	11.1	16.9***	10.0
Visited Website of a presidential campaign or political party	12.3	17.9***	8.7	13.9**	11.2	20.7***	11.6	17.2**	11.9	18.9***	10.6
Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign	13.4	18.1***	10.2	16.6***	11.0	26.0***	12.3	19.8***	12.8	19.5***	11.8
Read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a campaign	7.3	9.9***	5.6	8.8**	6.3	13.0***	6.9	10.6**	7.0	9.9**	6.7
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know	14.7	19.5***	11.5	15.1	14.3	15.9	14.6	14.1	14.7	23.2***	12.5

++=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

4-2: Determining Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation

The Case 1 descriptive analysis of participation during the primaries taking place on and around Super Tuesday suggest that the biases toward the more advantaged groups (educated and affluent) continue, but at the same time, it suggests potential for the emergence of more non-traditional participatory groups—young adults and African Americans, being particularly energized. The next step in the analysis involving Logistic and OLS regression produced a more accurate outcome because the models of participation were tested with a number of statistical controls in place. In the presence of controls, high education is a significant predictor only for the acts of contributing money to campaigns, either offline or online. Education was not significant for any other activities. The emergence of a more active African American participation group is not borne out by the results of the multivariate analysis, where African Americans are significant predictors of just two activities. On the other hand, the models did produce an increase in the predictive value of age since young adults were significant predictors for half of the activities measured. While the demographic variables are my primary focus, the political variables, including campaign interest and online campaign contact, emerged most often as the most robust significant predictors for many of the participation activities. The significant strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process. "High campaign interest" as a predictor is consistent with much of the previous work on participation, especially that which shows reinforcement (e.g., Johnson and Kaye, 1998, 2003; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Norris, 2001).

This pattern showing the strength and robustness of campaign interest and campaign contact is found throughout this study. In contrast to the consistency of interest and contact, the data will show a decided lack of consistency in the predictive value of the demographic variables from case to case.

For the remainder of this section, I present the details of the multivariate analyses of the four classes of participation activities: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, and offline donating, 3) online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, discussing politics online, visiting campaign web sites, viewing political video on sites like YouTube, reading or posting to a political blog, and forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and offline indexes. Within each of these classes of activities, profiles will be constructed to illustrate those who are more likely to engage in the participation behaviors.

Logistic regression was used to model the individual activities and OLS to model the indexes. The logistic predictors are represented as "odds ratios" (OR). Odds Ratios simply present the likelihood of an outcome occurring (e.g., visiting a campaign web site) for a particular independent variable (e.g., males). Within each of the participation activities, the most vigorous predictors are those with the highest odds ratios estimated by the logistic regression models when compared within category. A significant odds ratio of 2.5 for the likelihood of a male viewing a political video on YouTube means that a male is two and a half times more likely than a female to view an online political video,

controlling for other factors. In general, if odds ratios are significant and higher among younger people, African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then this would be evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after applying controls. Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the unstandardized "b" coefficients are significant and greater for the lower SES independent variables, then this would be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not emerge. Furthermore, if the coefficients are significant and greater for online participation than offline participation then that is also evidence of the mobilizing effects of the Internet.

4-2.1: Predictors of Participation Activities Regardless of Online or Offline Distinctions

The participation activities analyzed in this section are those which occur either offline or online. These activities, persuading, donating, and attending campaign meetings and rallies replicate some of the activities measured in elections before the advent of the Internet as a tool for political participation. The purpose of this analysis was to assess whether the traditional SES biases found in prior elections were found in the 2008 primaries.

4.2.1.1: Persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate.

This activity involves persuading someone with whom one comes in contact to either support or oppose one of the presidential candidates. This could be in-person, face-to-face, through writing, email, texting, blogging, by telephone, or in a meeting. Controlling for other demographic, attitudinal and behavioral factors, young adults, age 18 to 29, were twice as likely as older ones to say they persuaded someone to support or

oppose a presidential candidate (OR=1.985, p<.001). No other demographic group (e.g., gender, education, income) showed a significant relationship with persuasion. Of the non-demographic variables included in the model, high levels of campaign interest (OR=2.310, p<.001) and reporting having been contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=1.879, p<.05) were most strongly associated with attempting to persuade someone how to vote. Additionally, those who engaged in this type of persuasion were more likely to be self-identified as Democrats (OR=1.373) (See Table 4-2).

4-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. None of the SES variables traditionally associated with political participation significantly predicted volunteering for a campaign, though consistent with the findings of Verba et al. (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more one attends religious services the greater the likelihood of volunteering (OR=1.683, p<.001). Also consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) work on recruitment, online campaign contact was an exceedingly strong predictor of this behavior (OR=19.299, p<.001).[17] High interest in the presidential campaign (OR=1.916, p<.01), self-identifying as a liberal (OR=1.506, p<.05), and citing the Internet as a primary source for campaign information (OR=1.16, p<.05) were also significant predictors of volunteering regardless whether it was done online or offline (See Table 4-2).

4-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or a campaign. The more educated the respondent, the more likely he or she was to report having donated money to one of the campaigns (OR=2.184, p<.001). Those reporting online campaign contact (OR=2.291, p<.05), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.912, p<.001) were about

[17] Odds ratio may be high because so few said they volunteered to work for a campaign during that period.

twice as likely to contribute to a campaign. Surprisingly, according to the logistic regression, Obama supporters were less likely to say they contributed to a campaign in the week prior to being interviewed than supporters of other candidate (OR=0.665, $p<.05$).

In sum, the demographic predictors of activities without regard to whether they are done offline or online are young adults for persuading others, religious attendance for volunteering, and education for donating to campaign. These demographic variables are also found to be significant for predicting the related offline and online activities, as the next two sections will show.

Table 4-2: *Case 1--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was conducted offline or online*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate	Volunteer for Candidate or Campaign	Contribute Money to a candidate or campaign
Education (Collgrad+)	.996	.753	2.184***
Gender (male)	.924	.861	.974
Age (18-29)	1.985***	2.166	1.146
Race (African-American)	1.037	1.051	1.529
Income (100K plus)	1.182	.893	1.422
Religiosity	1.081**	1.683***	.963
Party (Democrat)	1.373***	1.319	1.239
Ideology (liberal)	.972	1.506*	1.024
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.087***	1.160*	1.052
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.088***	1.009	1.073*
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.008	1.073	1.090**
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.016	.926	.962
Internet Access (yes)	1.259*	.559	1.056
Campaign Interest	2.310***	1.916*	1.912***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.879*	19.299***	2.291*
Obama Supporter	.822*	1.312	.665*
Constant	.009***	.000***	.001***
N	4,458	4,458	4,458
Correctly Classified	73.7%	99.1%	96.7%
Nagelkerke R Square	.166	.226	.103
Cox & Snell R Square	.115	.022	.026

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,
^=not asked in Case 2

4-2.2: Predictors of Offline Participation Activities

In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were measured.[18] Demographically the logistic models produced no pattern of behavior that could be linked consistently to one or two demographic measures. Instead, each offline activity had a different significant demographic predictor. Youth was a significant predictor for offline persuasion, high levels of education was a significant predictor for offline donations, and religious attendance significantly predicted volunteering for a campaign offline. Online campaign contact was not a consistent predictor of offline participation. Campaign interest was the most consistent predictor, since it was significant for both offline persuasion and offline donation. Detail follows:

4-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to support or oppose a candidate. Demographically, young adults were most active in this behavior, according to the Case 1 logistic model. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were about twice as likely as older ones (OR=1.831, p<.001) to say they attempted to persuade someone, offline, to support or oppose a presidential candidate. Those highly interested in the presidential campaign during this period were more than twice as likely as others less interested to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=2.123, p<.001). Politically, self-identified Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they tried to persuade others offline (OR=1.401, p<.001) (See Table 4-3).

4-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Attending religious services (OR=1.619, p<.01) was a significant demographic predictor for offline

[18] Beginning with Case 2, I was able to add two more—a rally/meeting attendance and wearing a button/displaying a bumper sticker or lawn sign.

campaign volunteering, but it was the only one. Online campaign contact was an extremely robust predictor of volunteering offline (OR=12.809, p<.001). Additionally, those identifying themselves as liberal were almost one and a half times more likely to say they volunteered for one of the campaigns offline (OR=1.469, p<.05)(See Table 4-3).

4-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. Demographically, the more one is educated, the more likely one was to say he or she contributed to one of the campaigns during the primaries period covered by Case 1 (OR=1.740, p<.01). Campaign interest was also a significant predictor, as those with a high level of interest in the presidential campaign were about twice as likely as those with less interest to say they donated offline (OR=1.964, p<.01) Finally, the model showed that Obama supporters were less likely to contribute money to a campaign, offline (See Table 4-3).

Table 4-3: *Case 1-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation Logistic Regression EXP(B)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose candidate OFFLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Contribute money to candidate or campaign OFFLINE
Education (Collgrad+)	1.017	.730	1.740*
Gender (male)	.937	.888	.817
Age (18-29)	1.831***	1.628	1.052
Race (African-American)	1.055	1.675	1.383
Income (100K plus)	1.147	.711	1.297
Religiosity	1.072*	1.619**	.997
Party (Democrat)	1.401***	1.414	1.179
Ideology (liberal)	.993	1.469*	1.054
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.030*	1.048	.959
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.071***	.984	1.083*
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.009	1.088	1.110**
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.028	.969	1.003
Internet Access (yes)	1.232*	.602	.958
Campaign Interest	2.123***	2.048	1.964**
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.033	12.80***9	.907
Obama Supporter	.825*	1.323	.553*
Constant	.011***	.000***	.001***
N	4,458	4,458	4,458
Correctly Classified	75.5%	99.4%	97.9%
Nagelkerke R Square	.115	.158	.071
Cox & Snell R Square	.077	.011	.013

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,
^=not asked in Case 2

4-2.3: Predictors of Online Participation Activities

In this section I examine how predictors of campaign participation look when I separate on-line and off-line activities. The logistic regression models using the former as the dependent variables produce one fairly consistent demographic predictor of online participation —age. Those aged 18 to 29 years old emerge as significant predictors for five of the eight online activities. In comparison, race is a significant predictor for only two of the eight online activities and education is a significant predictor for just one. Among the non-demographic variables, citing the Internet as a campaign source was a significant predictor for all of the on-line activities, while online campaign contact was a significant predictor for all but one. High level of campaign interest was also a significant predictor for most of the activities. In sum, during this period of the campaign, the strongest predictors of most online political participation activities were: youth, Internet use for political purposes, campaign interest, and campaign contact were the strongest predictors of most online political participation activities.

4-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. While very few respondents said they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate online (3% total), among those who did, young adults (age 18-29) (OR=1.821, $p<.05$) were nearly twice as likely as older ones to say they engaged in this behavior. If one was contacted by a campaign online, that person was almost four times as likely as those who were not contacted online to say they persuaded others online (OR=3.598, $p<.001$). Additionally, the more one expressed interest in the campaign, the more likely one was to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate online

(OR=2.707, p<.001). Finally, reporting that the Internet was a main source for campaign information was a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=1.414, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate or campaign. Religious attendance was the only significant demographic predictor for online volunteering for a campaign (OR=1.687, p<.05). Among the political variables included in the models, the strongest predictor by far was online campaign contact. Those reporting such contact were nearly thirty times more likely than those who were not contacted online to volunteer to work online for a candidate. This large ratio might be explained by the fact that so few people indicated they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%) or perhaps the campaigns were good at identifying who to contact. Using the Internet as a primary source for campaign information was also a significant predictor (OR=1.682, p<.01) (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign. Higher education was the only significant demographic predictor for donating to a campaign online (OR=4.284, p<.001), and strongest among all the demographic and political variables in the logistic model. Online campaign contact was about as important as education since those contacted online were just about four times as likely as their counterparts to say they made an online contribution to a presidential candidate during the primary and caucus period on and around Super Tuesday (OR=3.928, p<.01). The more often one went online for campaign information the more likely they were to report donating online (OR=1.266, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. During this active February and early-March phase of the primaries and caucuses, younger adults, age 18 to 29 (OR=2.435, p<.001), were more than twice as likely as older adults to say they discussed politics online with others, even when controlling for a host of other factors. No other demographic independent variable was significant. Again, the most robust of the predictors, however, was online campaign contact (OR=4.358, p<.001). Not surprisingly, those highly interested in the presidential campaign were twice as likely as those less interested to say they discussed politics online (OR=2.031, p<.001). The other significant predictor of note was citing the Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.358, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site. According to the Case 1 logistic model, the demographic profile of those most likely to visit a presidential campaign web site comprised young adults (OR=2.422, p<.001), African Americans (OR=1.620, p<.01), and frequent attendees of religious services (OR=1.158, p<.001). Beyond the demographic predictors, online campaign contact (OR=2.571, p<.001) and campaign interest (OR=2.351, p<.001) were the other significant predictors of visiting a campaign web site. Citing the Internet as a primary campaign source was another important predictor for going to a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.6: Viewing political video on sites like YouTube. Viewing political video on sites like YouTube was typically done by young adults, African Americans, and males, according to the Case 1 logistic model. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were almost three times more likely (OR=2.698, p<.001) than older adults to say they viewed a

political video on YouTube. African Americans were almost twice as likely as non-African Americans to say they engaged in this viewing behavior (OR=1.817, p<.001). Males were about thirty percent more likely than females to say they viewed political video on sites like YouTube (OR=1.292, p<.05). Outside of demographic variables, high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.633, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary source of campaign information (OR=1.426, p<.001) were the other significant predictors for this viewing behavior (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.7: Reading or posting to a blog about the campaign. Youth was the only significant demographic predictor for reading or posting to a blog about the campaign. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were nearly two times more likely to read or post to a political blog than older adults (OR=1.836, p<.01). Online campaign contact (OR=1.791, p<.05), high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.418, p<.01), citing the Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.413, p<.001) and support for Barack Obama (OR=1.325, p<.05) were the other significant indicators of this behavior (See Table 4-4).

4-2.3.8: Forwarding emails, audio or videos about one of the candidates. While males were more likely to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube, they were less likely than females to say they would forward a political video, email, or audio to others (OR=0.690, p<.001). Economic affluence was the other significant demographic predictor indicating those from households with an income of one hundred thousand or higher were more likely than less affluent households to say they forward political material to others (OR=1.424, p<.01). Perhaps because it might be the source for some

of the forwarded campaign material, online campaign contact was the most significant predictor for this behavior (OR=3.981, p<.001). High levels of campaign interest (OR=1.453, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.313, p<.001) were also significant predictors of forwarding political emails, audio, or video (See Table 4-4).

Table 4-4: *Case 1-- Predictors of Online Political Participation: Logistic Regression EXP(B)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign ONLINE	Contribute money to candidate or campaign ONLINE	^Discuss Politics Online	Visit Campaign Website	^Viewed Political Video on Sites Like YouTube	^Read or Post to a blog about campaign	Forward Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others about the candidates
Education (Collgrad+)	.952	.926	4.284***	1.116	1.147	1.034	.965	.959
Gender (male)	.894	.747	1.399	.839	.993	1.292*	1.103	.690***
Age (18-29)	1.821*	3.249	1.324	2.435***	2.422***	2.698***	1.836**	1.215
Race (African-American)	.865	.000	1.850	.880	1.620**	1.817***	1.478	1.142
Income (100K plus)	1.235	1.353	1.608	1.098	1.212	1.112	.926	1.424**
Religiosity	1.068	1.687*	.905	1.027	1.158***	.969	1.029	.977
Party (Democrat)	.870	1.146	1.364	.871	1.055	1.307*	1.065	.712**
Ideology (liberal)	.906	1.487	.968	1.108*	1.103	1.065	1.084	.895*
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.414***	1.682**	1.266***	1.358***	1.411***	1.426***	1.413***	1.313***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.100**	1.077	1.049	1.077***	1.032	1.034	1.073**	1.106***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.994	1.011	1.040	1.022	1.007	1.027	1.034	1.002
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.932	.841	.894	.971	.969	.937**	.953	1.024
Internet Access (yes)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Campaign Interest	2.707***	1.331	1.709	2.031***	2.351***	1.633***	1.418**	1.453***
Contacted by Campaign Online	3.598***	29.173***	3.928**	4.358***	2.571***	1.664	1.791*	3.981***
Obama Supporter	.920	1.190	.873	1.224	.965	1.152	1.325*	1.035
Constant	.000***	.000***	.000***	.002***	.001***	.007***	.004***	.027***
N	4,458	4,458	4,458	4,458	4,458	4,458	4,458	4,458
Correctly Classified	96.9%	99.7%	98.8%	88.7%	87.0%	86.8%	92.3%	85.0%
Nagelkerke R Square	.230	.386	.189	.284	.313	.306	.239	.231
Cox & Snell R Square	.056	.015	.023	.146	.168	.169	.100	.133

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^=not asked in Case 2

4-2.4: Online Index and Offline Index: Predictors

The analyses thus far suggest a complex pattern of predictors of campaign participation that varied both by type of participation and whether that participation occurred online or offline. But can we say anything more general about these patterns? As one attempt to do this, in this section I report the results of two OLS regression models measuring the predictors for a combined online index and a combined offline index. As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3.), the online participation index was created by combining the "yes" responses to the questions related directly to online participation. The offline index variable was created by combining the "yes" responses to the offline questions.

The OLS online participation index model produced two strong demographic predictors: Age and race. Age is also a significant predictor for offline participation, but not as strong as for online participation. Young adults were more likely to report engaging in at least one of the online participation activities ($b=.368$, $p<.001$). Being African American significantly predicts online participation, as well ($b=.128$, $p<.05$). Youth is a significant predictor for offline participation ($b=.105$, $p<.001$), but no other demographic variables produce strong significant effects. Religious attendance produces a weak, but significant positive effect for offline participation ($b=.013$, $p<.05$) (See Table 4-5).

Moving beyond the demographic variables, online campaign contact was a strong, significant predictor for online participation, more so, by far, than any other control variable ($b=1.295$, $p<.001$). However, it was not a significant predictor for offline

participation. High campaign interest was a significant predictor for both online (b=.196, p<.001) and offline participation (b=.119, p<.001). Finally, citing the Internet as a primary campaign information source was a significant predictor of online participation (b=.202, p<.001) (See Table 4-5).

Table 4-5: *Case 1--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline Political Participation: OLS Regression*

	Online Participation Index	Offline Participation Index
Education (College Grad+)	.008	.012
Gender (male)	-.028	-.015
Age (18-29)	.368***	.105***
Race (African American)	.128*	.025
Income ($100K plus)	.071	.028
Religiosity	.011	.013*
Party (Democrat)	-.001	.064***
Ideology (liberal)	.013	.003
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.202***	.006*
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.041***	.016***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.009	.004
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.018**	.003
Internet Access (Yes)	NA	.024
Campaign Interest	.196***	.119***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.295***	.084
Obama Supporter	.065	-.043**
Constant	-.538***	-.275***
N	4,457	4,457
R Square	.362	.079
R Square Change	.306***	.067***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

4-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both

As our final effort to assess the mobilizing and/or reinforcing effects of the Internet on political participation in Case 1, I replicated the logistic regression models for predicting online participation discussed earlier, this time adding variables for the

interaction of Internet access the central demographic independent variables (age, income, race, gender and education).[19] The purpose of these analyses is to determine if the combination of Internet access (used here as a proxy for general Internet use) and key demographic characteristics has an additional effect on offline participation beyond that of any main effects, and if so, are these effects more consistent with reinforcement (i.e., the interaction further boosts the participation of those who already participate at relatively greater rates) or mobilization (i.e., it reduces or erases the participation gaps traditionally associated with SES).

However, the results of these tests of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses produced no significant interactions between Internet access and any of the significant demographic variables predicting the offline participation activities. In short, these tests, while limited, provided no additional support for either mobilization or reinforcement.

4-4: Case 1--Summary of Findings

In Case 1 the analysis focused on a period during the primaries and caucuses in which there was a great deal of activity due to the number of states holding their primary/caucus electoral contests at that time. The takeaway from the Case 1 analysis is that age, race, online contact and campaign interest are consistently strong predictors for both the online index and individual activities, but individuals show more nuanced behavior which cannot be picked up by the index. In summarizing Case 1 findings, the

[19] As detailed in the methods chapter, a test was conducted for mobilization or reinforcement only among the offline participation variables. The Internet measure during the Case 1 period was an access measure and not a frequency measure.

descriptive analysis of the Case 1 online and offline participation activities revealed that the traditional demographic variables associated with participation—education and income—produced the biases found in prior research. However, the frequencies pointed to some evidence that young people, a group not traditionally associated with participation, had become involved in a number of participation activities, both offline (persuasion), and online (persuasion, discussion, visiting campaign web sites, viewing online political video and reading or posting to a blog). In addition, African Americans were more likely to become involved in the campaign, according to the descriptive analysis.

As for general participatory behavior, the descriptive analysis indicated a relatively low level of reported participation among the total adult population for most activities. However, when extrapolating these relatively low numbers to the actual adult population, they do not appear to be insignificant—numbering in the millions. One potential explanation for the low numbers could be a result of how the questions were posed to the respondents. During the Case 1 period, respondents were asked to report their behavior in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign. Case 2 posed the participation questions to respondents in a way they could answer retrospectively over the entire campaign. As will be shown in the presentation of the Case 2 findings, reported behaviors were higher.

As part of the descriptive analysis, correlations among the various participation activities were generally low, with a few exceptions for online participation where the relationships were moderate (r ranging between .24 and .45). This analysis indicates that

since the activities were not highly correlated, then following an analytical plan whereby, each activity was examined, separately, makes sense.

Predictors showed that with statistical controls in place, the effect of education and income disappeared or diminished for most activities. Young adults remained significant predictors for several activities, but the significance of African Americans as predictors of certain behaviors disappeared or diminished. Beyond the demographics, online campaign contact and campaign interest, emerged consistently as the most robust predictors of behavior for nearly all participation activities, both online and offline.

Contrary to the online analysis presentation online campaign contact was not a consistent predictor of offline participation. However, where the Obama campaign excelled—using the Internet to mobilize volunteers—online campaign contact was a robust, significant predictor. Campaign interest was most consistent predictor, since it was significant for both offline persuasion and offline donation.

Tables 4-6 and 4-7 provide a visual summary of which variables were the top predictors based on both level of significance and size of the odds ratio. A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity. For example, if Age (18-29) was significant and negative, then those older than age 29 were more likely to perform the activity.

Table 4-6: *Case 1-- Top 6 Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)*

	Persuade someone to vote offline	Volunteer for candidate offline	Donate to Presidential Campaign OFFLINE
Education (College Grad+)			X+
Gender (male)			
Age (18-29)	X+		
Race (African-American)			
Income ($100K plus)			
Religiosity		X+	
Party (Democrat)	X+		
Ideology (liberal)		X+	
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days			
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days			
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days			
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days			
Campaign Interest	X+		X+
Contacted by Campaign Online		X+	
Obama Supporter	X-		X-

Table 4-7: *Case 1—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)*

	Persuade someone to vote online	Volunteer for candidate online	Donate to a Presidential Campaign Online	Discuss politics online	Visit Campaign Website	Viewed Video Sites Like YouTube	Read or Post to a blog about campaign	Forward Emails
Education (College Grad+)			X+					
Gender (male)						X+		
Age (18-29)	X+			X+	X+	X+	X+	X-
Race (African-American)					X+	X+		
Income ($100K plus)								X+
Religiosity		X+			X+			
Party (Democrat)						X+		X+
Ideology (liberal)								
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	X+		X+				X+	
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days								
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days								
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)								
Campaign Interest	X+	X+		X+	X+	X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online	X+		X+	X+	X+		X+	X+
Obama Supporter							X+	

Finally, the Case 1 analysis provided no support for either mobilization or reinforcement during the early primaries and caucuses. Internet access did not significantly interact with any of the significant demographic predictors for the offline activities, either individually or for the combined index.

CHAPTER 5: CASE 2 FINDINGS-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA COLLECTION

This chapter presents the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement during the primaries and caucuses, measured retrospectively. The findings reported in the previous chapter were measured during a narrower period of time and respondents were asked to report their activities in the prior week. This retrospective analysis takes a broader look at the participation activities respondents reported throughout the primaries and caucuses.

The Case 2 data were collected as part of the NAES rolling cross section telephone sample from July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008. This chapter presents results of the following analyses

- A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported retrospectively, including a correlation analysis among participation activities;
- Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online participation;
- Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or reinforcement; and
- A comparison between the data from Cases 1 and 2

5-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

In Case 1, political participation was based on self-reported behavior in the week prior to being interviewed during an intensive period of the primaries and caucuses

calendar when a strong majority of the states were holding or had just held their primaries or caucuses. Despite the intensity of campaign activity across many states, the percentage of adults who indicated engaging in some form of participation was low. Perhaps this low report of activity is a consequence of the prior week recall method. The data indicate a similar pattern of recall and reporting as Case 3 (which focused on the general election) when the participation questions were posed in a similar manner. Not surprisingly, given the wider time-frame covered, respondents reported higher levels of participation using this method. The relative rates of participation across different types were generally similar across the two cases, however, giving us confidence that the responses accurately reflect actual behavior.

Consistent with the traditional SES model documented by Verba and Nie (1972) among others, advantaged groups--well-educated and affluent--were consistently more likely to say they participated in all the activities—offline or online—than were the less educated and less affluent (See Table 5-1). However, once again African Americans, a group considered less likely to participate in prior elections, far exceeded their non-African American counterparts in a number of reported offline activities and two of five of online activities. The emergence of African Americans as more active participants in this and other cases reported in this dissertation suggests that the unique nature of the 2008 presidential campaign, where for the first time in United States history an African American was a serious contender for a party nomination, may have disproportionately mobilized African American voters. In addition young adults (age 18-29) were more likely to say they participated in some activities, but less likely than older adults to do so

for things like donating money to a campaign. The data in Table 5-1, are descriptive in nature and there are no controls to further explain the result.

Across the adult population, more than three in ten (31%) said they made an attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate during the primaries and caucuses. More than a quarter said they did so offline (27.5%), but well under a tenth (3.6%) said they persuaded others using online methods (See Table 5-1). The finding showing that persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate is done most often offline, rather than online, is consistent with findings from all the cases.

About a tenth of adults (10.5%), claimed to have contributed to a campaign. The data reveal that contributing is more likely to be done offline (6.5%) than online (4.1%) during the primaries and caucuses, but the differences are slim and insignificant. However, it is noteworthy that there is a nearly even split between the more traditional offline methods and the more recent online methods (See Table 5-1). Additionally, despite the massive efforts campaigns make to solicit donations via their web sites, there is only a moderate correlation between donating to a campaign online and visiting a campaign web site (r=.26).

The success of any campaign also rests partly on the size of its volunteer campaign organization. According to the Case 2 data, just 2.1 percent of respondents indicated they performed any work for one of the candidates offline and even fewer did so online (less than one half of one percent) (See Table 5-1). While a relatively small proportion of adults said they took part in these activities, they were both moderately correlated with attending political rallies and meetings and wearing a presidential

campaign button (r=.29) or displaying a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a candidate (r=.24).

About a tenth of adults also said they engaged in the two traditional offline activities added to the survey during the retrospective period--wearing presidential campaign buttons, placing a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a candidate (9.1%) and attending political meetings and rallies in support of a candidate (7.4%). These represent modest numbers but are slightly higher than what NAES reported in 2004 (Romer et al., 2006).[20]

Because of space limitations on the survey, I measured only five of the original eight online participation activities in the retrospective period.[21] Among the included activities, the most popular related to campaign learning and passing along campaign information. About a quarter (23.1%) said they visited a web site of a presidential campaign or political party and slightly more than a fifth (20.9%) said they forward emails, audio, or video about the presidential campaign to others (See Table 5-1). Their interest is in campaign information gathering and dissemination and as such, these activities are moderately correlated (r= .31). Forwarding emails was also moderately correlated with online persuasion (r=.28). Correlations offer support to this research design which asserts that analysis should focus on individual activities rather than a combined index.

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[20]In 2004 NAES showed that 4.0% reported displaying a sign, button, or bumper sticker at any time during the campaign, and 3.4% said they attended a rally or meeting in support of a candidate at any time during the campaign.

[21] The survey did not include the following activities; discussing politics online, reading/posting to a blog, and viewing a political video online.

Table 5-1: *Case 2 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)*

Activities Regardless of Whether it Was Performed Offline during the presidential primary campaign	All Adults % (n=2,217)	College Graduate/ Higher % (n=906)	Not College Graduate % (n=1,311)	Male % (n=906)	Female % (n=1,311)	Age 18-29 % (n=175)	Age 30 or older % (n=2,042)	African American % (n=158)	Not African American % (n=2,059)	Household Income: $100K Or more % (n=464)	Household Income: Less than $100K % (n=1,753)
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate	31.1	37.0***	26.9	32.8	30.0	36.0	30.7	32.3	31.0	38.8***	29.1
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates	2.4	3.4**	1.7	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	5.1*	2.2	4.3**	1.9
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates	10.5	18.0***	5.3	11.6	9.8	4.0**	11.1	15.8*	10.1	19.0***	8.3
OFFLINE Activities during the presidential primary campaign											
Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or oppose a candidate	27.5	32.0***	28.1	27.2	36.8	32.0	27.1	30.4	27.3	33.0**	26.1
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates OFFLINE	2.1	2.8	1.6	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.1	4.4*	1.9	3.9**	1.6
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE	6.5	9.8***	4.1	7.1	6.0	1.1**	6.9	7.6	6.4	9.7**	5.6
Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate OFFLINE	7.4	9.4**	5.9	7.3	7.4	6.9	7.4	14.6***	6.8	10.8**	6.4

Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house.	9.1	10.2	8.3	7.9	9.8	13.7*	8.7	24.1***	7.9	12.7**	8.1
ONLINE activities during the presidential primary campaign											
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	3.6	5.2**	2.5	4.7*	2.8	4.0	3.6	1.9	3.7	5.8**	3.0
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	+ +	0.7*	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +	0.6	+ +	+ +	+ +
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE	4.1	8.2***	1.2	4.5	3.7	2.9	4.2	8.2**	3.7	9.3***	2.7
Visited Web site of a presidential campaign or political party	23.1	33.2***	16.2	24.0	22.6	29.7*	22.6	31.6**	22.5	37.3***	19.4
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know	20.9	26.9***	16.8	19.0	22.3	20.0	21.0	19.6	21.0	33.0***	17.7

+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

5-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the Primaries

The descriptive analysis of participation activities during the primaries provided some evidence that the traditional biases that favor the better educated and more affluent continued in 2008, with some exceptions. However, multivariate analysis using logistic and OLS regression models including several statistical controls provide a very different picture. For instance, high levels of education continued to be a significant predictor for contributing campaign funds, but its significance disappeared for all other participation activities measured. Income as a predictor of campaign participation emerged only for the acts of forwarding emails and offline volunteering. On the other hand, unlike Case 1 the models did not predict an increase in the predictive value of age on participation. Young adults were significant predictors for just a handful of activities. Like Case 1, African Americans and women were significant predictors of only a few activities.

In the remainder of this section, I present the details of these multivariate analyses for the following types of participation activities: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline; 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or the wearing of campaign buttons; 3) online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, visiting campaign web sites, and forwarding emails,

audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and offline indexes.

While the demographic variables are my primary focus, the political variables-- campaign interest and online campaign contact--generally emerged as the most robust significant predictors for many of the participation activities. The noteworthy strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process.

5-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions

Generally, Case 2 patterns of participation in these areas were similar to those observed in Case 1. Age was a significant predictor of donating to campaigns. Online contact and campaign interest were the most robust and significant predictors within all three of the activities measured, regardless of online and offline distinctions.

5-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate. Even with controls, young adults, age 18 to 29, were nearly twice as likely as older respondents to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate (OR=1.921, $p<.01$). African Americans were less likely than non-African Americans to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=.636/1.57 for non-African Americans, $p<.05$). High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.179, $p<.001$) and online campaign contact (OR=1.832, $p<.05$) also were significant predictors of persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, "persuaders"

were more likely to be Obama voters in the primaries (OR=1.553, p<.01) (See Table 5-2).

5-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. Once controls were added there were no significant demographic predictors for volunteering to work for a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline. High interest in the presidential campaign (OR=2.346, p<.01) and online campaign contact (OR=2.596, p<.05) were the strongest predictors. They were more than twice as likely to volunteer for a campaign during the primaries than those not contacted and less interested. This may suggest the success or necessity for an effective grassroots communication campaign to encourage this active form of participation (See Table 7-2).

5-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign. The regression model indicates that better educated adults were more likely to donate to a campaign during the primary (OR=2.176, p<.001). However, the likelihood of donating was greatest among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=4.698 p<.001). As in the other activities, campaign interest (OR=2.155, p<.001) was also a significant predictor. The effect of Internet use was important to the act of donating money to a campaign, according to the model, since those more frequently online were nearly one and one half times more likely to say they contributed to one of the campaigns (OR=1.448, p<.05). Politically, Obama support during the primaries, was a significant predictor. Obama voters (OR=1.7436, p<.01) were almost twice as likely

as those who voted for other candidates to say they donated to one of the campaigns (See Table 5-2).

Table 5-2: *Case 2--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was conducted offline or online*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate	Volunteer for Candidate or Campaign	Contribute Money to candidate or campaign
Education (CollGrad+)	1.064	.718	2.176***
Gender (male)	.876	.950	1.045
Age (18-29)	1.921**	1.252	.416
Race (African American)	.636*	1.620	1.316
Income (100K +)	1.028	1.924	1.384
Religiosity	1.089*	1.032	.961
Party (Democrat)	1.155	1.382	1.235
Ideology (liberal)	.998	1.246	1.030
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.121***	1.092	1.003
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.067**	1.058	1.026
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.019	1.133*	1.137***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.032	.881*	.997
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)	.794	.825	1.448*
Campaign Interest	2.179***	2.346**	2.155***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.832*	2.596*	4.698***
Obama Primary Voter	1.553**	1.377	1.743**
Constant	.015***	.000***	.002
N	2,000	2,000	2,000
Correctly Classified	71.8%	97.6%	90.0%
Nagelkerke R Square	.190	.159	.266
Cox & Snell R Square	.136	.032	.133

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

5-2.2: *Predictors of offline participation activities*

There were no dominant demographic independent predictors of the offline behaviors. Younger adults were more likely to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate during the primaries and caucuses. Economic affluence was a significant predictor of offline campaign volunteering. African Americans, females, and those with less than a college degree were more likely than their counterparts to say they wore buttons or displayed a bumper sticker or sign during the primary and caucus season. Those with at least a college degree were more likely to say they donated offline to a presidential campaign during the primaries. The retrospective analysis produced little consistency in which demographic groups would be more likely to engage in offline participation. Again, there was more consistency among the political variables, especially high campaign interest, online campaign contact, and Obama support, with campaign interest being a significant predictor for all measured activities.

These results bear some resemblance to Case 1 findings. However, the strength of online campaign contact diminished, while campaign interest remained a significant predictor.

5-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate. Young adults were nearly twice as likely to say they persuaded others to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates during the primaries and caucuses (OR=1.900, $p<.001$). Those highly interested in the primary campaigns (OR=1.937, $p<.001$) and those contacted online by one of the candidates (OR=1.797, $p<.05$) were also nearly twice as

likely as their counterparts to say they engaged in this type of persuasion. Obama voters in the primaries were over one and a half times more likely to say they persuaded someone offline to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.540, p<.01). Interestingly, the less time one spent online the more likely they were to report persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.402/ 0.713 for frequent Internet users, p<.05) (See Table 5-3).

5-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Affluence and online campaign contact were the most robust predictors of volunteering offline. Those with household incomes of $100,000 or greater (OR=2.279, p<.05) and those contacted by a campaign online were more than twice as likely (OR=2.354, p<.01) to say they volunteered to work for a candidate offline (See Table 5-3).

5-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. Those with at least a college degree were nearly twice as likely as their counterparts (OR=1.701, p<.05) to say they donated to a presidential campaign offline during the primaries. Perhaps related to education, those who cite the newspaper as a campaign source (OR=1.213, p<.001) are also more likely to indicate they participated online. Campaign interest is the most robust predictor of offline campaign donation during the primary (OR=1.929, p<.001), according to the model (See Table 5-3).

5-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. According to the logistic model tested in Case 2, no significant demographic predictors emerged for attending a rally or meeting in support of a candidate. Those more likely to participate in this way were those contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.528,

p<.001), highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.832, p<.001), Obama voters in the primaries and caucuses (OR=1.700, p<.05) and liberal (OR=1.296, p<.01) (See Table 5-3).

5-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support of a candidate. The logistic model estimates that African Americans were nearly three times more likely to display their support for their candidate with either a button, bumper sticker or sign (OR=2.767, p<.001). Additionally, the model estimated that the less educated were more than one and a half times more likely to display their support in this manner (OR=1.618/0.618 for higher educated, p<.05). Again, online campaign contact (OR=2.221, p<.01), voting for Obama in the primaries or caucuses (OR=2.112, p<.001), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.853, p<.001) were significant predictors of this form of persuasion. Ideologically, self-identified liberals were more likely than moderates or conservatives to say they wore a button or displayed a sign or bumper sticker (OR=1.328, p<.01) (See Table 5-3).

Table 5-3: *Case 2-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose candidate OFFLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Donate to candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Attend Rally/ Meeting	Wear Campaign Button/Bumper Sticker/Lawn Sign
Education (CollGrad+)	1.048	.656	1.701*	.781	.618*
Gender (male)	.866	1.100	1.013	.885	.691*
Age (18-29)	1.900**	1.436	.149	.878	1.685
Race (African American)	.699	1.569	1.373	1.572	2.767**
Income (100K +)	1.056	2.279*	1.204	1.329	1.327
Religiosity	1.081	1.000	.960	1.050	1.029
Party (Democrat)	1.169	1.211	1.023	1.349	1.287
Ideology (liberal)	.986	1.215	1.030	1.296**	1.328**
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.064**	1.046	.930	1.056	1.119***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.056**	1.055	1.036	1.074*	1.055
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.026	1.129*	1.213***	1.073*	1.048
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.045*	.867	.981	.945	.969
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day)	.713*	.736	1.052	.893	.900
Campaign Interest	1.937***	2.354**	1.929***	1.832***	1.853***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.797*	2.212	1.592	3.528***	2.221**
Obama Primary Voter	1.540**	1.601	.904	1.700*	2.112***
Constant	.021***	.000	.003	.003	.003***
N	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Correctly Classified	728%	97.9%	93.3%	92.4%	90.8%
Nagelkerke R Square	.141	.139	.149	.171	.202
Cox & Snell R Square	.098	.026	.058	.071	.093

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

5-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities

As with the online participation behaviors measured in Case 2, no single demographic independent variable dominated as the most likely to predict the online participation activities measured in Case 2. A high level of education was a significant predictor of two of the five measured activities. However, campaign interest, online campaign contact, citing the Internet as a campaign information source, a high frequency of Internet use, and Obama support all were significant predictors of multiple online activities. The models show that most of the significant predictors were for contributing money to a campaign online, visiting a campaign web site, and forwarding political emails, audio, and videos to others.

Case 2 results differ from Case 1 possibly as a consequence of three factors. First, Case 2 measured fewer participation activities, excluding because of space limitations "reading or commenting on a political blog," "viewing a political video online," and "discussing the presidential campaign online." Second, the sample size was smaller by more than half in Case 2. Age was not as frequently a significant predictor, nor was online campaign contact. Third, the question wording differed in each case

5-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. Once controls were added, there were no significant demographic predictors of online persuasion, according to the logistic regression model. In fact, there were just two significant predictors from the model. These predictors, high campaign interest (OR=3.269, $p<.001$) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.358,

p<.001), are more consistent with a reinforcement than a mobilization argument (See Table 5-4).

5-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. There were no significant predictors for the act of volunteering online for a campaign (See Table 5-4). This result is also possibly due to very few respondents, retrospectively, reporting that they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%). However, this low number does not fully explain the lack of significant predictors and I am uncertain of other reasons for this.

5-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential campaign. The analysis to determine the predictors of donating online to a campaign, again, showed that the higher the education level, the more likely one is to say they contributed money to one of the presidential campaigns online. Those with a college degree or higher were over three times more likely to indicate they made an online donation to one of the campaigns (OR=3.709, p<.001), a finding consistent with the reinforcement argument. The model also indicates that online contact efforts to solicit donations were very successful since those who said they were contacted by one of the campaigns online were over six times more likely to say they made an online donation (OR=6.178, p<.001). Voting for Obama during the primaries and caucuses was also a significant predictor of online donations since those claiming they voted for Obama in the primaries or caucuses were over three times more likely to report contributing online than were voters of the other primary season candidates (OR=3.394, p<.001). High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.483, p<.01), spending a great deal of time online (OR=2.115, p<.01) were also significant predictors (See Table 5-4).

5-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign web site. The profile of someone visiting a presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses in Case 2 can be described generally as a young adult, with at least a college degree, highly interested in the campaign, generally online a great deal including time spent on the Internet for campaign information. They were more likely to say they voted for Obama during the primaries and caucuses and say they were contacted by one of the campaigns online.

According to the logistic model, younger adults were more likely to say they visited a presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses than older adults (OR=1.601, p<.05). Those with at least a college degree were more likely than those with less education to say they visited a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.01). The several other significant political and behavioral predictors for going to a campaign web site included, online campaign contact (OR=3.191, p<.001), high campaign interest (OR=1.773, p<.001), high frequency of Internet use (OR=1.653, p<.001), Obama voter (OR=1.479, p<.05), and citing the Internet as a major campaign information source (OR=1.240, p<.001) (See Table 5-4).

5-2.3.5: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about the candidates or campaign. A different demographic profile of those more likely to forward political emails emerged than the one for visiting a campaign web site. Females (OR=1.825/.548 for men, p<.001) and those from more affluent households (OR=1.368, p<.05) were more likely than their counterparts to say they forwarded political emails, audio, or video to others. Politically, those more likely to forward political emails included Obama primary

voters (OR=1.571, p<.05) and non-Democrats (OR=1.445/0.692 for Democrats, p<.05).[22] In this case, unlike others, online campaign contact is *not* a significant predictor of this behavior, but high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001), spending a great deal of time online (OR=1.665, p<.001), and users of the Internet for political information (OR=1.240, p<.001) are significant predictors of this behavior (See Table 5-4).

[22] There was a great deal of email in support or opposition of all candidates. Some were campaign-generated or sanctioned, some were not. This might explain why I see Obama voters and non-Democrats more likely to forward emails, etc…For example, there were anti-Hillary Clinton campaign emails coming from both the Obama campaign and its supporters as well as a loosely organized group calling itself "Project Chaos." The goal of "Project Chaos" was to encourage Republicans to switch registration during the primaries to become Democrats in order to vote for Hillary Clinton and thus artificially extend the Democratic primaries and caucuses. These groups may have been forwarding both pro-Obama/anti-Obama, pro-Clinton/anti-Clinton electronic communications. In addition, during January and February, the Republican campaign was active. I have no way of confirming this with the available data, however.

Table 5-4: *Case 2-- Predictors of Online Political Participation*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
(*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign ONLINE	Contribute money to candidate or campaign ONLINE	Visit Campaign Web site	Forward Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others about the candidates
Education (CollGrad+)	1.146	1.303	3.709***	1.411**	1.015
Gender (male)	1.008	.213	1.159	.869	.548***
Age (18-29)	1.334	.000	.839	1.601*	1.136
Race (African American)	.530	2.170	1.295	1.323	.719
Income (100K +)	.840	.505	1.489	1.304	1.368*
Religiosity	1.057	1.529	.951	1.076	1.035
Party (Democrat)	.903	4.362	1.713	1.201	.692*
Ideology (liberal)	1.073	1.787	.999	1.135*	.921
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.358***	1.999	1.161**	1.240***	1.240***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.039	1.098	.993	1.033	1.044
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.966	1.161	.954	1.023	1.023
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.934	1.028	1.021	.926**	.991
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day)	1.540	1.913	2.115**	1.653***	1.665***
Campaign Interest	3.269***	2.593	2.483**	1.773***	1.614***
Contacted by Campaign Online	.973	4.322	6.178***	3.191***	1.243
Obama Primary Voter	.968	.390	3.394***	1.479*	1.571*
Constant	.000	.000	.000***	.011***	.035***
N	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Correctly Classified	96.6%	99.7%	96.3%	80.3%	79.4%
Nagelkerke R Square	.211	.401	.387	.299	.228
Cox & Snell R Square	.055	.016	.115	.200	.147

5-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors

As in Case 1, an analysis was conducted to determine the predictors of online political participation and offline participation, where the dependent variables are the combined indexes of participation. The purpose, again, is to determine whether there is a more general pattern underlying the findings regarding predictors of more specific forms of offline and online participation, and whether this pattern hints at mobilization, reinforcement, both, or neither.

Among the demographic variables in the model, income is the only one which emerged as a significant predictor of both the online (b=.116, p<.01) and offline indexes (b=.095, p<.05). That is, those affluent adults were more likely to participate in at least one activity. However, the income coefficient for offline participation is weak. Education (b=.080. p<.05) and gender (b= -.100, p<.01) were significant predictors for online participation, but not offline participation. The offline model suggests that women were more likely than men to say they participated in offline activities. Race was a significant predictor for offline participation, but not online participation. African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to participate offline (b=.143, p<.05).

The variables with the strongest coefficients for predicting online or offline participation were online contact by the campaign Obama voters in the primary, and campaign interest (b= .582 for the online index and b=.597 for the offline index. Additionally, online frequency was not a significant predictor for offline activities, but was a significant predictor for online activities (b=.23, p<.001) (See Table 5-5).

The results differ from the analysis of individual participation variables since gender and income emerged from the online index model, but other significant variables do not. Interest and contact are significant for both models, while race is significant for the offline index, only.

Table 5-5: *Case 2--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline Political Participation: OLS Regression*

	Online Participation Index	Offline Participation Index
Education (College Grad+)	.080*	-.015
Gender (male)	-.100**	-.063
Age (18-29)	.068	.128
Race (African American)	.002	.143*
Income ($100K plus)	.116**	.095*
Religiosity	.014	.016
Party (Democrat)	-.006	.069
Ideology (liberal)	.014	.045*
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.097***	.021**
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.015*	.027***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.006	.030***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.015*	-.004
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.218***	-.082
Campaign Interest	.164***	.209***
Contacted by Campaign Online	.582***	.597***
Obama Voter	.217***	.262***
Constant	-.366***	-.510
N	1,999	1,999
R Square	.326	.173
R Square Change	.252***	.149***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

5-3: Further Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both

The final step in Case 2 is the more direct test of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses. As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3), the logic of the analyses in this step is straightforward. Consider, for example, the frequency of online political discussion. Suppose, hypothetically, that in the initial logistic regression analyses described in "step three" I find that both frequent Internet use and being young (18-29) *increases* online political discussion. If Internet use acts to increase discussion among an older population (30 or older) beyond the direct or main effects of being young and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a mobilizing effect), then the interaction (b coefficient) between these two variables should be significant and negative. The negative interaction serves to close the gap between the two age groups. In this case the Internet mobilizes older people to more online political discussion. A positive and significant interaction (b coefficient) in this case would widen the gap between the two age groups and serve to reinforce. Beyond this, the size of the interaction (relative to the main effects of age and Internet use) and the specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it is being driven by young people who use the internet frequently increasing their political discussion or Internet users decreasing their political discussion) provides further evidence in support or opposition to the mobilization hypothesis. In order to see the effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to display its effect.

Moving from the hypothetical to the actual Case 2 data, the logistic models produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use and education for predicting contributing to a campaign offline (OR=.801, $p<.05$, b=-.222) and for

predicting visiting a campaign web site (OR=.880, p<.05, b=-.127). The negative coefficients indicate that the original relationships between education and these activities were moderated by their interaction with the frequency of general Internet use. Therefore, this provides support for mobilization (H1A). Additionally, the models showed that relationship between high income and forwarding political emails, audios, or videos (OR=.851, p<.01, b=-.162) and engaging in any online activity (as measured by the index) (b=-.031, p<.05) was significantly moderated by interacting with online frequency (See Table 5-6 and 5-7). These results provide support for hypotheses 2c and 2d—evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement. While the coefficients presented in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the significant interactions, the effects are better illustrated by viewing the graphic presentations in Figures 5-1 to 5-4.

Table 5-6: *Case 2: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions: (Exp(B)(b coefficient)*

	Offline Campaign Contributions: with Interaction (Internet Frequency X Education (Coll grad or higher))	Visiting a Campaign Web Site (Internet Frequency X Education (Coll grad or higher))	Forwarding Political Emails (Internet Frequency X Income ($100K or higher))
Education (College Grad+)	1.677* (b=0.517)	1.485** (b=0.396)	1.013
Gender (male)	1.012	.871	.538***
Age (18-29)	.147	1.596*	1.131
Race (African American)	1.334	1.307	.727
Income ($100K plus)	1.240	1.324*	1.609** (b=0.475)
Religiosity	.972	1.082	1.038
Party (Democrat)	1.039	1.215	.686*
Ideology (liberal)	1.032	1.138*	.922
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.929*	1.239***	1.239***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.038	1.034	1.041
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.215***	1.023	1.021
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.979	.927***	.993
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.341	1.795***	1.837***
Campaign Interest	1.934***	1.768***	1.619***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	1.575	3.093***	1.277
Obama Voter	.944	1.519*	1.592*
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher)	NA	NA	.851** (b=-0.162)
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad or higher)	.801* (b=-0.222)	.880* (b=-0.127)	NA
Constant	.003***	.010***	.033***
N	1,999	2,000	2,000
Correctly classified	93.3%	80.5%	78.9%
Nagelkerke R Square	.155	.303	.235
Cox Snell R Square	.060	.203	.152

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Table 5-7: *Case 2: Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online Participation Index*
OLS Regression
(Unstandardized B)

	Online Participation Index
Education (College Grad+)	. 080*
Gender (male)	-.101**
Age (18-29)	.068
Race (African American)	.003
Income ($100K plus)	.137**
Religiosity	.015
Party (Democrat)	-.007
Ideology (liberal)	.014
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.097***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.015*
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.006
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.014*
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.231***
Campaign Interest	.164***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	.588***
Obama Supporter	.218***
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher)	-.031*
Constant	-.369***
N	1,999
R Square	.323
R Square Change	.249***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

5.3.1: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting offline contributions to a presidential campaign during the primaries and caucuses

Figure 5-1 illustrates that frequent general Internet use reduces the likelihood of offline campaign donations among the better educated, while increasing this likelihood among those without a college degree. That is, the result of this interaction is a clear narrowing of the participation gap between greater and lesser educated citizens, a finding that provides direct support for the mobilization thesis (H1a).

Figure 5-1: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Offline Donations



5-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting visiting a campaign web site

The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting visiting a campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses period. Those who have earned at least a college degree and are frequently on the Internet are more likely to say they visited a web site during that time. Similarly, the more frequently those with less education are online, the more likely they are to say they visited a campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses (See Figure 5-2). Thus, hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data. At the very least, visiting a campaign website the Internet mobilized previously disengaged citizens to participate online (H2c) *while also* reinforcing the online participation of already engaged citizens (H2d). The net effect of these two impacts of the Internet is to increase the overall level of this form of participation while modestly reducing the participation gap based on education.

Figure 5-2: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Visiting a Campaign Web Site



5-3.3:Income (household income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting the likelihood of forwarding political email/audio/video

The gap between more and less affluent adults just about completely closes in the interaction between income and frequency of Internet when assessing the likelihood of forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others. Those most frequently online are most likely to engage in this forwarding behavior regardless of income. The gap is much wider between the two income categories ($100K or more and less than $100K) among those who are less frequent Internet users.. These results provide evidence for both mobilization and reinforcement and, thus, evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d.

Figure 5-3: Case 2 Interaction: (Income Household Income $100k or higher)by High Internet Use Predicting Likelihood of Forwarding Email/Audio/Video about Presidential Campaign



5-3.4: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting online participation

Income by Internet frequency also shows evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement when it comes to predicting online participation, in general. The combined online index is the dependent variable in this instance, and as Internet frequency increases among both income categories, the likelihood for online political participation also rises. Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by this interaction (See Figure 5-4).

Figure 5-4: Case 2: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation



5-4: Case 2--Summary of Findings

The Case 2 findings presented a retrospective look by respondents across the entire primaries and caucus period, rather than a narrow one week window to report their participation activities. Given that descriptive analysis covered a wider period of engagement—the entire primary and caucus campaign, the data revealed a higher frequency of reporting participation activities when compared with Case 1. Also, in Case 2, there were more data on offline participation with the addition of "meetings and rallies," and "button wearing and bumper sticker/yard sign" display. While Case 1 had a much lower level of activity reporting, the general patterns were similar.

In the Case 2 descriptive analysis, without the presence of statistical controls, the data revealed that the biases of the past continued to dominate in this part of the campaign. Higher education and higher income adults were more likely to participate in most activities than those with less education and income. However, I also saw a significant participation effort by African Americans in both online and offline activities and a moderate effort by young adults. Nevertheless, many of these numbers did not maintain any significance in the presence of controls.

With controls in place, the effect of education as a predictor was only significant for contributing to campaigns, according to the model tested for the participation activities. There were no consistent patterns among the demographic independent variables when placed in each of the models to determine significant predictors of the participation activities. Younger people were more likely to say they visited campaign web sites and persuade others offline to support or oppose a candidate. Affluent adults

were more likely to say they volunteered to work for a candidate, offline, and forward political emails, audio, or video. Females were more likely to say they forwarded political emails, audio, or videos, and African Americans were more likely to say they displayed their support with a button, bumper sticker, or lawn sign.

Rather, the most robust predictors were not demographic but rather political or behavioral—those with a great deal of campaign interest, those contacted online by one of the campaigns and those who voted for Obama were all significant predictors of online and offline participation activities during the primaries and caucuses, according to the results of the model. Tables 5-8 and 5-9 summarize which variables significantly predicted offline and online activities.

Table 5-8: *Case 2-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose candidate OFFLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Donate to candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Attend Rally/ Meeting	Wear Campaign Button/Bumper Sticker/Lawn Sign
Education (CollGrad+)			X+		X-
Gender (male)					X-
Age (18-29)	X+				
Race (African American)					X+
Income (100K +)		X+			
Religiosity					
Party (Democrat)					
Ideology (liberal)				X+	X+
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days					
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days					
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days		X+	X+		
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days					
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)	X-				
Campaign Interest	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online	X+			X+	X+
Obama Primary Voter	X+			X+	X+

A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.

Table 5-9: *Case 2—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)*
(A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign ONLINE	Contribute money to candidate or campaign ONLINE	Visit Campaign Web site	Forward Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others about the candidates
Education (CollGrad+)		NONE	X+	X+	
Gender (male)					X-
Age (18-29)				X+	
Race (African American)					
Income (100K +)					X+
Religiosity					
Party (Democrat)					X-
Ideology (liberal)					
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	X+		X+		
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days					
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days					
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days					
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)			X+	X+	X+
Campaign Interest	X+		X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online			X+	X+	
Obama Primary Voter			X+	X+	X+

The above summarized findings are just a preamble for the crux of this research—finding evidence for mobilization and/or reinforcement. The evidence in Case 2 supported hypotheses H1a, H2c and H2d. There was clear evidence of mobilization and reinforcement when Internet use interacts with education and income. Lower educated but frequent Internet users were more likely to donate offline; which is a clear indication of mobilization. Regardless of education level, the more one is online the more one is likely to visit a campaign web site, thus supporting mobilization and reinforcement. Additionally, regardless of income, higher frequency of Internet use predicts forwarding political emails, audio, and video and general online participation (mobilization and reinforcement).

MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART II: GENERAL ELECTION

Part II of the "Findings" presents the mobilization and reinforcement findings from Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7).

CHAPTER 6: CASE 3-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-PRE-CONVENTION (AUGUST 8, 2008 TO OCTOBER 2, 2008)

In this chapter, I present the findings from the Case 3 data collected during the general election period (August 8, 2008 to October 2, 2008). Ultimately, I will test the hypotheses addressing mobilization and reinforcement (1a-b and 2a-d), as I detailed in Chapter 3 (Methods), this analysis will follow three steps:

- A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using pre-general election data, including a correlation analysis among participation activities and between those activities and demographic independent variables;
- Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online participation; and,
- Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or reinforcement.

6-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

In prior research on political participation during general elections, the more advantaged demographic elements, higher educated and more affluent adults, primarily engaged in most participation activities. The descriptive data I presented in Part I from the primaries and caucuses affirmed the prior biases, but showed some evidence of increased participation by younger adults and African Americans. While more complex multivariate analysis decreased the strength of education and income for some activities,

there was evidence, also, that younger adults and African Americans were more likely to participate in some activities. Similar to the research I conducted during the primaries, presented in Part 1, the expectation is that the same pattern will emerge in the analysis of the general election data. As the descriptive analysis of the Case 3 data shows, this pattern does emerge.

In the Case 3 data, without the presence of controls, the traditional demographic groups, such as the better educated and more affluent were consistently more likely to say they participated in the political activities I measured during this period of the general election. However, for several of the activities, my research reveals that African Americans were significantly more likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in the political process. The participation activity of young adults, age 18 to 29 years old, is consistent with past biases for the more traditional offline activities, but they are more likely to say they participated in the online activities.

As Table 6-1 shows, those with at least a college degree are significantly more likely than their less educated counterparts to engage in all the measured activities, except for working for a campaign online where the numbers were extremely low and the differences were not significant. Those with higher incomes also reported a greater likelihood to engage in just about all of the activities, with the exception of wearing a button and performing online work for a candidate.

On the other hand, African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in many of the measured activities (See Table 6-1). This is a departure from previous general elections where participation by African

Americans in measurable activities was either significantly less than non-African Americans, or not significantly different. For example, in the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, African Americans were less likely to participate in the activities measured during the 2004 general election period. According to the NAES data, this election (primaries and general elections) compared to the past election, demonstrates a clear increase in political participation among African Americans.[23]

While Case 3 provides initial evidence that most of the biases found in prior elections emerged in 2008, NAES data show the overall level of participation among the voting age population was low during the general election. As in Case 1 (Chapter 4), relatively few adults participated in the various political activities I measured (See Table 6-1).[24] Without regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online, persuading someone to support a candidate was the activity reportedly done most frequently (24.4%). The other activities, volunteering for a candidate or donating money to a candidate were performed by few adults, (1.3% and 4.3%, respectively). Examining offline activities, specifically, the descriptive data yields a similar result. In the week prior to being interviewed, persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate was reportedly performed by a little more than one fifth of adults, according to the survey data. Other offline activities measured during this period, including wearing a button, placing a bumper sticker on one's vehicle, or placing a lawn sign (7%), attending a

[23] According to the 2004 NAES, during the general election campaign, Non-African Americans were more likely to try to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate (22.9% vs. 17.0%), and donate money to a presidential candidate (5.6% to 1.3%). Further there was no significant difference between African Americans and Non-African Americans in attending campaign rallies.

[24] These low numbers may be an artifact of how the question was asked. That is, the survey asked for behavior performed in the prior week rather than over the course of the general election period. It is difficult to assert with certainty that this accounts for the low numbers, since the survey did not ask a comparison question measuring behavior over the course of the campaign during the same period.

meeting or rally in support of a candidate (1.7%), or volunteering for a candidate offline (1.0%) were all reported at significantly lower levels than persuading someone directly. In contrast to offline participation behavior, very few adults (3%) said they engaged in online persuasion by trying to convince others to support or oppose a candidate. Instead, persuasion took on a more indirect form. Among the variety of online participation activities measured by the NAES survey, more adults said they viewed video about the presidential campaign on sites like YouTube (14.4%) or forwarded emails, audio, or video about the candidates to friends and family members than the other participation activities (14.3%). Yet, the proportion who said they took part in these activities represented less than a fifth of the adult respondents. As for the other online activities, about one in ten said they performed other online activities that serve as a means of learning about the campaign and discussing the campaign online with others. These activities include visiting a campaign web site (10.1%), discussing politics online (10.0%), and reading or posting to a political blog (8.9%). Online work for a campaign is an activity that was performed by just about no adults.

Table 6-1: *Case 3-- Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)*

Activities Regardless of Whether it Was Performed Offline in the *prior week*	All Adults % (n=6,832)	College Graduate Or Higher % (n=2,778)	Not College Graduate % (n=4,054)	Male % (n=2,936)	Female % (n=3,896)	Age 18-29 % (n=480)	Age 30 or older % (n=6,352)	African-American % (n=520)	Not African-American % (n=6,312)	Household Income: $100K Or more % (n=1,427)	Household Income: Less than $100K % (n=5,405)
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate	24.4	28.2***	21.7	27.1***	22.3	28.3*	24.1	28.5*	24.0	31.1***	22.6
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates	1.3	1.9***	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.3	5.0***	1.0	2.1**	1.1
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates	4.3	6.3***	2.9	4.3	4.3	1.7**	4.5	9.0***	3.9	6.1***	3.8
OFFLINE Activities in the prior week											
Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or oppose a candidate	21.3	23.8***	19.6	23.6***	19.6	24.4	21.1	25.6*	21.0	26.7***	19.9
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates OFFLINE	1.0	1.4**	0.7	0.7*	1.2	0.8	1.0	4.2***	0.7	1.5*	0.9
Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate OFFLINE	1.7	2.1*	1.4	1.6	1.7	3.1*	1.6	5.6***	1.4	2.6**	1.4

Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house.	7.0	8.4***	6.0	6.8	7.1	10.2**	6.7	20.6***	5.8	7.9	6.7
ONLINE activities in the prior week											
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	3.0	4.4***	2.1	3.6*	2.6	4.0	3.0	2.9	3.1	4.4**	2.7
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	+	0.06	+	+	+	0.06	+	0.08	+	0.06	+
Discuss politics online	10.0	14.2***	7.1	10.7	9.4	15.8***	9.5	8.3	10.1	14.3***	8.9
Visited Website of a presidential campaign or political party	10.1	14.1***	7.4	10.9	9.5	17.1***	9.6	21.0***	9.2	14.6***	8.9
Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign	14.4	18.9***	11.2	17.2***	12.2	28.8***	13.3	21.0***	13.8	22.5***	12.2
Read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a campaign	8.9	11.9***	6.8	11.4***	6.9	16.0***	8.3	13.1***	8.5	13.5***	7.6
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know	14.3	18.9***	11.1	14.2	14.4	16.0	14.2	17.3*	14.1	16.0***	8.3

+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

Assessing the relationship among the participation variables is an important means of determining whether it was correct or not to analyze each activity separately, rather than combine them into an index. The results from this Case, as in previous cases, affirm this analytical decision. In general, many of the correlations among the variety of participation variables were statistically significant; however, they were very low. This outcome is likely due to the large sample size of Case 3 (n=6,832), which can uncover substantively small but statistically significant relationships. The full correlation matrices can be found in Appendix E.

Among online activities, the highest correlations were for discussing politics online and forwarding campaign-related emails to others ($r=.41$, $p<.001$), online persuasion to encourage support or opposition to a candidate ($r=.34$, $p<.001$), viewing political videos about the campaign ($r=.29$, $p<.001$), reading or posting to a blog about the campaign ($r=.28$, $p<.001$), and visiting campaign web sites ($r=.24$, $p<.001$). Further, there was a clearly positive relationship between viewing a video about the presidential campaign on a site like YouTube and forwarding an email, audio or video related to the presidential campaign to others ($r=0.32$, $p<.001$). Additionally, viewing video about the presidential campaign on a site like YouTube was positively related to visiting a campaign website ($r=.31$, $p<.001$), and reading or posting to a blog ($r=.26$, $p>.001$) two places where links to videos are often found. Forwarding emails, audio, or video was also correlated with online persuasion to support or oppose a candidate ($r=.31$, $p<.001$) and with visiting a campaign's web site ($r=.24$, $p<.001$).

Among offline activities, most associations were low. The only relationship above the threshold was the correlation between attending campaign rallies or meetings and volunteering for a campaign offline ($r=.32$, $p<.001$). Correlations between offline and online activities were also generally very low, also. The strongest correlation was between the offline activity of showing ones support by wearing a button or placing a lawn sign and the online activity of visiting a campaign web site ($r=.20$, $p<.001$) (See Appendix for the full correlation matrix table).

6-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the General Election Period: Pre-Convention through October 2, 2008

In the previous section, I established two important trends regarding participation in the 2008 election. First, the frequency of political participation among respondents was generally low. Second, without applying statistical controls, the biases found in prior research emerged again in the 2008 data, but there was some evidence that previously marginalized electoral groups were participating at greater levels relative to their more advantaged counterparts.

As stated before, much of this study is predicated on the idea that the Internet will diminish the importance of demographic groups such as higher educated and more affluent while increasing the importance of demographic groups such as the young and African Americans. As stated in chapter 4, when controlling demographic, political and behavioral variables, odds ratios and OLS "b" coefficients can flip the results from univariate analysis. For example, the effect of education as a predictor for a particular activity could disappear in such models with the application of controls.

Therefore, I present the results of the regression models for all participation activities with the inclusion of statistical controls. Participation activities are presented in four subsections: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or the wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, political discussion, visiting campaign websites, viewing political campaign-related videos on sites like YouTube, reading or posting on a blog, and forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) combined online index and combined offline index.

Generally, across all the analytic subsections in Case 3, age and race emerged most frequently as significant demographic predictors of several of the participation activities. Specifically, younger people and African Americans were *more* likely than their counterparts to engage in activities such as discussing politics online, visiting campaign web sites, reading or posting to a political blog, attending rallies and displaying a button, bumper sticker or sign. As I will describe in the following pages, after adding controls to the regression models, the significance of education disappears and high income is a significant predictor for just two of the activities.

The most robust predictors for all the activities were two political variables. For most activities, being contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns and indicating a high level of campaign interest were more likely to predict engagement with the activities than age, race, gender, education or income. As in the prior cases, the

importance of campaign contact and campaign interest, are consistent with prior research on participation.

6-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions

The analysis in this section focuses on three dependent variables performed regardless of method: persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate, volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign, and contributing money to a campaign. According to the data, race was a significant predictor of volunteering and contributing money, without regard to whether they were done offline or online. African Americans were more likely to say they engaged in those activities. No other demographic independent variable stood out as predictors of more than a single activity within this section. Among the non-demographic variables, campaign interest and online campaign contact were significant predictors for each of these participation activities.

6-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate. Using a logistic regression model, with controls,[25] I constructed a profile of voters who generally reported engaging in persuading others to support or oppose a presidential candidate consisting of younger (OR=1.602, p<.001), more affluent (OR=1.171, p<.05) adults, who tended to be male (OR=1.144, p<.05). Politically they were highly interested in the campaign (OR=2.127, p<.001), and they tended to identify themselves as Democrats (OR=1.276, p<.01). This profile of persuaders were more likely to be

[25] Without the presence of controls in the logistic regression model, education, a traditional predictor of political participation also was a significant predictor in this election for persuading someone to support a candidate (OR=1.263, p<.001), volunteer on a campaign (OR=1.927, p<.001), or donate money (OR=2.012, p<.001). However, education, as a significant predictor disappears when the controls are applied to the models for participation activities without regard to whether they are performed online or offline.

contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=1.342, p<.05), and were more likely to be Obama supporters (OR=1.210, p<.05) (See Table 6-2).

6-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. Those more inclined to say they volunteered for a presidential candidate in the 2008 general election, according to the logistic regression model, were African Americans (OR=2.868, p<.001) and females (OR =1.65/0.605 for males, p<.05). Volunteers were more likely to say they were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.816, p<.001) and perhaps as a result, they were more likely to indicate a high interest in the presidential campaign (OR=2.690, p<.001). Finally, the more they relied on newspapers for campaign information, the more likely they were to say they volunteered for one of the campaigns (OR=1.177, p<.001) (See Table 6-2).

6-2.1.3: Contributing money to candidate or campaign. During the general election period measured by Case 3, African Americans were more likely to say they donated to a presidential candidate than non-African Americans (OR=1.711, p<.01). Further, those saying they donated to a campaign were more likely to be a Democrat (OR=1.415, p<.05). The model also showed that those with more education were also more likely to say they contributed to a presidential campaign (OR=1.334, p<.05). Those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were three times more likely to report donating than those who were not (OR=3.148, p<.001). While it is unclear whether this contact increased campaign interest or whether campaign interest inspired contact, the odds of contributing to a campaign were greater for those with higher campaign interest than those with less interest (OR=2.714, p<.001) (See Table 6-2).

Table 6-2: *Case 3--Predictors of Political Participation Without Regard to Online/Offline Logistic Regression EXP(B)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate	Volunteer for Candidate or campaign	Contribute Money to campaign or candidate
Education (College Grad+)	.977	.990	1.334*
Gender (male)	1.144*	.605*	.906
Age (18-29)	1.602***	1.101	.481*
Race (African-American)	.840	2.868***	1.711**
Income ($100K plus)	1.171*	1.244	.994
Religiosity	1.056*	1.203	1.018
Party (Democrat)	1.276**	1.124	1.415*
Ideology (liberal)	.902**	1.034	.963
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.057***	1.108*	1.044
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.097***	1.041	1.072**
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.033**	1.177***	1.084***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.035*	.916	1.011
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.021	.976	1.009
Campaign Interest	2.127***	2.690***	2.714***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.342*	3.816***	3.148***
Obama Supporter	1.210*	1.897	1.285
Constant	.012***	.000***	.000***
N	6,251	6,251	6,251
Correctly Classified	75.4%	98.7%	95.5%
Nagelkerke R Square	.151	.201	.158
Cox & Snell R Square	.102	.027	.048

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

6-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities

Perhaps it was because Obama was the first African American to be nominated for president or perhaps it was due to the efforts of the Obama \campaign, but during the period prior to the general election, when these Case 3 data were collected, African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to report they engaged in offline participation activities for three out of the four measured—volunteering offline, attending a campaign rally or meeting, and wearing a button, placing a bumpers sticker or lawn sign in support of a presidential campaign. Younger adults, like African Americans, were more likely than older ones to say they engaged in three of the four offline activities—persuasion, rally attendance, and displaying a button, bumper sticker or lawn sign. Campaign interest, online contact, and support for Obama each significantly predicted offline behavior.

6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate. Significant demographic predictors of offline persuasion were age, gender, and income, though neither of these variables were significant predictors of online persuasion. More specifically, being younger (OR=1.539,p<.001), male (OR=1.159, p<.05) and more affluent (OR=1.220, p<.05) were significant predictors of offline persuasion. Politically, those engaged in offline persuasion tended to identify themselves as Democrats (OR=1.308, p<.01), highly interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.933, p<.001) and said they supported Obama (OR=1.265, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).

6-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Three variables significantly stood out above the others as predictors of volunteering to work

for a candidate offline: race, online campaign contact, and campaign interest. According to the logistic regression model, African Americans were nearly three and a half times more likely than non-African Americans to say they volunteered to work for a candidate (OR=3.420, p<.001). Further, those who reported receiving an online campaign communication were four times more likely to say they volunteered to work for one of the candidates, offline (OR=3.966, p<.001). Campaign interest would seem to naturally lead to campaign voluntarism and those with the highest levels of campaign awareness were nearly three times more likely to report volunteering for a campaign than those with lower interest (OR=2.949, p<.001) (See Table 6-3).

6-2.2.3: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. Race and age were the significant demographic predictors for attending a campaign event or meeting during the general phase of the campaign through October 2, 2008. African Americans (OR=2.488, p<.01) and younger adults (OR=1.993, p<.05) were most likely to say they participated in this activity. However, religious service attendance (OR=1.206, p<.05) also served as a significant predictor. Campaign interest was once again a powerfully significant predictor of attending a campaign rally or meeting. By about a four and a half to one ratio, those with a high level of campaign interest said they were more likely to attend an event than those with lesser levels of interest (OR=4.440, p<.001). Consistent with other offline and online activities, online campaign contact was also a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=2.170, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).

6-2.2.4: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support of a candidate. Similar to rally attendance, being African-American (OR=2.212,

p<.001), young (OR=1.824, p<.01), or a regular attendee of religious services (OR=1.146 p<.01) were reliable predictors of wearing a button, or placing a sign or bumper sticker in support of a candidate. Additionally, the odds of this type of display of support were significantly higher for those who were contacted online by a campaign (OR=3.210, p<.001) than those who were not contacted. Other significant predictors include campaign interest (OR=2.096, p<.001) support for Obama (OR=1.695, p<.001), and self-identified Democrats (OR=1.545, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).

Table 6-3: *Case 3--Predictors of Offline Political Participation Logistic Regression EXP(B)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose candidate OFFLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign OFFLINE	Attend Rally/ Meeting	Wear Campaign Button/ Bumper Sticker/Lawn Sign
Education (College Grad+)	.959	.886	.810	.900
Gender (male)	1.159*	.602	.857	.987
Age (18-29)	1.539**	.821	1.993*	1.824**
Race (African-American)	.857	3.420***	2.488**	2.212***
Income ($100K plus)	1.220*	1.124	1.416	.903
Religiosity	1.050	1.214	1.206*	1.146**
Party (Democrat)	1.308**	1.190	1.091	1.545**
Ideology (liberal)	.930*	1.111	1.243*	1.037
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.011	1.033	1.066	1.047*
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.094***	1.049	1.010	1.057**
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.040***	1.176**	1.046	1.061**
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.049**	.899	.948	1.004
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)	.953	1.068	1.129	1.040
Campaign Interest	1.933***	2.949***	4.440***	2.096***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.048	3.966***	2.170**	3.210***
Obama Supporter	1.265**	1.647	1.370	1.695***
Constant	.013***	.000***	.000***	.001***
N	6,251	6,251	6,251	6,251
Correctly Classified	78.0%	98.9%	98.3%	92.9%
Nagelkerke R Square	.115	.190	.153	.170
Cox & Snell R Square	.075	.021	.024	.069

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

6-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities

Age and race were significant predictors of more online activities than any other demographic variable. Young adults were more likely than older ones to say they participated in four of the seven activities measured during this general election period. African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they engaged in visiting a campaign web site, viewing a political video on a site like YouTube, and forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others. Men and women split on several activities. In some instances, the logistic model showed that women were more likely than men to say they performed an activity, and in some cases men were more likely than women to engage in an activity. The model also showed that citing the Internet as a primary source of campaign information, online campaign contact, and high levels of campaign interest, were significant predictors of nearly all the activities measured.

6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. Demographically, there were no significant predictors of online persuasion, according to the logistic regression model. However, those who persuaded online tended to be highly interested in the campaign (OR=2.982, $p<.001$), frequent users of the Internet for general purposes (OR=1.402, $p<.05$), and as a source for political information (OR=1.311, $p<.001$). Online contact from one of the campaigns was also a significant predictor of this behavior of persuading (OR=2.233, $p<.001$) (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.2: Volunteering online to work for a candidate or campaign. As with online persuasion, the model reveals that demographic variables were not significant predictors

of volunteering online for a candidate. The only significant predictors of online volunteering were typically contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=3.171, p<.05) and using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.604, p<.01) (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.3: Discussing politics online. Those who reported engaging in online political discussion were more likely to be younger (OR=1.881, p<.001), and less likely to be African-American (OR=0.557, p<.01), and less likely to be male (OR=.831, p<.05). Online political discussion typically occurred among those who said they were frequently online (OR=1.740, p<.001) and cited the Internet as a major source for campaign information (OR=1.287, p<.001). High campaign interest (OR=1.75, p<.001), and online contact by one of the campaigns (OR=1.718, p<.001) were also among the predictors with the highest odds ratios (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign website. The significant demographic predictors of visiting a campaign website, according to the model, were age and race. For example, young people age 18 to 29 (OR=1.999, p<.001), were twice as likely as older adults to say they visited a campaign website. African Americans (OR=1.806, p<.001) were also about twice as likely as non-African Americans to say they participated in visiting a campaign website. Frequent Internet users (OR=1.308, p<.001) tended to say they visited campaign websites more so than less frequent Internet users. Again, online campaign contact was a strong predictor: those contacted were nearly three times more likely than others to say they visited a campaign website (OR=2.909, p<.001). Those who were highly interested in the campaign were twice as likely as those less interested

to report visiting a campaign website (OR=2.011, p<.001), and Obama supporters were one and a half times more likely than non-supporters to visit a campaign website (OR=1.493, p<.01) (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.5: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Consistent with other online activities, the model demonstrated that younger people were more likely than older people to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube. In fact, they were nearly three times more likely than those ages thirty or older to report this behavior (OR=2.687, p<.001), suggesting that YouTube is generally a medium for the young. However, African Americans were more likely to report viewing political video online than non-African Americans (OR=1.365, p<.05), despite their age. Perhaps an explanation for the findings related can be attributed to the popularity of the pro-Obama videos, including the Will.I.Am's "Yes We Can" video (14.4 million views on YouTube) and "Wassup 2008" video (5.3 million views on YouTube) (ShiftingtheDebate.com, 2008) .

Those who used the Internet as a campaign source (OR=1.338, p<.001) were more likely to report viewing political videos online than those who were less likely to rely on the Internet for campaign information. Online contact from one of the campaigns (OR=1.842, p<.001) and campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001) were significant predictors of viewing political videos as well (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.6: Reading or posting to a blog about the presidential campaign. Younger people (OR=2.015, p<.001) and males (OR=1.366, p<.01) were characteristically more likely to say the read or posted to a blog about the presidential campaign. Other

significant characteristics predicting this behavior included online frequency (OR=1.457, p<.001), using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.282, p<.001), high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.399, p<.001), and being contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=1.535, p<.01) (See Table 6-4).

6-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the candidates or campaigns. Forwarding emails, audio or videos about the presidential campaign to others was an activity primarily reported by females (OR=0.694 for males, p<.001) and African Americans (OR=1.480, p<.05), according to these data. Those who did not support Obama were more likely to say they did this than Obama supporters (OR=1.44/0.647, p<.001). Other significant predictors include: frequent use of the Internet (OR=1.55/0.644 for Obama supporters, p<.001) and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.539, p<.001). Further, as seen with other activities, online forwarders were more likely than non-forwarders to have been contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=2.514, p<.001) (See Table 6-4).

Table 6-4: *Case 3--Predictors of Online Political Participation*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for candidate or campaign ONLINE	Discuss Politics Online	Visit Campaign Website	Viewed Political Video on Sites Like YouTube	Read or Post to a blog about campaign	Forward Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others about the candidates
Education (College Grad+)	1.132	1.674	1.205	1.063	.968	1.006	1.037
Gender (male)	.964	.647	.831*	.959	1.192*	1.366**	.694***
Age (18-29)	1.536	2.465	1.881***	1.999***	2.687***	2.015***	1.126
Race (African-American)	.834	1.100	.557**	1.806***	1.365*	1.356	1.418*
Income ($100K plus)	.897	1.595	.887	.971	1.247*	1.069	1.106
Religiosity	1.044	1.130	1.033	1.039	1.012	1.060	.992
Party (Democrat)	.935	.930	.895	1.095	.965	.852	.925
Ideology (liberal)	.829*	.783	.956	1.071	1.106*	.963	.905*
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.311***	1.604**	1.287***	1.288***	1.338***	1.282***	1.267***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.040	1.002	1.055**	1.040*	1.065***	1.056**	1.074***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.970	1.165	1.011	1.004	.987	1.043*	1.009
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.938	.987	.974	1.024	.946**	.940**	1.009
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)	1.402*	.728	1.740***	1.308**	1.363***	1.457***	1.628***
Campaign Interest	2.982***	1.799	1.750***	2.011***	1.614***	1.399***	1.539***
Contacted by Campaign Online	2.233***	3.171*	1.718***	2.909***	1.842***	1.535**	2.514***
Obama Supporter	.824	3.220	1.168	1.493**	1.009	1.200	.644***
Constant	.000***	.000***	.005***	.001***	.008***	.009***	.020***
N	6,251	6,251	6,251	6,251	6,251	6,251	6,251
Correctly Classified	96.8%	99.7%	89.6%	89.7%	85.3%	90.8%	85.7 %
Nagelkerke R Square	.192	.231	0.226	0.270	.277	.193	.237
Cox & Snell R Square	.047	.009	0.110	0.132	.157	.088	.135

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

6-2.4: *Online index and offline index: predictors*

The previous sections of Case 3 concentrated on the significant predictors of individual participation activities. Different attributes were more predictive of different behaviors, with some attributes like campaign interest, online campaign contact, race, and age emerging most often as predictors with the highest odds ratios. Turning to the combined indexes of online and offline behaviors and using OLS regression, results show a similar pattern for online and offline participation behavior. As stated in the methods chapter, the offline index variable was created by combining the "yes" responses to the offline questions. The online participation index was created by combining the "yes" responses to the questions related directly to online participation. According to the data, younger adults and African Americans were more likely to perform either one of the online or offline participation activities. However, the coefficients are stronger for younger adults for the online index than the offline index (See Table 6-5). As in the analyses of the individual participation activities, online campaign contact is a key influence of any participation. Being online frequently and using the Internet as a source for campaign information are other important influences for online participation behavior

Table 6-5: Case 3—*Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online and the Combined Offline Participation Index*
OLS Regression
(Unstandardized B)

	Online Participation Index	Offline Participation Index
Education (College Grad+)	.008	-.016
Gender (male)	-.019	.013
Age (18-29)	.321***	.108***
Race (African-American)	.131**	.138***
Income ($100K plus)	.026	.035
Religiosity	.014	.020***
Party (Democrat)	-.025	.076***
Ideology (liberal)	-.006	.001
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.148***	.008**
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.033***	.022***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.005	.013***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.012*	.004
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.219***	-.002
Campaign Interest	.185***	.131***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	.716***	.247***
Obama Supporter	.013	.067***
Constant	-.474***	-.377***
N	6,250	6,250
R Square	.312	.116
R Square Change	.261***	.092***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

6-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both

Thus far, the Case 3 data have shown that with statistical controls in place, some of the traditional demographic biases predicting participation have diminished or disappeared for some activities, but remained for others. Additionally, the findings point to an emergence of young adults and African Americans as reliable predictors of several participation activities. Yet, while these results are potentially suggestive of mobilization, none of the analysis provides firm support for either mobilization or reinforcement.

The purpose of step 4 of the analytical process is to establish evidence for mobilization, reinforcement, or both by testing interactions between a high frequency of Internet use and the significant demographic predictor variables across the various types of participation. As the final and most direct test of the mobilization versus reinforcement hypotheses, I added interaction terms (between frequency of internet use and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic regression analyses. In order to see the effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to display its effect.

While there were many instances of statistically significant predictor variables in the analyses, only a small number of those variables were moderated by the interaction with Internet frequency. During the general election data collection phase represented by Case 3, I found evidence of mobilization in two very similar areas—1) persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done offline or online, and 2) persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, I found evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in two areas of

activity: First, the online participation activity of viewing a campaign video online by age. Second, when looking at the combined index of online participation, there was evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in the likelihood of participating online by race.

6-3.1: Case 3 interactions represented in the model

In Table 6-6, one can see the results of the models including the interaction terms. In each, the model produced a significant and positive main effect for age, represented by 18 to 29 year olds. However, as hypothesized, age interacting with frequency of Internet use, produced a negative b coefficient and diminished the effect of age on each of the predictions: attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate without regard to it being performed online (OR=0.945, $p<.05$, b=-.057), attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate, offline (OR=0.944, $p<.05$. b=-.057), and viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=0.931, $p<.05$,b=-.071). The conclusion one can reach is that an age by Internet frequency interaction moderates the effect of age, and thereby shows evidence of mobilization. However, to obtain a clearer picture of what that mobilization effect looks like, I have plotted the interaction as a graph (Figure 6-1) showing the closing of the gap between the young adults, age 18 to 29, and the adults age 30 or older, as a result of the interaction.

Table 6-6: *Case 3--Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions (Exp(B)(b coefficient)*

	Persuade Someone to Support or Oppose a Candidate with Interaction (Internet Frequency X Age(18-29))	Offline: Persuade Someone to Support or Oppose a Candidate with Interaction (Internet Frequency X Age(18-29))	Viewing A Political Video on a Site Like YouTube (Internet Frequency X Age(18-29))
Education (College Grad+)	.974	.956	.964
Gender (male)	1.143*	1.158*	1.190*
Age (18-29)	1.686*** (b=0.523)	1.609*** (b=0.476)	2.963*** (b=1.086)
Race (African-American)	.842	.859	1.367*
Income ($100K plus)	1.169*	1.218*	1.245*
Religiosity	1.056*	1.051	1.012
Party (Democrat)	1.277**	1.308**	.967
Ideology (liberal)	.902**	.930*	1.106*
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.056***	1.010	1.336***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.097***	1.094***	1.064***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.033**	1.040***	.986
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.036*	1.050**	.948**
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.030	.962	1.406***
Campaign Interest	2.139***	1.943***	1.630***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	1.353*	1.056	1.858***
Obama Supporter	1.209*	1.264**	1.006
Online Frequency X Age (18-29)	.945* (b= -.057)	.944* (b=-.057)	.931* (b=-.071)
Constant	.011	.013***	.007***
N	6,251	6,251	6,251
Correctly classified	75.5%	77.9%	85.4%
Nagelkerke R Square	.103	.117	.279
Cox Snell R Square	.153	.076	.158

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

6.3.2.1: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with Internet frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate without regard to it being performed online or *offline.* In Figure 6-1, the graph shows that as Internet frequency increases there is a greater likelihood of engaging in persuasion by those over age 30, beyond the main effects of both age and Internet use. The more often older Americans use the Internet, the more likely they were to engage in persuading others to support one of the candidates. This closing of the gap between old and young, albeit small, is clear evidence of mobilization, but not in the way originally hypothesized. The expectation was that the Internet would mobilize previously disengaged voters, thus closing the anticipated participation gap between young and old by increasing the involvement of the former at a greater rate than the latter. Rather, frequent use of the Internet increased the likelihood of persuasion among a group more associated with engagement, older people. It is important to note that the technology may have served to motivate older adults, though it is difficult to illustrate this using survey data, it is entirely possible. The interaction between the Internet and age was not significant in predicting persuasion to support or oppose a candidate. With or without the technology, younger adults persuaded at the same rate. This analysis illustrated by Figure 6-1 provides support for Hypothesis 1b—the Internet reinforces participation of already engaged citizens.

Figure 6-1: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or Oppose a Candidate Without Regard to Performing it Offline or Online



6.3.2.2: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29)interacting with Internet frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate offline. Similarly, the interaction between age and Internet frequency produces a negative coefficient and significantly diminishes the effect of age, graphically represented in Figure 6-2. The illustrated analysis provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b---using the Internet reinforces the offline participation of already engaged citizens by showing that older adults are more likely to attempt offline persuasion, the more they are online. The expected group, older adults increase their likelihood when they get online.

Figure 6-2: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or Oppose a Candidate Offline



6-3.2.3: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with internet frequency predicting viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Finally, the third significant interaction also involves age and Internet frequency as a predictor for viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. The main effect of age is strong and in a positive direction. Young adults are nearly three times more likely than older ones (OR=2.963, p<.001) to say they viewed online political video. Interacting age and Internet frequency causes this effect to disappear (OR=.931, p<.05). Figure 6-3 shows the graphic plot of this interaction. Figure 6-3 shows evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement occurring. Regardless of age, the greater the frequency of Internet use, the more likely one is to view a political video online. However, it is clear from the graph that the gap between young and old is closing with more Internet usage. This provides support for both Hypotheses 2c and 2d.

Figure 6-3: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing A Political Video on a Site Like YouTube



6-3.2.4: Race (African American) interacting with internet frequency predicting online participation (combined index). Not only is there some evidence of mobilization and reinforcement for some individual participation activities, the Case 3 data also produced evidence of mobilization for race in predicting general online participation (represented by the combined index). Using OLS regression, the model produced a significant main effect for race (African American) as a predictor of online participation. The effect is significantly moderated by the interaction between race and Internet frequency (b=.027, p<.05). While not negative, the main effect is moderated by Internet frequency (See Table 6-7).

Table 6-7: *Case 3--Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online Participation Index: OLS Regression (Unstandardized B)*

	Online Participation Index	Standard Error (SE)
Education (College Grad+)	.007	.026
Gender (male)	-.019	.025
Age (18-29)	.318***	.047
Race (African-American)	.130**	.047
Income ($100K plus)	.027	.031
Religiosity	.014	.010
Party (Democrat)	-.024	.030
Ideology (liberal)	-.006	.013
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.148***	.005
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.033***	.005
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.005	.004
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.013*	.005
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.219***	.029
Campaign Interest	.185***	.017
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	.712***	.053
Obama Supporter	.013	.031
Online Frequency X Race (African American)	.027*	.012
Constant	-.472	.072
N	6,250	
R Square	.313	
R Square Change	.262	

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

The evidence for mobilization and reinforcement is more obvious in Figure 6-4. As Internet frequency increases, there is a greater *likelihood* that the voter will engage in any of the online participatory activities among both African American and non-African American populations. This small but significant increase provides support for the mobilization hypothesis 2c and the reinforcement hypothesis 2d. With all the controls in place, including support for Obama, campaign interest, and online campaign contact, the Internet mobilized a previously less engaged group, African Americans, to a greater level of participation. However, the gap between African Americans and non-African Americans is widening rather than narrowing, suggesting that while the Internet mobilizes people of all races to participate online, the rate of increase is greater among African Americans.

Figure 6-4: Case 3 Interaction--Race (Black) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation



6-4: Case 3--Summary of Findings

The Case 3 findings represent participation activity in the relatively early part of the general election campaign—before the party conventions through the first presidential debate (September 29). Analyzing the raw frequencies, participation activities were relatively low, with many of the activities reported only in the single digits. This may be as a result of the question wording where respondents were asked to report their behavior in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign. Still, when extrapolating behavior even as low as one percent to all U.S. households, those numbers translate into millions of participants.

Without statistical controls, traditional demographic variables—education and income resulted in the expected modes they have in prior election studies. However, there were some variables which did not—race and age. Investigating the raw data, those with higher education and income were more likely to say they performed most of the participation activities measured in this study. However, African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in most activities. Younger adults, were more likely to engage in online activities than older adults. The greater likelihood to participate by these groups might be the result of a number of factors surrounding the uniqueness of this general election campaign, including the greater role of technology, the nomination of the first African American candidate for president by a major political party, and the Obama campaign's ability to mobilize support.

Predictors showed that with controls in place, the effect of education and income disappeared or diminished for most activities. However, young people and African

Americans emerged as significant predictors of participation. As in the primaries, online campaign contact and campaign interest, more often than not, produced the highest odds ratios. If one was contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns or was strongly interested in the presidential campaign, then there was a greater likelihood to participate in one of the activities. Tables 6-8 and 6-9 summarize the significant predictors with the highest odds ratios.

Table 6-8: *Case 3-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)*

	Persuade someone to vote offline	Volunteer for candidate offline	Attend Rally/Meeting	Wear Campaign Button
Education (College Grad+)				
Gender (male)	X+			
Age (18-29)	X+		X+	X+
Race (African-American)		X+	X+	X+
Income ($100K plus)	X+			
Religiosity			X+	
Party (Democrat)	X+			X+
Ideology (liberal)			X+	
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days				
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days				
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days		X+		
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days				
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)				
Campaign Interest	X+	X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online		X+	X+	X+
Obama Supporter	X+			X+

(A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

Table 6-9: Case 3—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)

	Persuade someone to vote online	Volunteer for candidate online	Discuss politics online	Visit Campaign Website	Viewed Video Sites Like YouTube	Read or Post to a blog about campaign	Forward Emails
Education (College Grad+)							
Gender (male)			X-		X+	X+	X-
Age (18-29)			X+	X+	X+	X+	
Race (African-American)			X-	X+	X+	X+	X+
Income ($100K plus)					X+		
Religiosity							
Party (Democrat)							
Ideology (liberal)							
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	X-	X+					
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	X+						
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days							
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days							
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)			X+				
Campaign Interest	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online	X+		X+	X+	X+	X+	X+
Obama Supporter	X+			X+	X+	X+	X-

(A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

The analysis testing for mobilization and reinforcement provided some support for H1a-b and H2a-d, but only for a limited number of activities. The data show mobilization towards participation as a result of using the Internet among groups more likely to be engaged anyhow. Use of the technology led to both offline and online participation. The Internet mobilized older people to become more active, but at the same time increasing the likelihood of younger people to participate in viewing political videos. The OLS model testing interactions between race and Internet frequency as predictors for online participation (combined index) showed that African Americans were more likely to participate online the more they were online, more so than non-African Americans.

CHAPTER 7: CASE 4 -- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA COLLECTION AMONG POST-GENERAL ELECTION PANEL

In the prior chapter, I presented the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement reported as close to "real time" as possible by asking about participation behaviors in the week prior to the interview. This results I present in this chapter provide a different view: retrospective analysis of mobilization and reinforcement. The findings in this chapter are reported from the Case 4 data collected among a telephone panel who participated in the rolling cross-section survey. The post-election panel was conducted in the seven days following the general election (November 5, 2008 through November, 12, 2008). I present the following analyses:

- A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using post-general election panel data, including a correlation Analysis among participation activities;
- Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online participation; and,
- Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or reinforcement.
- A comparison between the data from Cases 3 and 4

7-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

Perhaps as a result of the different data collection methods, the frequency of reporting participation activities in Case 4 was higher than for Case 3. However, the patterns of participation were generally similar, and, like Case 3, the descriptive analysis of the Case 4 post-election panel data affirms some of the past demographic biases about participation, while countering them in other instances.

The raw frequencies in Case 4, without any controls, reveal that better educated and more affluent respondents continue to be advantaged since they are significantly more likely to report participating in most of the measured behaviors than less educated and less affluent (See Table 7-1). Young adults age 18 to 29 years old report participating in fewer offline activities than older adults. This is consistent with past research showing older adults were more likely to participate in traditional activities. Countering past biases, African Americans were significantly more likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in several political activities. These include, working for a presidential candidate offline, contributing to a presidential campaign regardless if the method was offline or online, attending political meetings or rallies, and wearing a campaign button or displaying a sign in support of a candidate. Unlike Case 3, where results show younger adults more likely to say they participated in most of the measured online activities, the Case 4 descriptive data reveal they are more likely than older adults to say they participated in less than half of the measured online activities.

Not surprisingly, reported participation behavior was demonstrably higher in Case 4, undoubtedly the result of the expanded time frame in which respondents considered

performing the participation behaviors. However, the patterns of behavior, i.e., which activities respondents reported doing most often, were generally the same between cases, but there were exceptions.

Nearly half of all adults (46.1%) said they attempted to persuade others to support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was performed offline or online. Nearly a fifth (19.2%) said they contributed money to one of the presidential campaigns without regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online, and under a tenth (7.5%) said they performed work from one of the presidential candidates without specification of whether it was done offline or online (See Table 7.1).

Among the offline activities, more adults engaged in in-person persuasion either by directly speaking with someone (38.5%) or by the more passive method of wearing a campaign button or displaying a sign or bumper sticker (21.1%). An equal number reported attending political meetings or rallies (11.5%) and contributing to a campaign or candidate through traditional offline methods (11.2%). Few said they actually did any work offline for one of the candidates (6.3%) (See Table 7.1). Respondents were more likely to report rally attendance in Case 4 than in Case 3, relative to other activities.

In the descriptive analysis of online activities, three activities stood out. A roughly equal proportion of adults said they visited a campaign web site (30.1%), viewed a political video on a site like YouTube (29.1%) or forwarded campaign-related emails, audio, or video to others (28.8%). All three were top activities in Case 3, also. These activities are moderately correlated. The correlation between visiting a campaign web site and viewing a political video is r= .41 and between forwarding a campaign-related email

is r=.37. The correlation between viewing a political video and forwarding a campaign-related email is r=.42.[26] About one in five said they discussed politics online during the general election campaign. The data suggest that direct persuasion online, person-to-person, is less popular than offline persuasion with just 7.6 percent adults saying they tried to persuade others to support or oppose a candidate during the general election. Finally, while much has been written and spoken about online donations, fewer adults said they gave online (7.9%) than offline (11.2%). However, the proportion of online donors represents a significant number of adults, well into the millions (See Table 7.1).

[26] While these correlations are moderate, they are not so high to warrant abandoning an analysis of the individual activities in favor of combined online and offline indexes.

Table 7-1: *Case 4 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)*

Activities Regardless of Whether it Was Performed Offline during the presidential campaign	All Adults % (n=2,026	College Graduate Or Higher % (n=944)	Not College Graduate % (n=1,082)	Male % (n=898)	Female % (n=1,128)	Age 18-29 % (n=93)	Age 30 or older % (n=1,933)	African American % (n=137)	Not African American % (n=1,889)	Household Income: $100K Or more % (n=514)	Household Income: Less than $100K % (n=1,512)
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate	46.1	51.0***	41.9	49.0*	43.8	40.9	46.4	43.8	46.3	55.6***	42.9
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates	7.5	10.1***	5.3	5.9*	8.9	6.5	7.6	20.4***	6.6	9.3	6.9
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates	19.2	26.3***	12.9	18.5	19.7	12.9	19.5	26.3*	18.6	28.2***	16.1
OFFLINE Activities during the presidential campaign											
Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or oppose a candidate	38.5	39.9	37.2	40.6	36.8	32.3	38.8	37.2	38.6	43.0*	37.0
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates OFFLINE	6.3	8.4***	4.5	4.7*	7.6	5.4	6.4	18.2***	5.5	7.4	6.0
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE	11.2	13.3**	9.3	11.7	10.8	2.2**	11.6	16.1	10.9	14.6**	10.1
Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate	11.5	16.1***	7.4	9.8*	12.8	14.0	11.3	27.7***	10.3	13.0	10.9

OFFLINE											
Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on car/place sign in your window/ in front of your house.	21.1	23.7*	19.0	19.4	22.7	26.9	21.1	43.8***	19.6	23.0	20.6
ONLINE activities during the presidential campaign											
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	7.6	11.0***	4.6	8.4	7.0	8.6	7.6	6.6	7.7	12.6***	5.9
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates ONLINE	1.2	1.7*	0.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	1.1	1.9	0.9
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE	7.9	12.9***	3.6	6.8	8.9	10.8	7.8	10.2	7.8	13.6***	6.0
Discuss politics online	19.6	28.6***	11.7	21.3	18.3	33.3**	18.9	23.4	19.3	29.2***	16.3
Visited Web site of a presidential campaign or political party	30.1	41.0***	20.5	31.1	29.3	41.9*	29.5	35.0	29.7	42.8***	25.7
Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign	29.1	40.0***	19.5	31.2	27.4	45.2***	28.3	28.5	29.1	43.2***	24.3
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know	28.8	39.0***	20.0	28.8	30.4	24.7	29.0	33.6	28.5	40.9***	24.7

+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

7-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation

With the presence of statistical controls in the regression models, the data provide a more accurate picture of which variables are more effectively predicting political participation activities. In this section, I present results of the multivariate analyses of the four classes of participation activities: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or the wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, political discussion, visiting campaign web sites, viewing political campaign-related videos on sites like YouTube, and forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and offline indexes.

In contrast to what the data showed in Case 3, higher education was a significant predictor for a variety of activities, more so than any other demographic variable. This is especially true of the online participation variables. More consistent with Case 3, however, is the outcome that young adults are significant predictors of several online activities, but still fewer than in Case 3, and was not at all significant for any offline activities. Females turned out to be a significant predictor for a majority of offline activities, and those activities measured without regard to whether they were performed offline or online. Female was also a significant predictor for two of the seven online activities.

As in all three of the prior cases, online campaign contact and campaign interest were the most robust predictors for all the activities. In addition, voting for Obama was a significant predictor for a number of activities.

7-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions

Affluence was a consistent predictor for two of the three activities not taking into account whether they were performed offline or online, while education was a significant predictor for one of them. The meaning one could take away from this is that, in Case 4 for these activities, the traditional biases were affirmed. Yet again, gender, specifically, being female, was a significant predictor for volunteering and donating—two critical needs for any successful campaign. Campaign interest, online campaign contact, and support for Obama, were significant predictor for all three.

7-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to vote for a candidate.

Demographically, the predictors for persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate differ from the Case 3 predictors, but the non-demographic variables in the model generally are consistent with Case 3. Based on the results of the logistic regression model, with statistical controls, those from more affluent households were 1.3 times more likely to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate than those from less affluent households (OR=1.338, $p<.05$). Politically those more likely to say they persuaded others to support or oppose a candidate tended to be highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.873 $p<.001$), likely to be contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=1.455, $p<.01$), and more likely to be an Obama voter (OR=1.299, $p<.05$) (See Table 7-2).

7-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. The Case 4 demographic predictors for volunteering for a candidate are somewhat similar to Case 3. Consistent with Verba et al. (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more frequent one attends religious services, the more likely they were to say they volunteered to work for a campaign (OR=1.231, p<.01). Females (OR=1.664/.601 for males, p>.05) were more likely than males to say they volunteered to work for a campaign. Also consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen, those contacted by a campaign online were nearly five times more likely to say they volunteered to work for a campaign (OR=4.829, p<.001) than those who had no such contact. Obama voters were nearly two and a half times more likely (OR=2.334, p<.01) than McCain voters to say they worked for one of the candidates, and those with a higher level of campaign interest were more than one and a half times more likely (OR=1.584, p<.05) to say they volunteered for a campaign either offline or online (See Table 7-2).

7-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign. According to the results of the regression, those most likely to say they donated to one of the campaign during the general election campaign were the more affluent (OR=1.594, p<.01), the better educated (OR=1.352, p<.05) and females (OR=1.328/.753 (male), p<.05). Unlike in Case 3, race was not a significant predictor for making a campaign contribution in Case 4. Politically, those saying they donated to a campaign typically were more likely to be Democratic (OR=1.515, p<.05). Again, online campaign contact was a significant predictor since those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were four times more likely to say they donated than those who were not (OR=4.206, p<.001). Presumably, one would

have to have a certain amount of interest in a campaign to want to donate, thus high campaign interest was a significant predictor of donating (OR=2.278, p<.001). Finally, the model revealed that Obama voters were more likely to say they donated money to a campaign during the general election period (OR=1.605, p<.05), though this might have more to do with the fact that the McCain campaign accepted public campaign financing which barred it from accepting direct campaign donations once McCain accepted the nomination at the party convention in early September. Obama had no such restriction, since his campaign chose not to accept public financing (See Table 7-2).

Table 7-2: *Case 4--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of Online or Offline*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate	Volunteer for candidate or campaign	Contribute Money to a candidate or campaign
Education (College Grad+)	.868	1.204	1.352*
Gender (male)	1.136	.601*	.753*
Age (18-29)	1.004	.883	.839
Race (African American)	.680	1.738	.815
Income ($100K plus)	1.338*	1.126	1.594**
Religiosity	.952	1.231**	.995
Party (Democrat)	1.091	1.494	1.515*
Ideology (liberal)	.905	1.220	.966
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.077***	1.051	1.024
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.087***	1.100**	1.120***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.038*	1.021	1.107***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.025	.982	1.013
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.960	1.257	.946
Campaign Interest	1.873***	1.584*	2.278***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	1.455**	4.829***	4.206***
Obama Voter	1.299*	2.334**	1.605*
Constant	.056***	.001***	.002***
N	1,925	1,925	1,925
Correctly Classified	64.9%	93.0%	83.1%
Nagelkerke R Square	.160	.279	.308
Cox & Snell R Square	.120	.114	.193

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

7-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities

The demographic analysis of offline participation activities reveals that women and African Americans are more likely to say they took part in these traditional behaviors of political participation. This is particularly true for offline volunteering, attending rallies, and displaying support for a candidate among women, and attending rallies and displaying support for African Americans. Consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995) regarding the importance of religious attendance and volunteering, the Case 4 logistic model shows that the more one attends religious services the more likely that person was to volunteer to work for a campaign online and to attend a rally or meeting in support of a candidate. Politically, online campaign contact appears to have made a difference for offline activities as well as online activities. Online contact significantly predicted, volunteering offline, attending rallies or meeting, displaying campaign support, and donating money offline. Similarly, high campaign interest was a significant predictor of offline donating, rally attendance, and displaying support. Additionally, more than predicting online activities, Obama voters were more likely than non-voters to say they persuade offline, attend rallies or meetings, and display candidate support. The remainder of this section details the significant predictors for the offline participation activities.

7-2.2.1: Attempting to p*ersuade someone offline to vote for a candidate.* Case 3 data indicated that youth, gender, and income were significant predictors of offline persuasion, however, in Case 4, there were no significant demographic predictors of offline persuasion. Those saying they engaged in offline persuasion tended to be highly

interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.560, p<.001) and were more likely to be Obama voters (OR=1.34, p<.05) (See Table 7-3).

7-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. According to the logistic regression model, women (OR=1.72/.582 for men, p<.05) and frequent religious service attendees (OR=1.288, p<.01) were the only significant demographic predictors of offline volunteering. Those contacted by a campaign online were nearly five times as likely as others (OR=4.949, p<.001) to say they volunteered offline. Obama voters (OR=2.863, p<.01) were almost three times more likely than McCain voters to say they volunteered offline (See Table 7-3).

7-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. In the presence of controls, no demographic variables significantly predicted donating to a presidential campaign through an offline mechanism. The Case 4 model shows that self-identified Democrats (OR=1.478, p<.05) were more likely to say they donated than Republicans or Independents during the general election campaign. Again, this might be a result of the McCain campaign accepting matching Federal funds and therefore unable to collect donations after McCain accepted his party's nomination in early-September. The strongest predictors were high campaign interest (OR=1.990, p<.001) and online campaign contact (OR=1.869, p<.001) (See Table 7.3).

7-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. African Americans (OR=2.199, p<.001) were more than twice as likely to say they attended a rally meeting or some other event in support of a candidate. Higher educated adults (OR=1.764, p<.01) and women (OR= 1.464/0.683 for males, p<.05) were also

significant predictors of attending rallies. More frequent religious service attendees (OR=1.145, p<.05) were also significantly more likely than less frequent ones to say they attended campaign rallies or meetings. The most robust predictor of this offline activity, again, is online campaign contact (OR=3.092, p<.001). This is further evidence of the impact of online campaign communications with voter mobilization. Other significant predictors are highly campaign interested adults (OR=2.172, p<.001), and being an Obama voter (OR=1.573, p<.05) (See Table 7.3).

7-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support of a candidate. African Americans are about twice as likely as non-African Americans to say they wore a button, displayed a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support of a candidate (OR=1.923, p<.01). Women were significantly more likely than men to display their support in this manner (OR=1.285/0.778 for men, p<.05). Politically, Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they wore a button (OR=1.362, p<.05). The effect of online campaign contact was also the predictor with the highest probability (OR=3.180, p<.001). And, as I found for most of the other offline and online activities, high campaign interest was a significant predictor (OR=1.763, p<.001) (See Table 7-3).

Table 7-3: *Case 4--Predictors of Offline Political Participation*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate OFFLINE	Volunteer for candidate OFFLINE	^Contribute Money to a Candidate or Campaign OFFLINE	Attend Rally/ Meeting	Wear Campaign Button/ Display Bumper Sticker/Lawn Sign
Education (College Grad+)	.839	1.309	1.102	1.764**	.903
Gender (male)	1.154	.582*	1.019	.683*	.778*
Age (18-29)	.924	.923	.269	1.486	1.673
Race (African American)	.788	1.612	1.194	2.199**	1.923**
Income ($100K plus)	1.196	1.135	1.365	.851	.965
Religiosity	.939	1.288**	1.069	1.145*	1.052
Party (Democrat)	1.071	1.609	1.478*	1.315	1.362*
Ideology (liberal)	.896*	1.224	.864	1.050	1.016
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.036	1.002	.948	1.078*	1.056*
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.064**	1.103**	1.047	1.078**	1.113***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.041	1.014	1.147***	1.041	1.042*
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.027	.989	1.038	.909*	1.018
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.809	1.162	.915	.971	.829
Campaign Interest	1.560***	1.469	1.990***	2.172***	1.763***
Contacted by Campaign Online	.902	4.949***	1.869***	3.092***	3.180***
Obama Voter	1.340*	2.863**	1.001	1.573*	1.332
Constant	.119***	.001***	.004***	.001***	.008***
N	1,925	1,925	1,925	1,925	1,925
Correctly Classified	62.1%	94.1%	88.7%	89.1%	80.6%
Nagelkerke R Square	.074	.268	.128	.241	.218
Cox & Snell R Square	.055	.100	.065	.123	.141

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, shaded means predictor is also significant in Case 3; ^=Not asked in Case 3

7-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities

Those most likely to say they engaged in the online participation activities tended to be better educated, younger, more affluent, and female. Politically, they benefitted from online campaign contact and were very interested in the presidential campaign. Online participants' Internet behavior suggests they spend a lot of time online, in general, and relied on the Internet as an important campaign source. Better educated adults were significant predictors for online political discussion, visiting a campaign web site, viewing a political video online, and forwarding a political email, audio or video. Younger adults were more likely to say they discussed politics online, visited a campaign web site, and viewed a political video online. Females were more likely to say they donated online and forwarded a political email. More affluent adults were more likely to say they donated online and viewed an online political video. Online contact significantly predicted all of the measured online activities except volunteering online. High campaign interest was a significant predictor of online persuasion, discussing politics online, visiting a campaign web site, viewing an online political video, and forwarding a political email, audio or video. The more one was online, the more likely one was to say they performed one of the measured online activities except for volunteering online and donating online. The remainder of this section details the significant predictors for the online participation activities.

7-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate.

Consistent with the Case 3 data, there were no significant demographic predictors of online persuasion, according to the logistic regression model. Rather, those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.850, p<.001) and those highly interested in the campaign (OR=3.501, p<.001) were most likely to say they tried to persuade others via an online method to support or oppose a presidential candidate. Additionally, being online frequently (OR=1.718, p<.01) was also a significant predictor of this online persuasive behavior (See Table 7-4).

7-2.3.1: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. The descriptive analysis shows that better educated adults were most likely to say they worked online for one of the candidates. With controls, the influence of education on this behavior disappears. In fact, like online persuasion, there were no significant demographic predictors for this behavior. Online campaign contact (OR=3.509, p<.05) and using the Internet as a source for campaign information in the prior seven days (OR=1.447, p<.01) were significant predictors (See Table 7.4).

7-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign. The Case 4 model shows that the demographic profile of those most likely to donate to a candidate online differs little from prior research on general election campaign donations. While the Obama campaign promoted the notion (New York Times, July 17, 2008) that its donor base was made up of many small donors, those who say they made those contributions in the general election, according to the model, tended to be better off financially than those who did not donate (OR=1.811, p<.01). These findings appear to conform to the post-election study, noted earlier in this dissertation

but bears repeating. The Campaign Finance Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit institute affiliated with The George Washington University, conducted an analysis of the data from the FEC showing that Obama raised 80 percent more from large donors than small donors, a much higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential candidate. Additionally, the CFI analysis concluded that Obama raised about the same percentage from small donors (amounts of less than $200) in 2008, than George W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).

The model also indicates that women (OR=1.845/.524 (men), p<.01) and those who were better educated (OR=1.794, p<.05) were almost twice as likely as their counterparts to say they made an online donation. However, it bears restating, and perhaps it is obvious, but online efforts by the campaigns were truly the primary driver in choosing to make an online donation. Getting a campaign email made one eleven times more likely to say they made an online donation than those who did not get one (OR=11.365, p<.001). Obama voters, again, perhaps because McCain was barred from accepting donations once he became the party's nominee, were nearly four times more likely to say they made an online donation than McCain voters (OR=3.731, p<.001). Related to contact and support, high campaign interest (OR=2.468, p<.001) was another significant predictor (See Table 7.4).

7-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. The demographic profile of those who say they went online to discuss politics and the campaign turned out to be younger and better educated. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were two and a half times more likely than older adults to say they went online to discuss politics and the presidential

campaign (OR=2.462, p<.001). Highly educated adults, a group more traditionally involved in campaigns, were nearly twice as likely as less educated to say they discussed politics and the campaign online (OR=1.826, p<.001). Those who say they discussed politics and the campaign online were more likely to be contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=2.431, p<.001), frequently online (OR=1.962, p<.001), and highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.396, p<.01) (See Table 7.4).

7-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site. Youth, education and online campaign contact also defined who were more likely to say they visited a campaign web site. Younger people were twice as likely to say they visited a campaign web site, according to the Case 4 model (OR=2.062, p<.001). The odds of a college educated adult to say they visited a campaign web site was 1.503 (p<.01). Those who got an email from one of the campaigns were four times more likely than those who did not receive a campaign email to visit a campaign web site (OR=4.029, p<.001). Frequent Internet users were more likely than less frequent ones (OR=1.316, p<.001) to visit campaign web sites and high campaign interest was a significant predictor (OR=1.617, p<.001) (See Table 7-4).

7-2.3.6: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Youth is the most robust predictor, both demographically and behaviorally, of viewing online political videos, with odds ratios higher than online campaign contact. 18 to 29 year olds are just about three times more likely than older adults (OR=2.808, p<.001) to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube during the general election campaign. Those contacted online by one of the campaigns were just about twice as likely as

non-contacts to say they viewed online political video (OR=1.854, p<.001). Demographically, in addition to younger adults, those with higher income (OR=1.444, p<.01), and more education (OR=1.427, p<.01) were typically more likely to say they viewed online political video. Other political predictors for going online to view political videos were high campaign interest (OR=1.488, p<.001), frequent use of the Internet (OR=1.495, p<.01), and citing Internet as a campaign source (OR=1.231, p<.001) (See Table 7-4)

7-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the candidates. Demographically, forwarding emails, audio or videos about the presidential campaign to others was an activity more likely to be reported by females (OR=1.84/0.543 for males, p<.001) and the more highly educated (OR=1.552, p<.001). Again, however, this activity is most driven by online campaign contact (OR=3.193, p<.001), campaign interest (OR=1.739, p<.001), and frequency of being on the Internet (OR=2.068, p<.001) (See Tables 7-4 and 7-4a).

Table 7-4: *Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 1)*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for Candidate or Campaign ONLINE	Contribute Money to a candidate or campaign ONLINE
Education (College Grad+)	1.277	.868	1.794*
Gender (male)	.896	.786	.524**
Age (18-29)	1.284	.818	1.884
Race (African American)	.648	1.861	.542
Income ($100K plus)	1.289	1.029	1.811**
Religiosity	1.045	.928	.871
Party (Democrat)	.958	.945	1.111
Ideology (liberal)	1.029	1.125	1.114
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.177***	1.447**	1.161**
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.065	1.048	1.182***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.990	1.043	.988
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.976	.953	.951
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.718**	1.629	1.085
Campaign Interest	3.501***	2.286	2.468***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	3.850***	3.509*	11.365***
Obama Voter	.858	.914	3.731***
Constant	.000***	.000	.000***
N	1,925	1,925	1,925
Correctly Classified	92.3%	98.8%	92.3%
Nagelkerke R Square	.270	.200	.450
Cox & Snell R Square	.113	.024	.194

Table 7-4a: *Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 2)*
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

	Discuss politics ONLINE	Visit Campaign Web site	Viewed Political Video on Sites Like YouTube	Forward Political Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others
Education (College Grad+)	1.826***	1.503**	1.427**	1.552***
Gender (male)	.952	.925	.982	.543***
Age (18-29)	2.462**	2.062**	2.808***	.857
Race (African American)	1.042	.908	.687	1.094
Income ($100K plus)	1.216	1.275	1.444**	1.262
Religiosity	1.012	1.013	1.058	1.022
Party (Democrat)	1.038	.870	.784	.942
Ideology (liberal)	1.055	1.058	1.150*	.907
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.156***	1.245***	1.231***	1.155***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.074**	1.033	1.054*	1.076**
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	.975	.950*	.996	1.003
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	1.033	1.023	.960	.997
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.962***	1.316*	1.495**	2.068***
Campaign Interest	1.396**	1.617***	1.488***	1.739***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	2.431***	4.029***	1.854***	3.193***
Obama Voter	.871	1.316	1.280	.809
Constant	.010***	.011***	.016***	.020***
N	1,925	1,925	1,925	1,925
Correctly Classified	81.4%	78.7%	75.5%	77.4%
Nagelkerke R Square	0.271	.379	.300	.327
Cox & Snell R Square	0.172	.268	.211	.230

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

7-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors

Combining the measured participation activities into online and offline participation indexes yield a set of results fairly consistent with many of the individual participation activities. Even with controls in place, education continues to be a significant predictor for online participation (b=.287, p<.01), but not for offline participation. Similarly, gender and age are significant only as predictors of online behavior as reflected by the index. Being female is a significant predictor (b=-.152, p<.01). Somewhat consistent with the models for the individual online activities, those age 18 to 29 are more likely than older adults to say they engaged in at least one of the online activities (b=.479, p<.001). The other significant demographic variable predicting online participation was income. More affluent adults (b=.241, p<.01) were more likely to say they performed an online activity. Race is the only significant demographic predictor for the offline index according to the OLS model. African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they performed at least one of the offline activities (b=.298, p<.001).

Among the political control variables, online campaign contact (b=1.057, p<.001 was a robust significant predictor of online participation. Heavy use of the Internet (b=.402, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.296, p<.001) were significant predictors of online participation as was using the Internet as a source of campaign information (b=.142, p<.001).

Online campaign contact (b=.474, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.247, p<.001) were also strong predictors of offline participation. Other significant predictors

of offline participation among the political controls were, being an Obama voter (b=.179, p<.01), and being a Democrat (b=.166, p<.001) (See Table 7-5).

Table 7-5: *Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline Political Participation: OLS Regression*

	Online Participation Index	Offline Participation Index
Education (College Grad+)	.287***	.005
Gender (male)	-.152**	-.063
Age (18-29)	.479***	.055
Race (African American)	-.108	.298**
Income ($100K plus)	.241**	.060
Religiosity	.014	.024
Party (Democrat)	-.016	.166**
Ideology (liberal)	.056	-.009
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	.142***	.022*
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	.053***	.051***
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	-.013	.033***
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	-.004	-.001
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	.402***	-.086
Campaign Interest	.296***	.247***
Contacted by Campaign Online	1.057***	.474***
Obama Voter	.066	.179**
Constant	-1.056***	-.552***
N	1,924	1,924
R Square	.423	.196
R Square Change	.311***	.161***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

7-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both

Thus far, this study has detailed the frequency of participation across activities and found that the reporting frequency was much higher in Case 4 than in Case 3. The data also showed that, like in other cases, the biases of the past were reinforced but there was also evidence that groups marginalized in the past became more active and participatory than in prior elections. While there has been no direct linkage to the effectiveness of the Internet in this regard, the role co online campaign contact cannot be discounted. However, a better test of mobilization and reinforcement involves testing the logistic models with interactions between Internet frequency and the significant demographic variables produced by the initial logistic and OLS regression models.

The logistic models produced a significant interaction between frequent Internet use and gender for predicting volunteering to work for a presidential campaign (OR=.824, $p<.05$, b= -.188), thus providing evidence for H1a (mobilization). Additionally, the model produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use and education for predicting online political discussion (OR=.875, $p<.05$, b=-.136), viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=.876, $p<.05$, b= -.137), and forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (OR=.876, $p<.05$, b= -.136). These interactions provided support for hypotheses 2c and 2d (See Table 7-6).

In order to see the effects of the interactions more clearly, one must observe the graphical figures. In one instance where the interaction was significant, the graphical figure (7-1) points to evidence of mobilization, while the other figures provide evidence for both mobilization and reinforcement (See Figures 7-2 through 7-4).

Table 7-6: Case 4: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions: (Exp(B)(b coefficient)

	Volunteering to work for a presidential campaign with Interaction (Internet Frequency X Gender (Male))	Online Political Discussion: with Interaction (Internet Frequency X Education (Coll grad or higher))	Viewing A Political Video on a Site Like YouTube (Internet Frequency X Education (Coll grad or higher))	Forwarding Political Emails (Internet Frequency X Education (Coll grad or higher))
Education (College Grad+)	1.122	1.911***	1.363*	1.490**
Gender (male)	.663 (b=-0.374)	.914	.906	.500***
Age (18-29)	.886	2.575**	3.064***	.899
Race (African American)	1.817*	1.094	.739	1.180
Income ($100K plus)	1.097	1.219	1.434**	1.253
Religiosity	1.244*	1.014	1.065	1.027
Party (Democrat)	1.472	1.051	.787	.956
Ideology (liberal)	1.212	1.060	1.164*	.912
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	1.051	1.150***	1.225***	1.149***
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	1.101**	1.073**	1.053*	1.075**
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days	1.020	.974	.991	.998
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days	.981	1.036	.961	.998
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)	1.177	2.172***	1.609***	2.227***
Campaign Interest	1.554*	1.379**	1.453***	1.710***
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	4.772***	2.383***	1.816***	3.136***
Obama Voter	2.409**	.867	1.283	.810
Political Knowledge (Delli Carpini/Keeter)	1.164	1.125	1.268**	1.251**
Online Frequency X Gender (Male)	.824* (b=-0.188)	NA	NA	NA
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad/ higher)	NA	.875* (b=-0.136)	.876* (b= -0137)	.876* (b=-0.136)
Constant	.000	.008	.011	.014
N	1,925	1,925	1,925	1,925
Correctly classified	93.0%	80.8%	76.5%	77.2%
Nagelkerke R Square	.285	.276	.310	.336
Cox Snell R Square	.117	.175	.218	.236

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

7-3.1: Gender by high internet use predicting volunteering to work for a presidential campaign without regard to online or offline work

Figure 7-1 shows greater evidence for mobilization than for reinforcement in the interaction between gender and Internet use predicting volunteering to work for a presidential campaign. The more frequently females were online the more likely they were to say they volunteered to work for a presidential campaign. Males who were online frequently were only slightly more likely to say they volunteered to work for a presidential campaign (See Figure 7-1). Therefore this provides support for Hypothesis 1a—using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens. Research by Converse et al.'s in their landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al. (1995) pointed to a slight gender gap in participation. These findings suggest that the Internet mobilized women to become more participatory during the general election period.

Figure 7-1 Case 4 Interaction-Gender (Male) by High Internet Use Predicting Volunteering to Work for a Campaign



7-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting online political discussion

The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting online political discussion. Those who have earned at least a college degree but frequently on the Internet are more likely to say they discussed politics online than those who reported being online less frequently. A similar pattern exists for those with less education, but the starting point is at a lower point (See Figure 7-2). Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data. The Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens to participate online (H2c) and using the Internet will reinforce the online participation of already engaged citizens (H2d).

Figure 7-2: Case 4 Interaction-Education (College Grad or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Political Discussion



7-3.3: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting viewing political video on sites like YouTube

Interacting education and frequency of Internet use produces significant outcomes for predicting viewing political video on sites like YouTube in much the same way it predicts online discussion and as I will present below, forwarding emails. The more frequently one is online, the more likely they are to say they viewed view political videos. The patterns are similar for both those with and without college degrees (See Figure 7-3), thus, this is more evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d.

Figure 7-3: Case 4 Interaction-- Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing Political Video on Sites Like YouTube



7-3.4: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others

While the interactions between education and frequency of Internet use are significant, and the figure points to instances of mobilization and reinforcement, the gap between college graduates and non-college graduates nearly intersects. This closing of the gap is evidence of a mobilizing effect whereby, less educated citizens who are frequently online are more likely than less online active ones to participate in this activity, but they are almost as likely as higher educated citizens to do so (See Figure 7-4). While not clear-cut, the evidence weighs more heavily toward mobilization (H2c) than reinforcement (H2d).

Figure 7-4: Case 4 Interaction--High Education by High Internet Use Predicting Forwarding Political Emails/Audio/Video



7-4: Case 4--Summary of Findings

Case 4 examined the general election period retrospectively during the week following the presidential election. Those sampled were part of a panel that completed the survey in the two months prior to the election, but they had no exposure to participation questions before the post-election wave.

Descriptive analysis of Case 4 shows a significantly greater level of engaging in participation activities, as compared to Case 3. Yet, despite this difference, the patterns are generally the same for total participation. Again, this is likely an artifact of question wording.

Similar to the Case 3 descriptive analysis, without statistical controls, those with a higher level of education and more income were more likely to engage in most of the measured participation activities. Younger adults were more likely to engage in several online activities, and African Americans were more likely engage in most offline activities than non-African Americans.

Different demographic variables were more predictive of participation behavior depending on whether the activity was performed online or offline. Those advantaged in the past (higher educated and more affluent) were more likely to continue to be advantaged in the logistic models. However, young adults were significant predictors of several online activities. Race (African American) and gender (female) were significant predictors for most offline activities. As seen in prior cases, online campaign contact and campaign interest were consistently significant predictors for nearly all activities.

Multivariate analysis also affirmed that biases were present in some of the online and offline activities. Those with greater levels of education were more likely to engage in online discussion, visiting campaign web sites, and viewing video. They were also more likely to attend campaign rallies. Age (18 to 29 year olds) continued to be a good predictor of several online activities, but African Americans did not emerge as a predictor group in Case 4, whereas in Case 3 African Americans were often seen as significant predictors. Politically, campaign contact, interest, and frequent internet use were reliable predictors of online behaviors. Interest and online contact were also significant predictors of offline behavior—these were consistent with Case 3. It is unclear what explains the disparity between the two cases—question wording, time-frame of data collection, or rolling cross-section versus panel designs. More research needs to be done to determine the cause of the differences. Tables 7-7 and 7-8 provide a summary of the significant predictors for each activity.

Table 7-7: *Case 4 Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)*

(A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

	Persuade someone to vote offline	Volunteer for candidate offline	Donate Money Offline	Attend Rally/ Meeting	Wear Campaign Button
Education (College Grad+)				X+	
Gender (male)		X-		X-	X-
Age (18-29)					
Race (African American)				X+	X+
Income ($100K plus)					
Religiosity		X+			
Party (Democrat)			X+		X+
Ideology (liberal)	X-				
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days					
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days	X+				
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days			X+		
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days					
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)					
Campaign Interest	X+		X+	X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign Online		X+	X+	X+	X+
Obama Voter	X+	X+		X+	

Table 7-8: *Case 4—Top Significant Predictors of Online Political Participation (Up to 6)*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE	Volunteer for Candidate or Campaign ONLINE	Contribute Money to a candidate or campaign ONLINE	Discuss politics online	Visit Campaign Web site	Viewed Political Video on Sites Like YouTube	Forward Political Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others
Education (College Grad+)			X+			X+	X+
Gender (male)			X-				X+
Age (18-29)						X+	
Race (African American)							
Income ($100K plus)			X+			X+	
Religiosity							
Party (Democrat)							
Ideology (liberal)							
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days	X+	X+					
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days							
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days							
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days							
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)	X+					X+	X+
Campaign Interest	X+		X+			X+	X+
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	X+	X+	X+			X+	X+
Obama Voter	.		X+				

(A positive sign next to the "X" indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

The models with interactions showed evidence of mobilization, and mobilization and reinforcement. High levels of education interacting with frequency of Internet use provided evidence for mobilization for online political discussion, viewing political video on sites like YouTube, and forwarding emails, audio, or video about the campaign to others. The Internet also appears to mobilize women to engage in volunteering to work for one of the campaigns.

CHAPTER 8: MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT

In the previous four chapters, one of the constants in the findings on mobilization and reinforcement has been the strong predictive quality of online campaign contact for nearly all of the measured participation activities. Online campaign contact consistently produced the most robust odds ratios and highest coefficients, meaning that those who were contacted online by any campaign were most often more likely to say they participated in some way. Certainly, one of the limitations of survey research is the difficulty in determining the causal direction between participation and contact, but it is clear that contact is an important element of participation, and worthy of further review. As part of the original research plan, I sought to measure the impact of campaign contact on participation. Campaign contact is stated throughout this dissertation and has long been theoretically important. It is through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and activation, which campaigns build up their organization and base of support (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). A more effective activation effort leads to greater success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out, therefore multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an attempt to maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support. Online recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of spurring them into action and helping them to expand this message to those who may be interested but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act. The final research question to

be addressed is the extent to which mobilization or reinforcement is dependent on the effectiveness in how the candidates and their campaigns utilize the Internet.

Results of three related hypotheses are presented in this chapter:

H3a: *Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to participate than those contacted offline*

The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008 presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential supporters. Given this perception, I further hypothesize

H3b: *Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton campaign in the primaries.*

H3c: *The Obama campaign online contact would more likely lead to political participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.*

8-1: Methods: Hypotheses 3a-c

I purposely designed sections of the NAES survey during the period covered by Case 2, July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008, to address hypotheses 3a-c. The instrument included a series of retrospective questions about the campaign contact activities of the Obama and Clinton campaigns during the primaries and caucuses:

- *Whether either campaign contacted respondent*
- *Whether the respondent was contacted online or offline*

- *Frequency of contact by either Clinton or Obama (Online or Offline)*
- *Whether either campaign asked in the contact to contact others*
- *Whether respondent acted on that contact*
- *Frequency of contributing to either Clinton or Obama during primaries and caucuses and the general amount donated.*

The analysis followed two steps. First, in order to test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I constructed several OLS regression models to determine if campaign contact activated political participation. I ran several regression models addressing this hypothetical claim that those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline. I then ran several more regression models addressing the claim of hypothesis 3b, that those contacted online by Obama were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted online by Clinton. The key dependent variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c were *political participation* (without specifying offline or online), *offline political participation*, and *online political participation*. There would be support for H3a if the positive coefficients are greater for online contact variables than for offline contact. Support for H3c would exist if the positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact variables than for the Clinton contact variables.

Second, to test H3b, I conducted a straightforward descriptive analysis showing the types of offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the primaries. In addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign contact by the Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with the participation activities (See Chapter 3 for the complete details of the methodology).

8-2: Testing Hypotheses 3a –c

8-2.1: Testing Hypotheses 3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline

I found support for hypothesis 3a when examining the coefficients of the contact type variables without distinguishing from the candidate source of the contact. Regardless of the source of the message, either from Obama or Clinton, if that message was sent online, then it was significantly more likely to lead to either online or offline political participation than a message sent offline (See Table 8-1).

Table 8-1: *Case 2--Hypothesis 3a Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Online Contact on Political Participation*

	Offline Political Participation (N=1,998)	Online Political Participation (N=1,999)	Combined Political participation (N=1,999)
Online Contact By Either Obama or Clinton (B)(SE)	**.529*****^ **(.075)**	**.532*****+ **(.066)**	**1.062*****+ **(.108)**
Offline Contact By Either (B)(SE)	.339*** (.045)	.170*** (.040)	.509*** (.066)
Combined offline/online Contact by Either (B)(SE)	.360*** (.044)	.248*** (.039)	.609*** (.064)

***B coefficient is significant
+Online contact is significantly greater than Offline Contact and Combined Offline/Online Contact at the .05 level
^ Online Type of contact is significantly greater than Offline Contact at the .10 level

8-2.2: Testing for hypothesis 3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton campaign in the primaries.

Relative to the population, very few respondents reported receiving any contact from either campaign during the primaries and caucuses. However, data show that the Obama campaign (15%) contacted significantly more respondents than the Clinton campaign (12%) during the primaries and caucuses. The difference, though, is small, but significant, nevertheless. Despite the media emphasis on online communication, the vast majority of those contacted by either Obama or Clinton were done so offline (mostly by telephone) rather than online. While the Obama (12.7%) and Clinton campaigns (11.2%) contacted respondents offline at roughly the same rate during the primaries, the Obama campaign was slightly more likely to do so than the Clinton campaign via online methods (3.7% vs. 1.5%) (See Table 8-2). Since the difference is significant, then the data support hypothesis 3b, since more people stated they were contacted by the Obama campaign, online, than by the Clinton campaign, online.

Table 8-2: *Case 2--Obama and Clinton Campaign Contact Activities during the Presidential Primaries*
(Among All)

	Contacted (n=2,217)	Contacted Online (n=2,217)	Contacted Offline (n=2,217)			
	Total (%)	Total (%)	Total (%)	Telephone (%)	In-Person (%)	Regular Mail (%)
Hillary Clinton	12.0	1.5	11.2	9.6	1.0	2.9
Barack Obama	15.0*	3.7*	12.7	9.6	2.0*	3.7
John McCain	10.1	NA^	NA^			
Other	4.1	NA^	NA^			
Not Sure	3.2	NA^	NA^			
Not Contacted	66.7	NA^	NA^			

*p<.05; ^Survey only measured type of contact from Obama and Clinton

Taking this analysis one step further, it becomes more evident that the Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton campaign was to contact its supporters online. Table 8-3 displays the mode of campaign contacts among those who said they voted for either Obama or Clinton during the primaries. While the number of Obama voters and Clinton voters contacted by each of the campaigns is about equal, the proportion of Obama supporters who were contacted online exceeds the proportion of Clinton supporters contacted online by a ratio greater than 2 to 1. The Clinton campaign was much more likely to rely on direct mail than the Obama campaign.

Table 8-3: *Case 2—Type of Campaign Contact by the Obama and Clinton Campaign Contact during the Presidential Primaries*
(Among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns and voted for either Clinton or Obama)

Contact Method	Clinton Voters who were contacted by Clinton Campaign (N=103) %	Obama Voters who were contacted by Obama Campaign (N=95) %
Telephone	74.0**	62.9
In-person	6.7**	17.5
Mail	31.7*	20.6
Email or other online method	17.3*	40.2
Other/	1.0	2.0

*p<.05, **p<.10

The frequency of contact by each of the campaigns was moderately high. Respondents contacted by the Obama campaign reported slightly more frequent contacts than those contacted by the Clinton campaign. However, the differences are not statistically significant. A plurality of those contacted either by the Clinton (43.3%) or Obama campaigns (41.6%) said they were contacted less often than one time per month (see Table 8-4). Among eventual Obama and Clinton primary voters, the differences are stark and significant. Those who said they voted for Obama in the primaries were twice as likely to be contacted several times a week as those who said they voted for Clinton (37.9% compared with 16.5%) (See Table 8-5).

Table 8-4: *Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaigns during the Primaries and Caucuses*
(Among those who said they were contacted either by the Clinton or Obama campaigns)

Frequency of Contact	Clinton Contact (n=263) (%)	Obama Contact (n=329) (%)
Once a week or more often	22.1	27.4
Every other week	10.3	7.9
One or two times a month	19.4	18.8
Less than once a month	43.3	41.6
Don't know	4.9	4.3

Table 8-5: *Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaign during the Primaries and Caucuses*
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the Clinton or Obama campaigns)

Frequency of Contact	Clinton voters contacted by Clinton Campaign (n=103) (%)	Obama voters contacted by Obama Campaign (n=95) (%)
Once a week or more often	16.5	37.9
Every other week	10.7	9.5
One or two times a month	24.3	14.7
Less than once a month	42.7	34.7
Don't know	5.8	3.2

Frequency of contact was much greater for online contacts than offline contacts by both campaigns. This is likely due to the ease and cost of sending online messages as opposed to making more expensive and time consuming telephone calls and direct mail pieces. Despite the very small sample size, differences were statistically significant. The Obama campaign more frequently sent out online contact messages than the Clinton campaign, thus providing more support for H3b (See Tables 8-6 and 8-7).

Table 8-6: *Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaigns*
(Among those who said they were contacted by either the Clinton or Obama campaigns)

Frequency of Contact	Clinton Contact (n=263) (%)		Obama Contact (n=329) (%)	
	Online Contact (N=33)**	Offline Contact (N=248)	Online Contact (N=82)**	Offline Contact (N=282)
Once a week or more often	60.6*	21.0	73.2*	18.8
Every other week	9.1	9.7	8.5	8.5
One or two times a month	9.1	19.8	9.8	20.2
Less than once a month	15.2	45.2	6.1	48.2
Don't know	6.1	4.4	2.4	4.3

**Small Sample Size, *p<.05

Table 8-7: *Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaigns*
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the Clinton or Obama campaigns)

**Small Sample Size, *p<.05

Frequency of Contact	Clinton voters contacted by Clinton Campaign (n=103) (%)		Obama voters contacted by Obama Campaign (n=95) (%)	
	Online Contact (N=18)**	Offline Contact (N=95)	Online Contact (N=39)**	Offline Contact (N=71)**
Once a week or more often	66.7	13.7	76.9	21.1
Every other week	5.6	10.5	7.7	11.1
One or two times a month	11.1	25.3	10.3	18.3
Less than once a month	5.6	46.3	0	47.9
Don't know	11.1	4.2	5.1	1.4

8-2.4: Testing hypotheses 3c: Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign

The test of the hypothesis 3c, that the Obama online contact would be more likely to lead to political participation than Clinton contact was not supported by the results of the OLS models. Examining the coefficients produced by the models for Obama online contact, Obama offline contact, and Obama contact without distinguishing between online and offline were not statistically different from the coefficients produced from the models with Clinton contact (See Table 8-9). The Clinton coefficients were slightly higher in all cases, but not significantly so. This suggests that contact by Obama was just

as likely to lead to political participation as contact by Clinton. More specifically, although fewer respondents reported online contact from the Clinton campaign, those who were contacted were just as likely to participate as those contacted online by the Obama campaign. In the previous section, I noted support for the hypothesis that the Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton campaign was. This finding about the equal effectiveness of each campaign's online contact suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential supporter online, then, perhaps the race would have been closer. On the flip side, the Clinton campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it concentrated more on its offline techniques—telephone and direct mail.

Table 8-8: *Case 2--Hypothesis 3c Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Obama Online Contact versus Clinton Contact on Political Participation*

	Offline Political Participation (N=1,998)	Online Political Participation (N=1,999)	Combined Political participation (N=1,999)
Obama Online Contact (B) (SE)	.569*** (.097)	.600*** (.085)	1.169*** (.139)
Clinton Online Contact (B)(SE)	.689*** (.146)	.629*** (.128)	1.318*** (.21)
Obama Offline Contact (B)(SE)	.354*** (.053)	.102* (.047)	.456*** (.077)
Clinton Offline Contact (B)(SE)	.299*** (.057)	.215*** (.050)	.514*** (.082)
Obama Contact Either offline or online (B)(SE)	.353*** (.051)	.197*** (.045)	.550*** (.074)
Clinton Contact Either offline or online (B)(SE)	.307*** (.055)	.230*** (.049)	.537*** (.079)

***B coefficient is significant

8-3: Summary

The data from this analysis found support to hypotheses 3a and 3b. Online contact was more likely to lead to political participation than offline contact generally. The Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters and potential supporters using online methods than was the Clinton campaign. Yet, online contact from the Clinton campaign to its supporters was just as likely to lead to political participation as

online contact from the Obama campaign. The question remains open whether the Clinton campaign's greater use of offline methods hurt or helped her chances to win the nomination since self-identified Clinton primary voters were just as likely as self-identified Obama primary voters to get any type of campaign contact. However, because causal direction cannot be clearly determined, it might also be that those contacted online were already engaged in the campaign.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

9-1: Discussion and Conclusions

This study has been an attempt to clarify the role of the Internet as a mobilizing or reinforcing mechanism for political participation. As I stated in the introduction, the research has set out to go beyond the extant literature on the impact of the Internet on mobilization and reinforcement adding to the general debate by doing the following:

a. testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories related to the impact of the Internet on political participation;

b. refining these theories by testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently online versus offline;

c. testing whether mobilization and/or reinforcement effects are different for particular demographic groups such as young adults, women, and minorities;

d. and exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are contingent on the activities of individual campaigns.

In this dissertation, I have provided evidence to support each of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses using data from the 2008 NAES. While one could argue that the strongest case for the Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a clear pattern of mobilized groups emerged across the four cases for similar activities, evidence from this dissertation does point to a pattern of the Internet mobilizing less educated groups and reinforcing better educated groups in Cases 2 through 4 (See Tables

9-1 and 9-1a). The evidence suggests that increased Internet usage raises the probability of participation for less educated people and at the same time provides reinforcement for those who are better educated. Among the instances of mobilization, reinforcement, or both as displayed in Tables 9-1 and 9-1a, most demonstrated a positive interaction between Internet frequency and education or income. The net effect shown by the graphic presentations in the prior chapters indicates that the disadvantaged are closing the gap, slightly. The evidence of mobilization and reinforcement involving both education and income suggests that improved access to the Internet will continue to increase political participation for all citizens. As long as the digital divide remains wide, however, then mobilization effects of the Internet will remain limited. As the results presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate, the digital divide undoubtedly remains, therefore the challenge of increased mobilization continues to be substantial. Where the Internet is closing the gap in participation, is by age. As the evidence in Case 3 suggests, increased Internet usage nearly erases any gap between younger and older users.

By and large, the Internet both mobilizes and reinforces political participation, which truly fulfills the promise of hope for any technology. Yet, while the evidence points to somewhat of a pattern of interaction between educational attainment levels and the Internet, the data do not demonstrate consistency across the cases by activity. This lack of consistency could be due to the methodology, question wording, or time of interview. The activities measured varied from case to case, the time periods were different , and the measurements moved from a contemporaneous prior seven day measure to a retrospective the campaign measure. Each of these factors might have

contributed to the lack of a consistent pattern of mobilization and reinforcement. While this raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with the available data, the findings do illustrate that Internet use in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities, especially by education and income.

The Internet has changed the nature of participation in the sense that much of what traditionally occurred offline, now takes place online. The levels of traditional participation continue to be low, but the absolute amount has increased with the inclusion of such activities as viewing political videos on YouTube, engaging in online discussion, visiting campaign web sites, donating money online and forwarding emails, videos, and audios to those in ones social network as a means of persuasion.

The matrices in Tables 9.1 and 9.1a summarize where mobilization, reinforcement or both took place among which groups and within each case. Across the cases, reinforcement, mobilization, or both occurred most often with Internet frequency interacting with education and income. Age interacted with Internet use in Case 3, but rather than increasing the participation activity of younger people, the Internet mobilized older people to engage in activities. As this research has noted in prior sections, African Americans were more likely to participate in activities in greater proportions than in prior elections. However, the Internet did not act as a mobilizing mechanism for particular activities, among this group. Rather, in Case 3, results showed that the African-Americans were mobilized to participate when the dependent variable in the model was the combined participation index.

In Case 1, there was no evidence of mobilization or reinforcement. This case was the weakest of the four because it lacked an Internet measure which differentiated respondents by frequency or type of use and because the number of offline activities measured were limited to just three.

In Case 2, the evidence reveals that the more frequently the less educated were using the Internet, the more likely they were to say they donated offline (but not online), and visited a campaign website. While better educated adults also were more likely to say they visited a campaign website the more often they were online, they were less likely to say they donated offline the more frequently they were online. This is not a surprising result for those with higher education, because the expectation is that they will likely contribute online while they are online. For the less educated however, being online frequently is associated with the act of giving offline. The data does not provide me with a means to further explain this positive interaction.

The Case 2 analysis shows, also, that the more frequently one is online the more likely they are to engage in forwarding campaign related emails, audio, or video to others. Without the Internet, this and other online activities are impossible. Data show the greater frequency of Internet use, this activity narrows the gap between more and less affluent people regarding this behavior. It is a behavior that requires relatively little effort—reading, listening or viewing an online piece and forwarding it to others. This behavior is a way of influencing other people, not by talking to them directly, but providing them with evidence that may support their position. In addition, the activity affirms the idea of utilizing social networks to engage in this influence. An email or

video clip generated by a campaign or interest group supporting a candidate is sent to the strongest level of supporters with the hope that forwarding will take place. The evidence suggests that the campaigns or their supporting organizations have been somewhat successful in expanding the types of people who are engaged to include people across all income groups. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) write about utilizing social networks, "the basic idea is simple: to give weight to requests for assistance by presenting them through people to whom it is difficult to say 'no'" (p. 176).

Case 2 also provided evidence that the Internet mobilized those with lower income to participate online, in general, while also acting as a reinforcing mechanism for the more affluent. The combined online index result implies that the Internet acts as a mobilizing and reinforcement income for all online activities, but the results of the analysis of each individual activity reveal that this is not the case. In fact, it is more telling that the Internet mobilizes and reinforces for some activities and not all. This argues, therefore, for continuing with a model that tests for mobilization and reinforcement for individual activities in addition for a model which tests for an aggregate index of participation.

In Case 3, age played a significant role when interacting with frequency of Internet use for activities involving persuasion and information gathering. Studies have shown that younger people online are more likely to utilize online tools to participate (e.g., Pew, 2009) and our research has borne this out. However, there is little evidence to show that young people involved are not formerly inactive, uninterested actors. Evidence from Case 3 suggests that the Internet motivates older people to persuade someone to

support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline, and to persuade someone offline to support or oppose a candidate. In both these instances, therefore, I have concluded that the Internet is a reinforcing tool. The Internet both mobilizes and reinforces people to view a political video on a site like YouTube since both younger and older groups increase their likelihood, the more they are online.

In Case 4, the Internet mobilized those with less education and reinforced those with higher education for online political discussion, viewing political videos online, and forwarding political materials online. However, there was no evidence to support the Internet mobilizing lower educated and reinforcing higher educated groups to participate online using the combined model. Further, there was no evidence of the Internet mobilizing or reinforcing these groups to engage in these activities in Case 3 which measured participation during a segment of the general election.

The Internet, in Case 4, also mobilized women to volunteer for a political campaign. Internet use had no effect on mobilizing males, but clearly increased the likelihood of females volunteering for a campaign. Research by Converse et al.'s in their landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al. (1995) pointed to a slight gender gap in participation. These findings suggest that the Internet mobilized women to become more participatory during the general election period.

The evidence I presented in support of the mobilization hypotheses affirms DiGennaro and Dutton (2006). The Internet did have a significant impact on "broadening political participation by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of organizing groups and opening new channels of information that bypass traditional media

gatekeepers" (p. 209). However, at the same time, the Internet continued to reinforce the demographic groups which most enjoyed an advantage in the past. The participation gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged is narrowing and will likely continue to do so in future elections as the Internet becomes even more central to the campaign process. As the digital divide narrows, increased participation will occur thus narrowing the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged more rapidly.

Table 9-1: *Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for Each Participation Activity—Offline and Online Activities*

OFFLINE Activities during the campaign	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4
Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or oppose a candidate			Internet Freq X Age (R)	
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates OFFLINE				
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE		Internet Freq X Educ (M)		
Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate OFFLINE				
Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house.				
ONLINE activities during the campaign				
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of the presidential candidates ONLINE				
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates ONLINE				
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE				
Discuss politics online				Internet Freq X Educ (B)
Visited Web site of a presidential campaign or political party		Internet Freq X Educ (B)		
Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign			Internet Freq X Age (B)	Internet Freq X Educ (B)
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know		Internet Freq X Income (B)		Internet Freq X Education (B)

M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement

Table 9-1a: *Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for Each Participation Activity—Without Regard to Offline or Online and for Combined Indexes*

Participation Activities	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate			Internet Freq X Age (R)	
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates				Internet Freq X Gender (female) (M)
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates				
Combined Online and Combined Offline Index				
Online Index		Internet Freq X Income (B)	Internet Freq X Race (B)	

M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement

The analyses I presented to determine the demographic predictors of participation partly refute Margolis and Resnick's (2003) claim that the Internet will not empower the powerless because those who are powerful outside of cyberspace are taking those advantages with them in the Internet. The results from the 2008 NAES survey showed that these biases to the advantaged were diminished but did not disappear once the analysis controlled these variables for other factors. There will always be a high level of political participation by better educated, better informed, and more affluent voters. However, with controls, the strength of the education and income predictors diminished and can be explained by many factors including Internet use, campaign contact, and level of campaign interest.

Further, findings showing that African Americans were more likely to participate online are evidence of the refutation, but the advantaged and powerful still benefit from the role the Internet plays. The uniqueness of this election with the presence of the first African American party nominee and the first woman as front-runner in the primaries likely energized certain segments of the population such as African Americans and young adults, more so than other groups. The evidence supported this claim in 2008. However, the data also show that the Internet and other ICTs aided in this level of participation in several instances.

Demographic predictors were not consistent throughout the four cases analyzed, but it is clear that young adults are more likely than others to engage in online activities and offline activities. Religious service attendance was a significant predictor of volunteering to work on a campaign, offline, in three of the four cases. This result

affirms Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and Verba et al. (1995), also (See Tables 9-2 and 9-3).

Looking further at the predictors of political participation, either online or offline, the analysis revealed a clear and consistent pattern for online campaign contact and high levels of campaign interest as significant predictors of participation in all cases and for nearly all measured activities. This pattern supports much of the prior research on reinforcement, but especially, it is entirely consistent with Verba et al (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). Campaigns are most likely to contact their strongest supporters and those most likely to come out to vote. Therefore, the finding that those who are most likely to participate in many activities are those with the greatest level of campaign interest is not very surprising. However, there are two important points to be made about the effect of campaign interest and online campaign contact. First, in Boulianne's (2009) meta-analysis, she asserts that when political interest is combined with Internet use in models predicting engagement, the effect of Internet use "does not have a substantial impact on engagement" (p. 193) since only 35 percent of studies analyzed significantly predicted engagement when controlling for political interest. Our research would fall within those 35 percent of studies. Second, those who have been contacted online by one of the campaigns, while controlling for level of campaign interest, are also significant predictors. Online campaign contact is not just significant as a predictor for online participation activities, but also significant for some offline activities.

Only one media variable emerged as a consistent predictor of online participation—using the Internet as a source for campaign information. The more frequently one used the Internet for that purpose, the more likely one would be to participate in several online activities in nearly every case. Perhaps their Internet use for campaign information is just one element in their general participation behavior and using the Internet for this purpose in and of itself may be a participation behavior. To a certain extent, this finding is consistent with Boulianne's (2009) meta-analysis which found that using the Internet for information about public affairs produces positive and significant effects on participation or engagement.

As I have stated before in this dissertation, the 2008 campaign was one the most unique in history. Media reported that Obama supporters were energized during the campaign causing me to account for candidate support in my model. As a control variable, Obama support/vote was a significant predictor for a few participation activities across several cases. Even though the campaigns were important factors in encouraging participation, campaign support did not lead to the disappearance of other variables disappearing as predictors. Youth and Obama support can both significantly predict online political discussion, for example.

Table 9-2: *Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Offline Political Participation with an Odds Ratio of 1.15 or Greater*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support or oppose candidate OFFLINE (Cases 1-4)	Volunteer for candidate or campaign OFFLINE (Cases 1-4)	Donate to candidate or campaign OFFLINE (Cases 1,2,4)	Attend Rally/ Meeting (Cases 2,3,4)	Wear Campaign Button/Bumper Sticker/Lawn Sign (Cases 2,3,4)
Education (CollGrad+)			1,2	4	2-
Gender (male)	3		4-	4-	2-,4-
Age (18-29)	1,2,3	3		3,4	3,4
Race (African American)				3	2,3
Income (100K +)	3	1,2,4			
Religiosity				3	
Party (Democrat)	1,3	1	4		3,4
Ideology (liberal)				2,3	2
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days		3			2
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days					
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days			2		
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days		2,3			
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)*	1	1,3,4			
Campaign Interest	1,2,3,4	4	1,2,4	2,3,4	2,3,4
Contacted by Campaign Online	2		4	2,3,4	2,3,4
Obama Supporter/Voter**	1-,2,3,4			2,4	2,3

*Internet Access in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4

Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR≥1.15/≤0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates the Odds Ratio is less than.87. For example, "Gender (male)" for "Donate to candidate OFFLINE…" shows 4-, meaning that females were more likely than men to engage in this behavior for case

Table 9-3: *Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Online Political Participation with an Odds Ratio of 1.15 or Greater*

	Attempt to Persuade someone to support/ oppose candidate ONLINE (Cases 1-4)	Volunteer for Candidate or Campaign ONLINE (Cases 1-4)	Contribute Money to candidate or campaign ONLINE (Cases 1,2,4)	Discuss politics ONLINE (Cases 1,3,4)	Visit Campaign Web site (Cases 1-4)	Viewed Political Video on Sites Like YouTube (Cases 1,3,4)	Read or post to a blog about campaign (Cases 1,3)	Forward Political Emails, Audios, or Videos to Others (Cases 1-4)
Education (College Grad+)			1,2	4	2	4		4
Gender (male)				3-,4-		1,3	3	1-,2-,3-,4-
Age (18-29)	1			1,3	1,2,3	1,3,4	1,3	
Race (African American)				3-	1,3	1,3		3
Income ($100K plus)				4		3		1,2
Religiosity		1			1			
Party (Democrat)						1		2
Ideology (liberal)	3							
Internet for campaign info past 7 days	1,2,3,4	1,3,4	1,2,4	1,3,4	1,2,3,4	1,3,4	1,3	1,2,3,4
Talk Radio for Campaign past 7 days				4				
Newspaper for campaign past 7 days								
TV News for campaign info past 7 days								
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)*	4		2	3,4	2,3,4	3,4	3	2,3,4
Campaign Interest	1,2,3,4		2,4	1,3,4	1,2,3,4	1,3,4	1,3	1,2,3,4
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE	1,3,4	1,3,4	1,2,4	1,3,4	1,2,3,4	3,4	1,3	1,3,4
Obama Supporter/ Voter**			2,4		2,3		1	2,3-

*Frequency not measured in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4
Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR≥1.15/<0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates the Odds Ratio is less than.87. For example, "Gender (male)" for "Forward political emails…" shows 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, meaning that females were more likely than males to engage in this behavior for cases 1-4.

The study design examines participation from two perspectives. First, the analysis focused on measuring the impact of the Internet of individual participation activities. The theoretical rationale for this approach was that predictors of participation and the impact of the Internet on mobilizing disadvantaged demographic groups would vary from activity to activity. However, in general, prior research has examined participation as an aggregate model with all disparate activities combined into a single participation index. My research did not completely depart from this method and is useful in drawing comparisons to the extant research. Determining predictors of individual participation activities turned out to be the proper decision since the data showed that there were different influences to various predictors. However, the best predictors for the aggregated online and offline indexes in each case were generally consistent within each case, but not perfectly consistent. This suggests that future research should follow a disaggregated model, but it would not harm the study to also use an aggregated index. I do not recommend employing only an aggregated model since the nuance in determining predictors of online and offline participation and finding evidence of mobilization will be lost.

The multivariate analysis determining the predictors of participation pointed to online campaign contact as a significant predictor for many types of participation activities. Hypotheses 3a-c was a specifically targeted systematic test of the impact of campaign contact on political participation. Most important, regardless of candidate, online contact was more likely to predict participation than offline campaign contact.

However, causal direction is unclear. Were those contacted online more likely to participate because of the contact or because they were already interested?

As predicted Obama was more likely to contact supporters online than the Clinton campaign was to contact its supporters. However, it was more common for both campaigns to contact supporters and potential supporters using offline methods.

Perhaps more surprising was that H3c was not supported. Contrary to what was hypothesized, those contacted online by Obama were not more likely to participate than those contacted online by Clinton. Looking back to the 2008 campaign, this conclusion suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential supporters online, then, perhaps the election would have been closer. Conversely, the Clinton campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it concentrated more on its offline techniques. Going forward, the implication is that online campaign contact is the direction which all campaigns must move in order to succeed, but to not abandon offline techniques, which as senior Obama campaign staffers discussed in the 2008 Annenberg Election Debriefing, was still the most effective organizing tool. However, it was the initial online contact that served as the "net" that brought them into the campaign in the first place (Jamieson, 2009).

The implication for communications scholars, political scientists, and political campaigns is that online communication is indispensible tool for motivation and engagement. In the future, political campaigns will be developing more sophisticated methods of reaching potential supporters online and communication and political scholars must closely follow these methods in order to measure their impact in future studies.

9-2: Limitations

This study has gone beyond the extant research by recognizing that the Internet serves as a mechanism for both mobilization and reinforcement, particularly in motivating previously uninvolved actors into political engagement, in addition to reinforcing those who the political system has favored. The art of offline political persuasion continues to thrive and survive, but it is further enhanced by online communication methods from the campaigns, its supporters, and the social networks that exist or emerge around a candidate or campaign. These methods will continue to grow and researchers must design methods which capture these new methods or if at all possible, anticipate new methods as they happen. This study was designed before the beginning of the 2008 campaign and much of the focus has been on more established online methods focusing on the Internet. Specific attention was not paid to such methods as texting or Twitter (though that method was barely used in the campaign). Further, due to space limitations, there were no measures of social network use such as Facebook or MySpace. This section details the limitations of this study, including fast changing technologies, but also other issues to consider.

First, the 2008 election was unique in the sense there was a convergence of several factors hitherto not seen in any national election—extensive use of online tools, an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate who was considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice presidential nominee, and a collapsing national economy. The question remains to be answered about whether these findings can be replicated in future elections. Every election is different

and as stated above, technologies progress and campaigns find different approaches to mobilize and engage supporters. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the 2008 election may have drawn new participants, but the Internet helped provide the tools for participation—not just for those already interested but those who may not have done so otherwise.

Second, there is the issue of indeterminate causal direction. This is a problem for all surveys. For example, it is not entirely clear whether online campaign contact contributed to more engagement, or were those already engaged more likely to sign up to receive online campaign messages and requests. The data show a very strong relationship between online contact and participation. While more study is needed on the specifics of how the Internet affects participation, and on the impact of unique aspects of each campaign, my research, overall, suggests that the Internet is a new driver of political participation.

Third, related to the design of the instrument are several limitations. Question wording varied from case to case for some items thereby preventing a systematic comparison across the cases. However, the variation in the wording was beneficial in showing the impact of the Internet in four nearly distinct studies. Some items were excluded from the cases because of space limitations and human error. In Case 3, due to an oversight, there was an error in the wording related to method of campaign donations. As a result, I could not present findings comparing means of donating during the general election period. I was able to do so retrospectively in Case 4, however.

The nature of the campaign season was a limitation, as well. During the primary campaign period, measured by Case 1, and the general election period, measured by Case

3, participation behavior was asked in a contemporaneous fashion, albeit with a past seven day recall. In the post-primary and post-general election cases, which measured behavior retrospectively, extemporaneous wording was used, asking respondents to recall behavior carried out up to four months before. The use of contemporaneous and extemporaneous measures may have produced variant results. Yet, these methods are instructive about how people respond to contemporaneous and extemporaneous questions. For example, reported participation behavior was much lower during the contemporaneous periods asking only about the prior week's behavior when compared with the post-primary and post-general election behaviors.

The measure of Internet frequency was very useful in this study, allowing me to draw conclusions about the mobilizing effects of the Internet. However, there are a number of ways that Internet use can be effectively measured. Eszter Hargittai believes that Internet frequency as employed in this study is a poor proxy for Internet use. Instead she recommended a nuanced measure of Internet efficacy as a more accurate proxy. I had a private conversation with Hargittai after my data collection was completed, but did consider Internet literacy and efficacy in my original design. Unfortunately, space constraints prevented me from placing it on the survey. Future studies will employ both an Internet literacy/efficacy question as Hargittai recommends in her work (2005 and 2009) and the self-reported Internet frequency measure utilized in this research.

9-3: Future Directions

Rapid changes in technology will likely alter both the design and direction of future research. Just since the election, the growth of Twitter, the messaging social

networking tool has far exceeded the level of use during the election. It is impossible to predict which online techniques will be the new effective mechanisms for campaign contact, communication, and learning. Television and the Internet are converging. In this election, the NAES did not disaggregate TV viewing or newspaper reading online compared with offline. In 2012, the distinctions may become entirely blurred or vanish completely. Despite these fast-moving changes, I believe this research is structured in such a way as to serve as a useful foundation for future research.

Future research would continue to measure changing patterns of participation, but not rely solely on rolling cross sectional studies. A greater reliance on panel studies, for example, could lead to a more clearly defined assessment of changes in participation over the course of the election at the individual level. I recommend continuing tracking aggregate participation behaviors through a cross-sectional survey, to complement panel studies. Additionally, land line surveys may become a less effective data collection method, especially as we track the activities of youth and minorities. The growth in mobile phone use, especially among these segments, calls for significant changes in how researchers collect data (Blumberg and Luke, 2007). Therefore, survey researchers must design future studies to include this segment in a representative way. Scholars and industry professionals are developing such methods and those which prove most valid and reliable must be part of any future study. Future research also should extend beyond reliance of self-report to measure participation behavior. Technologies exist or are currently being developed to do this, but currently the expense prevents most from practically including such technologies in large-scale studies. Perhaps, an experimental

component should be part of a future research plan, where a randomly recruited panel agrees to allow researchers to track their behaviors but be unaware that researchers are primarily interested in participatory behavior. Nevertheless, self-report has its flaws and drawbacks but, perhaps can be utilized with some confirmatory data collected using tools which monitor online navigation.

Given that my findings demonstrated that online campaign contact was extremely influential in predicting participation, I think future studies should endeavor to examine message content and the delivery mechanism by which it is communicated to the receiver. Online campaign contact not only comes directly from the campaign itself but also from independent actors working to support and defeat another candidate. For example, how does a message incorrectly suggesting that Barack Obama is a Muslim become so quickly diffused throughout the population? Katz writes that diffusion, unlike persuasion, takes time making its way through the normal channels and networks of a community (Katz, Levin and Hamilton, 1963; Katz, 2001). The Internet, however, has changed that calculus by significantly reducing the time a message makes its way through a community or social network.— The "Obama is a Muslim" email message along with others, suggesting Obama was not born in the United States, provide excellent example for future research with regard to short term message diffusion.

In the future, researchers could address the same hypotheses in an election not as unique as the 2008 presidential election. Perhaps, the focus could be on a mid-term election in off presidential years such as 2010 or 2014. With the expanded role of the Internet and other ICTs, it may be more difficult to isolate the effect of the Internet on

mobilization, yet, one could use similar techniques to what I employed in this dissertation, namely interactions, along with similar controls.

One must consider, though, that as long as participation levels are low, researchers will continue to face challenges in measuring, in great detail, how campaign contact works to mobilize participation, but whatever surveys researchers create could measure behavior in a multi-step way, how people react to campaign contact. Finally, future research could distinguish which online methods are most effective in mobilizing new voters and reinforcing those already interested.

The rapidly changing technological environment calls for nearly continuous research on the effects of these technologies on participation. As this dissertation has shown, the technologies are having some impact, and the extent of that impact will likely expand even further as these technologies become more diffuse and an integral part of potential voters' everyday lives.

APPENDIX A: CASE 1--PRIMARY PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS

I2. In the past week, has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns talked to you about the presidential election?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I3. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ASK I5-I8 and I10-I15 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER

In the past week **,(READ FOR EACH ITEM)**

I5 have you talked to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I5a. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method? **(ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08) (ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)**

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I6 have you done any work for one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I6a. (IF YES-I6(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other online method? (ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08) **(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)**

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I7. have you given money to any of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I8 **IF YES TO I7** You said that you have given money to one of the presidential candidates. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the candidate, in the past week. **READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES**

1 Through the mail
2 Online donation through the Internet
3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I16A. During the presidential campaign, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I17A. During the presidential campaign, have you worn a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or placed a sign in your window or in front of your house

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ASK ALL
I9 On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at home, at work or someplace else?

1 Yes
2 No
8 (Don't know)
9 (Refused)

(ASK I10-I15 only if I9=1) I'm going to read you a list of some things people can do online. For each one, please tell me if that is something you have done (in the past week)(During the presidential campaign). (READ ITEMS)
In the past week, **(READ FOR EACH ITEM IF NECESSARY)**

I10 Did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant messaging services?

I11. Have you visited a website of a presidential campaign or political party?

NO I12

I13. Have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

I14. Have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a campaign?

I15. Have you forwarded any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?

1 Yes
2 No
8 don't know
9 Refused

APPENDIX B: CASE 2 QUESTIONS--RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS

ADDED 7/2/08

ADDED 7/2/08 IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month or so, rarely, never

1 Several hours per day
2 Almost every day
3 At least once per week
4 A few times per month
5 Every month or so
6 Rarely
7 Never
8 Don't know
9 Refused

U. RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U1. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, DID anyone from one of the presidential campaigns or a group supporting one of the presidential candidates contact you about the presidential election?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U2. IF YES—U1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign, or group that contacted you support?
(DO NOT READ)
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain

6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN U2, ASK U3-4 INSERTING OBAMA. IF RESPONDENT SAID CLINTON IN U2, ASK U3a-4b INSERTING CLINTON. ELSE SKIP TO U7-U22

U3. How did THE **Obama** campaign or group supporting the **Obama** campaign contact you? Was it **(rotate)** by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method? **(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)**

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 **(VOL)** Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U4. How often did you hear from the **Obama** campaign or group supporting the **Obama** campaign during the presidential primary campaign

(READ LIST)

a. by telephone **(if U3 = 1)**
b. in-person **(if U3 = 2)**
c. by regular mail **(if U3 = 3)**
d. by email or other online method **(if U3 = 4)**

1 Once a week or more often
2 Every other week
3 One or two times a month
4 Less than once a month
8 Don't know
9 Refused

DELETED 8/5/08

U3a. How did THE **Clinton** campaign or group supporting the **Clinton** campaign contact you? Was it **(rotate)** by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 **(VOL)**Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U4a. How often did you hear from the **Clinton** campaign or group supporting the **Clinton** campaign during the presidential primary campaign

a. by telephone **(if U3a = 1)**
b. in-person **(if U3a = 2)**
c. by regular mail **(if U3a = 3)**
d. by email or other online method **(if U3a = 4)**

(READ LIST)

1 Once a week or more often
2 Every other week
3 One or two times a month
4 Less than once a month
8 Don't know
9 Refused

DELETED 8/5/08
ROTATE SETS U23-25 WITH SETS U26-28
IF U3=4
U23[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to support their candidate.] During the presidential primaries, did the Obama campaign email you to contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Obama, or didn't the Obama campaign do this?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

DELETED 8/5/08

U24. IF YES U23(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did you contact people you know, people you did not know, or both to ask them to vote for Senator Obama, or did you not contact anyone at all?

1 People you know
2 People you did not know
3 Both
4 Did not contact anyone at all
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U25. IF U24(1-3) [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many people did you contact on behalf of the Obama campaign as a result of their emails asking you to do so? (DO NOT READ)

1 1
2 between 2 and 5
3 Between 6 and 10
4 between 11 and 20
5 between 21 and 50
6 More than 50
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
IF U3a=4
U26[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to support their candidate.] During the presidential primaries, did the Clinton campaign email you to contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Clinton, or didn't the Clinton campaign do this?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U27. IF YES U26(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did you contact people you know, people you did not know, or both to ask them to vote for Senator Clinton, or did you not contact anyone at all?

1 People you know
2 People you did not know
3 Both
4 Did not contact anyone at all
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U28. IF U27(1,2,3) [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many people did you contact on behalf of the Clinton campaign as a result of their emails asking you to do so? (DO NOT READ)

1 1
2 between 2 and 5
3 Between 6 and 10
4 between 11 and 20
5 between 21 and 50
6 More than 50
8 Don't know
9 Refused

Participation

ASK U7-U22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
ASK ALL
During the presidential PRIMARY campaign**, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)**

U7 DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U8. (IF YES-U7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U9. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did you do any work for one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U10. (IF YES-U9(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U11. (IF YES-U9(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain
6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U12. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did you give money to any of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U13. IF YES TO U12. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the candidate, during the presidential primary campaign. **READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES**

1 Through the mail
2 Online donation through the Internet
3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U14. **IF YES TO U12** Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain
6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
ROTATE U29-30 WITH U31-32
U29. IF U14(1) (CLINTON) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Hillary Clinton during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ)

1 once
2 two times
3 3-4 times
4 5 or more times
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U30 IF U14(1) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Hillary Clinton during the primary campaign?
(DO NOT READ LIST)

1 Fifty dollars or less
2 $51 to $100
3 $101 to $500
4 $501 to $1,000
5 $1,001 to $1,500
6 $1,501 to $2,000
7 $2,001 to $2,300
8 More than $2,300
98 Don't know
99 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U31. IF U14(2) (OBAMA) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Barack Obama during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ)

1 once
2 two times
3 3-4 times
4 5 or more times
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U32 IF U14(2) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Barack Obama during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ LIST)

1 Fifty dollars or less
2 $51 to $100
3 $101 to $500
4 $501 to $1,000
5 $1,001 to $1,500
6 $1,501 to $2,000
7 $2,001 to $2,300
8 More than $2,300
98 Don't know
99 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U15. During the presidential primary campaign, did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U16. (IF YES-U15(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally? **[MULTIPLE RESPONSES?]**

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain
6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U17 During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U18. (IF YES-U17(1)) For which candidate did you do that?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain
6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U19. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you visit a website of a presidential campaign?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U20. **(IF YES-U19(1))** Which candidate's web site did you visit during the presidential primary campaign? [MULTIPLE RESPONSE]

1 Hillary Clinton
2 Barack Obama
3 John Edwards
4 Mike Huckabee
5 John McCain
6 Mitt Romney
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U21. . During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?

1 Yes
2 No
8 don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U22. (IF YES-21(1)) How often did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know during the presidential primary campaign? **(DO NOT READ)**

1 Once
2 2-3 times
3 4-5 times
4 5-6 times
5 7 or more times
8 Don't know
9 Refused

APPENDIX C: CASE 3--GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS

IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month or so, rarely, never

1 Several hours per day
2 Almost every day
3 At least once per week
4 A few times per month
5 Every month or so
6 Rarely
7 Never
8 Don't know
9 Refused

Political Participation Questions to be asked during the general election period beginning in August, 2008

ASKED FULL SAMPLE 8/8-8/20
ASKED OF HALF-SAMPLE (A1) BEGINNING 8/21/08
ASKED OF ONE-THIRD SAMPLE (B1) BEGINNING 8/26/08

ADDED 8/8/08
J1. In the past week has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns contacted you about the presidential election?
(IF CONTACTED BY GROUP SUPPORTING CANDIDATE CODE YES, ALSO)

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J2. IF YES—J1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign that contacted you support? **(DO NOT READ)**
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
3 Ralph Nader
4 Bob Barr
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN J2, ASK J3 INSERTING OBAMA. IF RESPONDENT SAID MCCAIN IN J2, ASK J4 INSERTING MCCAIN.
ELSE SKIP TO J5-J22

J3. How did THE **Obama** campaign contact you? Was it **(rotate)** by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 **(VOL)** Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J4. How did THE **McCain** campaign contact you? Was it **(rotate)** by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 **(VOL)**Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

Participation

ASK J5-J22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER
ADDED 8/8/08
ASK ALL
In the past week**, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)**

FORM A1
J5 have you talked to any people and tried to show them why they should vote for or against one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

FORM A2
ADDED 8/8/08
J5A. In the past week, have you tried to convince anyone why they should vote for or against one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J6. (IF YES-J5(1) OR J5A(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK ALL
J7. In the past week, did you do any work for one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J8. (IF YES-J7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J9. (IF YES-J7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
3 Ralph Nader
4 Bob Barr
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J10. In the past week, did you give money to any of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J12. **IF YES TO J10** Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
3 Ralph Nader
4 Bob Barr
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J13. In the past week, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J14. (IF YES-J13(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally, in the past week? **[MULTIPLE RESPONSES?]**

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
3 Ralph Nader
4 Bob Barr
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J15 In the past week, did you wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J16. (IF YES-J15(1)) For which candidate did you do that?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
3 Ralph Nader
4 Bob Barr
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08; ASK IF I9=1
J17. In the past week, did you visit a website of a presidential campaign?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J19. . In the past week, did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?

1 Yes
2 No
8 don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J20. In the past week, have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J21. In the past week, have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a campaign?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/11/08
ASK IF 19=1
J22. In the past wee, did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant messaging services?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

APPENDIX D: CASE 4—POST-GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION

QUESTIONS

IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month or so, rarely, never

1 Several hours per day
2 Almost every day
3 At least once per week
4 A few times per month
5 Every month or so
6 Rarely
7 Never
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V1. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you receive email from either the Obama or McCain campaigns? IF YES Which campaign?

1 Yes, from Obama campaign
2 Yes, from McCain campaign
3 Both, campaigns
4 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

Participation

ASK V5-V18 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER

During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign**, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)**

V5. DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V6. (IF YES-V5(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V7. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you do any work for one of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V8. (IF YES-V7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)

1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V9. (IF YES-V7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V10. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you give money to any of the presidential candidates?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V11. IF YES TO V10. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the candidate, during the presidential General Election campaign. **READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES**

1 Through the mail
2 Online donation through the Internet
3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V12 IF YES TO V10 Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

1 John McCain
2 Barack Obama
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V13. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V14 During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?.

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V15 During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you visit a website of a presidential campaign?

1 Yes
2 No
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V16. . During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?

1 Yes
2 No
8 don't know
9 Refused

V17. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you view video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

V18. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant messaging services?

1 yes
2 no
8 Don't know
9 Refused

APPENDIX E: CORRELATIONS BY CASE

Table-E1: Case 1Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate	1.00										
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign	0.15	1.00									
(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign	0.10	0.18	1.00								
(4) Discuss politics online	0.35	0.14	0.10	1.00							
5) Visited website of campaign	0.21	0.11	0.20	0.30	1.00						
(6) Viewed video about campaign	0.16	0.08	0.11	0.30	0.36	1.00					
(7) Read or post about campaign online	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.28	0.24	0.32	1.00				
(8) Forwarded political email/audio/video	0.32	0.11	0.10	0.45	0.29	0.29	0.20	1.00			
(9) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.	-0.10	0.01	0.04	0.09	0.14	0.12	0.07	0.08	1.00		
(10) Offline vol. to work on campaign	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.05	1.00	
(11) Offline donation to a candidate/campaign	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.06	1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table-E2: Case 2 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate	1.00									
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign	0.16**	1.00								
(3) Online donation to a campaign/candidate	0.13**	0.23**	1.00							
(4) Visited website of campaign	0.17**	0.10**	0.26**	1.00						
(5) Forwarded political email/audio/video	0.28**	0.11**	0.15**	0.31**	1.00					
(6) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand	0.12**	0.02	0.10**	0.20**	0.13**	1.00				
(7). Offline vol. to work on campaign	0.09**	-0.01	0.10**	0.12**	0.05*	0.09**	1.00			
(8) Offline donation to a campaign/candidate	0.03	-0.01	-0.05**	0.09**	0.08**	0.14**	0.09**	1.00		
(9) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate	0.08**	0.17**	0.20**	0.18**	0.15**	0.18**	0.29**	0.20**	1.00	
(10) Wear button/Place sign to support candidate	0.12**	0.09**	0.23**	0.21**	0.14**	0.16**	0.24**	0.17**	0.36**	1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table-E3: Case 3 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate	1.00										
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign	0.08**	1.00									
(3) Discuss politics online	0.34**	0.08**	1.00								
(4) Visited website of campaign	0.17**	0.10**	0.24**	1.00							
5) Viewed video about campaign	0.18**	0.10**	0.29**	0.31**	1.00						
(6) Read or post about campaign online	0.14**	0.07**	0.28**	0.19**	0.26**	1.00					
(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video	0.31**	0.11**	0.41**	0.24**	0.32**	0.19**	1.00				
(8) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.	0.09**	0.02	0.08**	0.13**	0.10**	0.07**	0.10**	1.00			
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign	0.04**	-0.01	0.06**	0.08**	0.06**	0.06**	0.09**	0.09**	1.00		
(10) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate	0.04**	0.14**	0.07**	0.11**	0.09**	0.05**	0.08**	0.08**	0.32**	1.00	
11) Wear button/Place sign to support candidate	0.10**	0.11**	0.12**	0.20**	0.17**	0.13**	0.15**	0.14**	0.21**	0.21**	1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table-E4: Case 4 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate	1.00											
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign	0.26**	1.00										
(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign	0.27**	0.17**	1.00									
(4) Discuss politics online	0.43**	0.18**	0.26**	1.00								
(5) Visited website of campaign	0.27**	0.14**	0.34**	0.36**	1.00							
(6) Viewed video about campaign	0.27**	0.14**	0.28**	0.37**	0.41**	1.00						
(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video	0.39**	0.16**	0.28**	0.47**	0.37**	0.42**	1.00					
(8) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.	-0.23**	-0.04	0.05*	-0.03	0.10**	0.08**	0.06*	1.00				
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign	0.09**	-0.03	0.28**	0.14**	0.20**	0.11**	0.15**	0.14**	1.00			
(10) Offline donation to a candidate/campaign	0.05*	0.05*	- 0.10**	0.06**	0.06**	0.03	0.10**	0.12**	0.17**	1.00		
(11) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate	0.17**	0.13**	0.28**	0.20**	0.25**	0.20**	0.24**	0.11**	0.45**	0.18**	1.00	
(12) Wear button/Place sign to support Candidate	0.20**	0.09**	0.27**	0.22**	0.26**	0.17**	0.24**	0.15**	0.37**	0.21**	0.34**	1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

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